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ABSTRACT

Liberal Translations: Secular Concepts, Law, and Religion in Colonial Egypt
by
Jeffrey Culang

Advisor: Beth Baron

This dissertation is a conceptual history of Egypt’s national formation between the 1880s
and the 1930s. This period involved the convergence of nationalism, colonial rule, missionary
activity, and new modes of governance at the national and international levels. Drawing on state
and missionary archival material, periodicals, legal compendia, laws, and parliamentary
transcripts, and adapting methods developed by Reinhart Koselleck, I trace shifts within Egypt’s
socio-political lexicon through processes of translation and demonstrate their effects upon social
experience and political aspiration. I focus on a set of liberal-secular concepts critical to national
politics—religious freedom, public interest, nationality, and the minority—as they appeared in
Egypt and were adapted by jurists, colonial officers, parliamentarians, and “ordinary” Egyptians
in ways that advanced their respective interests. Following the fluid, contextual, and contingent
process through which these concepts accumulated meanings, I show that each had a distinct
genealogy linked to its conditions of translation and reinterpretation. This finding challenges
understandings of the nation-state as a fixed form that, originating in Europe, was replicated
across the globe.
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As Egyptian legislators gradually entered the concepts under study into Egypt’s
expanding modern legal system—top-down, rigid, and disciplinary—they fixed their meanings
in text in ways that enhanced the regulatory capacities of the state. The Egyptian state’s
articulation of religious freedom and public interest enabled it to wield increasing power over
religion and to gradually dismantle Egypt’s Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities, whose
more flexible legal structures had sustained the common good through bottom-up cultivation of
morality. Meanwhile, its definition and ascription of nationality and minority status linked
religious groups to emergent national categories along a grid of loyalty and disloyalty to the
Egyptian nation. Rather than opening space wherein religious divisions could be overcome
through the convergence of equal citizens, these liberal-secular transitions established new forms
of difference based on flattened notions of identity. Against automatic associations of secularism
with tolerance and boundless possibility, I argue that the unfolding of liberal-secular law in
Egypt introduced unprecedented discord and delimited the country’s religious and political
horizons. As Egypt enhanced its sovereignty in the 1920s and 1930s, law proved an essential tool
of the state to produce a homogenous and governable population. Muslims and Copts emerged as
the two essential elements of the Egyptian nation, while other non-Muslim groups, including
Armenians and Jews, were subjected to the gaze of suspicion and novel forms of exclusion.
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Chapter 1
Concepts and Historical Formations

This dissertation is a conceptual history of the secularization of Egyptian law and society during
the colonial period (1882–1936). It focuses on four legal-political concepts that were critical to
this process: religious freedom (hurriyyat al-‘itiqad), public interest (al-maslaha al-‘amma),
nationality (al-jinsiyya), and the minority (al-aqalliyya). I trace these concepts from their
translation into Arabic and Egypt, to their adaption by subjects in Egypt’s streets, courtrooms,
parliamentary halls, and colonial offices, to their codification and activation within modern law
as part of a regulatory secular state apparatus. The German historian Reinhart Koselleck, one of
the main contributors to theorizing conceptual history, defined concepts through their
differentiation from words. For Koselleck, concepts are a series of expressions that make up the
sociopolitical terminology within a given historical context. Though they are associated with
words, not all words are sociopolitical concepts, and whereas words can be unambiguous in
meaning, concepts are characterized by their ambiguity, bundling together a range of meanings
that often extend beyond the words that contain them.1 The concepts in which Koselleck was
especially interested—so-called “basic concepts”—were those that are indispensable to a
historical moment. They are concepts that subjects must work within and through, claim and
articulate, as they act in the world. In line with the broader linguistic turn in which he fit
uneasily, Koselleck presumed a relationship between basic concepts and “reality,” seeing them
as “joints linking language and the extralinguistic world,” or as the conditions of possibility for
social and political experience.2 As such, they can be seen as depositories of human experience

1

Reinhart Koselleck, Future’s Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, translated and with an
introduction by Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004 [1979]), 84–86.
2
Reinhart Koselleck, “A Response to Comments on the Geschichtiche Grundbegriffe,” in The
Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts: New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte,” ed. Hartmut
Lehmann and Melvin Richter (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1996), 61. On his
elaboration of conceptual history, see Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing
2

continuously in the process of becoming, unfolding contingently, fluidly, and differently in
particular historical contexts.
Koselleck made clear, however, that he was not interested in a merely positivistic
recording of shifting sociopolitical concepts, a project that could continue without end. Instead,
he sought to provide a theory of historical times, or the structure of historical process, that could
serve as a much-needed object of enquiry for a discipline that lacked one (i.e., history as its own
subject, or “history itself”). This depended on the development of a theory of periodization, “the
temporal specifics of our political and social concepts.”3 During periods of epochal change, the
fields of meaning circumscribing sociopolitical concepts shift, reshaping social and political
experience. Writing on modern Germany, Koselleck focused on what he termed the “saddle
period,” when the premodern use of language transformed into modern usage. Roughly spanning
the years 1750 to 1850, the saddle period involved the denaturalization of older experiences of
time—natural, repeatable, static—and the emergence of new experiences of time where it
continuously proceeds into a novel and unforeseeable future. As a split emerged between the
“space of experience” and the “horizon of expectation,” old concepts such as “democracy,”
“freedom,” and the “state” gained both anticipatory content and a sense of movement.4 “The
entire linguistic space of sociopolitical terms has,” Koselleck noted, “moved from a quasi-static
tradition that changed only over the long term to a conceptuality whose meaning can be inferred
from a future to be newly experienced.”5 Drawing on Koselleck, this study couples an attempt to
trace the shifting significations of Egypt’s sociopolitical linguistic register during a

History, Spacing Concepts, trans. Todd Samuel Presner and others, foreword by Hayden White
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
3
Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History, 5.
4
Ibid., 5.
5
Ibid., 6.
3

transformational period with an anthropological investigation of social experience. It presumes
that concepts form not in a linear or progressive fashion as the teleological “evolution” of ideals,
but through historical contingency, acquiring new significations through time as locally
embedded actors attempt to shape them to pursue their own interests.
Koselleck recognized a plurality of histories rather than a singular “History,” but his
notion of the saddle period was specific to Western and Central Europe. In much of the colonial
world, the reconfiguration of concepts along modern lines, and the emergence of new
sociopolitical terms, occurred later and involved an added layer of translation linked to the
colonial encounter. For Egypt, one could identify a saddle period lasting roughly from the 1830s,
with Mehmet Ali’s establishment of a translation school and its founding director Rifa‘a Rafi‘ alTahtawi’s rearticulation of classical Islamic concepts such as adab (ethics) along modern lines,6
to the mid-twentieth century, with Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir’s commitment to development through
technocratic bureaucratic rule. I focus, however, on the period from the late nineteenth century to
the 1930s. This starting point coincides with the rise of a new social category of the effendiyya, a
middling elite of urban intellectuals and professionals who sought reform and inaugurated a
broader engagement with liberal-secular ideas under colonial conditions.7 The ending point,
roughly the mid-1930s, marks Egypt’s attainment of near-complete sovereignty (the last British

6

See Rifa‘a Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi, Tahlis al-Ibriz ila Talhis Bariz au al-Diwan al-Nafis bi-Iwan Baris
(Bulaq: Dar al-Tiba‘a al-Hidiwijja, 1834). For analysis of this rearticulation, see Ellen
McLarney, “The Islamic Public Sphere and the Discipline of Adab,” International Journal of
Middle East Studies 43 (2011): 429–49.
7
On the effendiyya as a category, see Lucie Ryzova, “Egyptian Modernity through the ‘New
Efendiya’: Social and Cultural Constructions of the Middle Class in Egypt under the Monarchy,”
in Re-Envisioning Egypt, 1919–1952, ed. Arthur Goldschmidt and Amy Johnson (Cairo:
American University in Cairo Press, 2005), 124–63; and, more recently, Ryzova, The Age of the
Efendiyya: Passages to Modernity in National-Colonial Egypt (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014).
4

troops would not depart until 1956) through the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the
Montreux Convention of 1937. Between 1922 and the Free Officers’ Revolt of 1952, Egypt was
a nominally independent state governed by a liberal constitutional monarchy, with power
concentrated in the hands of the king, less allotted to parliament, a much-vaunted modern
judiciary, and the British shaping politics from the background. Thus, the period covered by this
study was one in which liberalism—defined here less in terms of a set of ideas articulated by its
canonical thinkers than as a discursive space that offers a common political and moral language
to identify problems and debate them—was widely engaged at the legal, political, and social
levels.8 I consider this engagement a form of translation: less a neutral, one-for-one transfer of a
word from one language to another than an act of intervention invariably involving alterations in
meaning mediated by one’s linguistic registers, culture, and tradition.9
In colonial Egypt, translation also acted as a form of dislocation, as entering concepts
linked to local variants to form novel meanings, or else erased these variants entirely. Integrated
into the national-colonial legal apparatus, the new concepts began to disable old forms of life and
oblige new forms to take their place.10 Thus, as I will describe, religious freedom displaced the
laws of blasphemy through which communal authorities had long regulated speech and averted
its sometimes-harmful social consequences as part of upholding a morally sound community.

8

On liberalism as a discursive tradition, see Talal Asad, “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular
Criticism,” in Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, by Talal Asad, Wendy
Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood (Berkeley, CA: The Townsend Center for the
Humanities, 2009), 25–26.
9
The literature on critical approaches to translation is broad. For an influential discussion, see
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
10
This is a characteristic of what David Scott dubs “colonial governmentality.” David Scott,
“Colonial Governmentality,” in Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and
Life Politics, ed. Jonathan Xavier Inda (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 23.
5

Public interest diverted the older notion of the public social good (also al-maslaha al-‘amma), a
concept within Islamic law that had been used by jurists (‘ulama’) to promote the public’s social
welfare and, as with blasphemy laws, sustain a moral community. Nationality displaced prior
definitions of the Egyptian (al-misri), in the process creating a new category of the Egyptian
national whose formation precipitated the politicization of religious groups and the reinscribing
of them into racialized categories of national belonging. And the minority displaced the ta’ifa
(community or group), enmeshing ta’ifas into new unequal relations of power part and parcel to
nation-state politics. Thus, on a broader level, I describe the formation of a sovereign state which
produces and regulates its population through top-down and fixed legal structures demanding
discipline through the threat of punishment.11 This process gradually dismantled and replaced
autonomous moral communities whose own legal structures—open and flexible—were intended
to maintain the common good through the bottom-up cultivation of embodied ethical practices.12
I have chosen to focus on religious freedom, public interest, nationality, and the minority
because they were indispensable to Egypt’s national formation. The dissertation traces how these
concepts, increasingly normative at the global level, came to be translated into Arabic and Egypt.
As I will show, they materialized in unpredictable and contingent ways in a complex context
characterized by the convergence of national formation, colonial intervention (including
missionary work), and new modern modes of governance that were gradually displacing older
forms of life and structures. Their significations continued to shift as they became integral to
public discourse, offering Egyptians of all religions a new vocabulary with which to identify

11

See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan
(New York: Random House, 1995 [1977]).
12
On this contrast, see Wael Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s
Moral Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
6

problems and debate them, and as they entered Egypt’s national legal system. As part of the
overall secularization of law, these concepts contributed less to an open space wherein religious
difference would be dissolved through the construction of an undifferentiated citizen, than to
new forms of more hardened religious subjectivity, unprecedented manifestations of religious
discord, and novel forms of exclusion. After its establishment in 1922, the Egyptian nation-state,
defining itself in terms of the majority religion as “Islamic,” increasingly came to define Egypt’s
moral and political vocabularies and imaginaries. In short, I argue that Egypt’s liberal period,
and more specifically the expansion of liberal-secular law as part of the emergence of the nationstate, created the conditions of possibility for the homogenization of Egyptian society in the
following decades.

Interventions
This project intervenes into several areas of scholarship in modern Egyptian history and in
anthropology. In its description of the formation of the Egyptian nation-state, the study builds on
a broad scholarship on Egyptian nationalism. Since the publication of Benedict Anderson’s
Imagined Communities, a preponderance of historical literature on modern Egypt has undertaken
the important task of delineating the material and intellectual processes through which the nation
was constructed and reconstructed.13 This literature has sought to counter nationalist

13

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006 [1983]). See also Ernest Gellner, Nations and
Nationalism, introduction by John Breuilly, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006
[1983]); and Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth,
Reality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 [1990]). On the construction of
Egyptian nationalism from different angles and critiques of nationalist historiography, see Israel
Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian
Nationhood, 1900–1930 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Gershoni and Jankowski,
Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995);
7

historiography emanating out of Egyptian academic circles (and, to a lesser extent, by an older
generation of scholars who wrote in English), in which the nation has been represented as
eternal, unified, and coherent, awakening in the modern period from a long slumber to liberate
itself from colonial domination.14 This dissertation also adopts a skeptical posture toward
nationalist narratives, albeit more implicitly. However, as David Scott has observed in a more
general manner, postcolonial critiques of the answers of anticolonial nationalists to their present
predicaments have often left unaddressed whether the questions of nationalists are or should be
the same as those animating the postcolonial present.15 While criticizing the essentialism of their
nationalist peers, postcolonial historians have shared with them a desire to plot how the nation,
now imagined rather than primordial, developed in search of redemptive futures. In other words,
despite the addition of postcolonial modes of analysis, the structure of the plot has remained
largely the same. In an attempt to address a different set of questions that stem from present

Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and
the Egyptian Working Class, 1882–1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998);
Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt
(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2002); Donald Malcolm Reid, Whose Pharaohs?:
Archaeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War I
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003); Mona L. Russell, Creating the New
Egyptian Woman: Consumerism, Education, and National Identity, 1863–1922 (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Beth Baron, Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005); Lisa Pollard, Nurturing the Nation: Family
Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing, and Liberating Egypt, 1805–1923 (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2005); Michael Gasper, The Power of Representation: Publics,
Peasants, and Islam in Egypt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); Ziad Fahmy,
Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2011).
14
For nationalist and Marxist readings in which the nation is eternal, see, e.g., works by ‘Abd alRahmad al-Raf‘i; M. A. Rifa‘t, The Awakening of Modern Egypt (London: Longman, 1947); and
Ali Barakat, Tatawwur al-Milkiyya al-Zira‘iyya fi Misr fi al-Nisf al-Thani min al-Qarn alThamin ‘Ashr (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafa al-Jadida, 1977).
15
David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2004).
8

predicaments, this dissertation turns from the nation’s imagination to the formation of the
sociopolitical concepts that conditioned it, the meanings of which are often taken for granted, as
well as to their effects. As Talal Asad has argued, the unleashing of modernity around the globe
conscripted non-Western societies to engage with and be managed by the categories that
modernity ushered in.16 This process was complex and locally contingent, giving rise to novel
meanings that, as we will see, are at the root of some of today’s major political fault lines in
Egypt and globally. In sum, rather than describe a different way in which the nation was
imagined, I attempt to trace the complex manners in which the basic sociopolitical concepts
structuring the act of imagining in Egypt—globally available but locally configured—took form.
The dissertation also adds to an extensive literature on the colonial history of Egypt. This
literature is primarily divided between social and intellectual history. Social historians have
generally sought to recuperate the agency of subaltern colonial subjects—children, peasants,
women, workers, and others—whether in “everyday life,” as resistance to colonial power, or
enmeshed with the state in complicated and mutually constitutive relations of power.17 Though
this scholarship is divided by methodological and analytical commitment, it implicitly shares the
kind of anticolonial nationalist concern to expose the negative structure of colonialism and
longing for anticolonial revolt identified by Scott. Influenced by recent theories of colonialism

16

Talal Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization,” in Dialectical Anthropology: Essays in
Honor of Stanley Diamond, vol. 1, Civilization in Crisis, ed. Christine Gailey (Gainesville, FL:
University Press of Florida, 1992), 333–51.
17
See, e.g., Judith Tucker, Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985); Mine Ener, Managing Egypt’s Poor and the Politics of Benevolence,
1800–1952 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); John Chalcraft, The Striking
Cabbies of Cairo and Other Stories: Crafts and Guilds in Egypt, 1863–1914 (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2004); Baron, Egypt as a Woman; Liat Kozma, Policing Egyptian
Women: Sex, Law, and Medicine in Khedival Egypt (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
2011); and Hanan Hammad, Industrial Sexuality: Gender, Urbanization, and Social
Transformation in Egypt (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2016).
9

put forth by Frederick Cooper, Ann Stoler, and others, intellectual historians of colonial Egypt
have sought to move beyond analytical binaries between colonizer and colonized, metropole and
colony, that were taken as axiomatic in earlier colonial histories of Egypt and elsewhere.18
Theorizing translation and circulation, scholars have traced ideas, intellectual practices, and their
human and textual vessels across oceans and borders to delineate the formation of colonial
knowledge and attendant institutions within the colony as part of the fashioning of modern
Egypt.19 Rather than simply transplanted from London, colonial knowledge was produced in
Egypt, in some cases prior to the onset of formal colonial rule, and drew on local epistemological
and ethical sources. On this basis, scholars have substantially revised how we conceive of the
forging of modernity in Egypt, from a British imposition inherited by Egyptian nationalists,
bureaucrats, and experts to a complex coalescence of desires, acts, and discourses.20 This
approach to the study of colonialism strongly informs how I have approached the formation of

18

See, e.g., Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a
Bourgeois World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997).
19
Omnia El Shakry, The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and
Postcolonial Egypt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Elliot Colla, Conflicted
Antiquities: Egyptology, Egyptomania, Egyptian Modernity (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2008); Michael Gasper, The Power of Representation; Hibba Abugideiri, Gender and the
Making of Modern Medicine in Colonial Egypt (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010);
Wilson Chacko Jacob, Working Out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in
Colonial Modernity, 1870–1940 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011); Samera Esmeir,
Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); Amr
Shalakany, Izdihar wa-Inhiyar al-Nakhba al-Qanuniyya al-Misriyya (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq,
2013); Marwa Elshakry, Reading Darwin in Arabic: 1860–1950 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2015); Ryzova, The Age of the Efendiyya; Iza R. Hussein, The Politics of Islamic
Law: Local Elites, Colonial Authority, and the Making of the Muslim State (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2016); Omnia El Shakry, The Arabic Freud: Psychoanalysis and Islam in
Modern Egypt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).
20
For the older view, see Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1991 [1988]). Mitchell’s own theorization of modernity changed over time:
Timothy Mitchell, “The Stage of Modernity,” in Questions of Modernity, ed. Timothy Mitchell
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
10

concepts in colonial Egypt. Meanwhile, I believe that this focus on concepts can help to bridge a
divide between social and intellectual histories. The aim is not to approximate a more “total
history” but to explore and highlight the powerful interplay between the articulation of concepts,
thinking, and practices.
Recent historical scholarship on Egypt’s missionary encounter has described the various
ways in which American and European Protestant missionaries shaped religion and politics in
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Egypt.21 My research builds on this literature in three ways.
First, it draws on sources from the Egypt General Mission (EGM), a British missionary group
that has received less scholarly attention relative to other missions.22 Second, it adds a
genealogical approach where social and institutional history have reigned. Third, it highlights the
role of missionaries in the unfolding of secularism in Egypt.
In this latter respect, the dissertation also builds on recent work in anthropology on
secularism and religion, much of it on Egypt. Following on the work of Talal Asad, over the last
decade a range of scholars have revealed secularism to be a political process involving not the
bifurcation of religion and politics but their close imbrication. These scholars have shown that
secularism demands that the modern state intervene into religious life, transforming normative
traditions and religious practices.23 In an influential recent work diverging somewhat from this

21

See in particular Heather Sharkey, American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary Encounters in
an Age of Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Paul Sedra, From Mission
to Modernity: Evangelicals, Reformers and Education in Nineteenth-Century Egypt (London:
I.B.Tauris, 2011); and Beth Baron, The Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of
the Muslim Brotherhood (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).
22
For a new study on European missions, including the EGM, see Samir Boulos, European
Evangelicals in Egypt (1900–1956): Cultural Entanglements and Missionary Spaces (Leiden:
Brill, 2016).
23
Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2003). For works following on Asad, see, e.g., Saba Mahmood, Politics of
Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
11

literature, Hussein Agrama has argued that secularism should be analyzed less in terms of the
state’s regulatory capacities than as a persistent question within the state’s legal and political
arms over where to draw the line between religion and politics. This irresolvable question, he
contends, authorizes the state to intervene time and again in the seemingly sacrosanct realm of
the private when and wherever it deems such intervention necessary for preserving the public
order, transforming religion in the process.24 Anthropologists have provided fruitful avenues for
considering the trajectory of liberal-secular concepts such as public order in Egypt and elsewhere
in the region, but their discerning historical claims are often thin on evidence from the historical
record. Historians of the region have yet to fill this gap, arguably because excavating subaltern
agency has seemed more pressing than the excavation of concepts. Pairing genealogy and
historiography, and linking the legal, social, and political spheres, this dissertation pushes the
analysis of secularism and religion in Egypt further. It shows how a set of liberal-secular
concepts that had become normative within international law and the laws of states accumulated
a particular set of meanings in colonial-national Egypt.
Finally, as a history of legal concepts, this dissertation makes two further contributions.
First, it adds to intellectual histories of the transmission of ideas across geographical space.25
Whereas for the colonial world such transmission has often been described in terms of
engagement or reception, which implies the coming together of two consenting parties in a kind

2005); Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic
Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Winnifred Fallers Sullivan,
Robart A. Yelle, and Mateo Taussif-Rubbo, eds., After Secular Law (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2011); and Saba Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority
Report (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
24
Hussein Ali Agrama, Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in
Modern Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
25
For a summation of this very broad literature, see Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, eds.,
Global Intellectual History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
12

of negotiation, this inquiry is framed in terms of what Talal Asad has described as conscription—
the idea that, at a certain point, the concepts under study become indispensable to political
thought and practice in Egypt, though the forms that they took were fluid and unpredictable
rather than fixed and stable.26 Second, this study adds to recent literature on the imbrication of
international law with colonialism. It emphasizes less the perpetuation of unequal relations of
sovereign or quasi-sovereign formations than the contingent process of how concepts became
locally intelligible and put into action in the colonial world.27 In an era in which reputedly
universal ideas such as democracy and human rights have been rendered global ethical standards,
and have authorized imperial intervention and violence, this research highlights the
complications involved in their mapping onto local contexts.

Sources and Structure
To carry out this analysis, I have drawn on British state archival records, sources from the Egypt
General Mission, and Egyptian periodicals, legal compendia, laws, and parliamentary transcripts.
Though I conducted research in the Egyptian National Archives (Dar al-Watha’iq) and have
incorporated Egyptian state material into the analysis, this portion of my research produced
limited yields due to problems of accessibility during a period of dramatic political change in
Egypt from 2012 to 2014. Collectively, the sources that I have gathered allowed me to analyze
the messy and staggered process of constructing the law in Egypt, changes to the law over a span
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of decades, and legal cases bearing on my areas of interest; diverse social encounters involving
locals and foreigners in a range of public settings and from a variety of perspectives; and
political discourse and process, both in and outside of parliament.
The dissertation is divided into two sections. The first section, comprising two chapters,
discusses “Concepts of Expectation,” namely religious freedom and public interest. As described
earlier, Koselleck observed that modern sociopolitical concepts often contain a sense of
temporality and movement. Religious freedom and public interest, as ambiguous ideals, both
establish an imperfect present space of experience and a horizon of expectation. As we will see,
Egyptian articulations of religious freedom were grounded in experiences of moral injury at the
hands of missionaries, a problem needing a solution, an expectation that conditions would
improve, a movement toward greater freedom. By contrast, the notion of blasphemy in classical
Islamic law which it displaced (or rearranged and incorporated into modern law) was premised
on preserving a moral community in the present based on a past model.
Coming under the domain of criminal law and bound up with issues of national security,
public interest in Egypt was intended to produce a society of obedient law-abiding subjects in the
future through the threat of punishment. This secular notion of public interest, which entered the
law in 1904, contrasts with an older notion of public interest, or the public social good. Rather
than a secure future, this older notion was defined in terms of a model past, the perfect society
inaugurated by the Prophet Muhammad to which the community continuously sought to return.
The second section, also made up of two chapters, focuses on the emergence of
“Categories of Classification and Political Identification,” namely nationality and the minority. I
show how these categories, part and parcel to the emergence of a homogenous nation-state, were
critical to producing an Egyptian population that was identifiable and governable through the
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regulative capacities of the law.28 Through dynamic interactions with subjects on the ground,
these categories displaced older concepts and categories to reconstitute subjectivities and social
worlds. To help us understand the complex relationships between legal-political categories and
subjects, I draw on philosopher Ian Hacking’s discussion of the “looping effect” in articulating
his notion of dynamic nominalism, a development of Michel Foucault’s concept of
subjectification.29 Focused on the human and social sciences, Hacking shows how categories of
people—the criminal, the homosexual, the psychopath, and others—which are dependent on
spaces of possibility particular to given times and places, and the people they describe are
mutually constitutive and transforming through time.30 Thus, for example, the proposed US
census category “Middle Eastern” and “Middle Easterner” as a kind of person, or a primary site
of identification, may appear simultaneously, rearranging prior identifications, followed by
Middle Easterners resignifying the category, the formal definition being transformed in response,
and so on and so forth.
The emergence of the Egyptian national as a political-legal category in Egypt in the late
nineteenth century reconfigured historical definitions of the Egyptian (al-misri), just as those
who became “Egyptian nationals” reconfigured what this category signified. The actualization of
the national idea also transformed religious groups (e.g., Jews and Armenians) into racialized
nations whose loyalty was in question and often believed to belong elsewhere. Similarly, the
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category of the minority, first claimed in Egypt in 1910 as part of an attempt by Copts to claim
rights based on their religious identification, displaced the ta’ifa (community), politicizing
religious identification and placing non-Muslim groups along a grid of exclusion.
Together, the two sections describe the crafting of a national society in Egypt between
the 1880s and the 1930s. In Chapter 2, “‘The Shari‘a Must Go’: Seduction, Moral Injury, and
Religious Freedom,” I examine how religious freedom accumulated meaning in Egypt after
World War I, when it became an international legal standard under the League of Nations
minority rights protection regime. Foreign and local missionaries in Egypt advocated religious
freedom as the right to proselytize and the right of Egyptians to convert to Protestantism. For
many Egyptians, by contrast, it came to mean the right to protect one’s religion from a perceived
missionary attack (ta‘n). The chapter follows the contingent formation of this paradox in the
legal, political, and social realms. Drawing on recent theorizations of seduction and moral injury,
I show how Egyptians articulated notions of religious freedom through a local ethical vernacular
around blasphemy that, while embedded within the Islamic tradition, crossed religious divides.
The Egyptian state gradually translated these sensibilities into its expanding public law in the
name of a majority-defined public order, thus making protection of religion a legal issue with
punitive power rather than a moral issue.
Chapter 3, “Whose Public Interest? Translations of Libel and the Elders of
Zion,” analyzes the concept “public interest.” Recent literature in anthropology and history of the
Middle East has described the translation and actualization of the related, though significantly
different, concept of public order within religious law in the colonial Middle East, particularly
Egypt, beginning in the late nineteenth century. By contrast, public interest, a vague secular legal
concept that manifests differently across liberal states but often authorizes judicial or executive
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power to implement a “common good” when it conflicts with other laws, entered into Egypt’s
public law in 1904 and was intimately linked to issues of national security. Focused on the
translation of the blood libel accusation in Egypt, and the campaign by the Jewish reformer
Murad Farag and his reformist colleagues to dismantle its logic, I trace how this secular notion of
public interest displaced a prior Islamic notion of the public social good that extended across
religious divides. As the Egyptian nation-state took form, and Arab and Jewish identifications
came to be seen as incompatible, secular public interest was critical to transforming Jewishness
in Egypt into a private interest detrimental to the good of the nation. This proved an important
element in the exclusion of Egyptian Jewry during the 1940s–1960s.
Chapter 4, “Ordering the ‘Land of Paradox’: The Fashioning of Nationality, Religion,
and Political Loyalty,” provides a genealogy of the “Egyptian national,” a definition of which
was initially established and put into effect by Egypt’s 1929 Nationality Law. Although the word
“Egyptian” long had complex and varied meanings in the social realm, the British-dominated
colonial administration was the first to use it to designate a juridical category, which it drew on
as part of ruling Egypt. This category was transformed within a colonial context, but also by new
international modes of governance focused on populations as homogenous and sovereign, ethnic,
religious, and/or national units. After tracing the emergence of Egyptian nationality, the chapter
explores Egypt’s implementation of a nationality regime. I examine how nationality, with its
many constituent categories, reinscribed religious groups into racialized national categories.
Thus, this chapter charts the gradual homogenization of Egypt’s population through processes of
regulation and classification, with Muslims emerging as a national majority, Copts a minority,
and other Christian and Jewish groups potentially disloyal and suspicious outsiders.
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In Chapter 5, “‘Between the Devil and the Deep Sea’: Constructing the ‘Minority,’” I
focus on the concept of the minority in Egypt. Scholars have claimed that this category of
political identification first appeared in Egypt and in the region with the establishment of nationstates after World War I. This timing would coincide with the appearance of the League of
Nations and its rendering the minority a legal category. Analyzing a period of heightened
sectarianism between Copts and Muslims from 1908 to 1911, as the Egyptian nationalist
movement began to challenge colonial rule, I show that the category emerged approximately a
decade earlier when Copts began to link their religious identification to this category, just as
Muslims attached themselves to the majority label (akthariyya or aghlabiyya). However, the
1923 Egyptian Constitution did not mention minorities at all, let alone afford them rights, and
Egypt did not fall under the League of Nations minority rights regime. While communal
structures remained in place through personal status laws, newly constructed minority
communities were left without avenues of collective political participation. I argue that the
establishment of a constitutional monarchy was not the onset of minority politics in Egypt, but
was its culmination, establishing the contours of minority–majority dynamics and the makeup of
Egyptian society.
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PART 1
CONCEPTS OF EXPECTATION

Chapter 2
“The Shari‘a Must Go”: Seduction, Moral Injury, and Religious Freedom in Egypt’s
Liberal Age

In January 2016, the Egyptian writer Fatima Na‘ut was sentenced to three years in prison and
fined LE20,000 for having remarked on her Facebook page that the tradition of slaughtering
sheep during Eid al-Adha is the “‘greatest massacre committed by human beings.’” The charge,
based on a law dating to 1982 in Egypt’s penal code, was “contempt of religion” (izdira’ al-din),
which the state has increasingly put to use since the 2011 uprising.1 Through Na‘ut’s and similar
cases, the state has regulated speech acts under the rubric of protecting religion. Whether and
how to limit speech around religion are contested questions not only in Egypt but around the
globe, including in Europe and North America where speech deriding Islam has sparked debate
over where to draw the line between free speech and incitement. In the case of Egypt, the state’s
use of izdira’ al-din, while sometimes assumed to be a medieval holdover signaling an
incomplete or failed project of secularism, has a genealogy traceable to the secularization of
Egyptian law in the liberal period, which stretched from 1922 until the 1952 Free Officers’
Revolt.
This chapter explores that genealogy. I begin by describing two related incidents that
occurred in the second quarter of the twentieth century. In April 1928, an American Protestant
missionary of Dutch descent, Samuel Zwemer, entered al-Azhar Mosque with a small group of
visitors and distributed a missionary pamphlet. The pamphlet, titled “Return to the Old Qibla,”
described Muhammad’s decision to redirect prayer from Jerusalem to Mecca, which Zwemer
saw as an antagonistic break with Judaism and Christianity that set a path to enmity. It invited
Muslims to return to the “original” qibla of Jerusalem and to seek Christ.2 After a shaykh
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confronted Zwemer, one student in the shaykh’s entourage hollered “down with evangelism” and
a stir ensued. Three thousand Azhar students soon initiated a strike, and protests spread to the
parliament (majlis al-nuwwab) in Cairo where the incident was debated.3 “Did the foreign
minister hear what the American missionary association did, igniting the fire of discord [fitna] all
over the country by distributing books and pamphlets all of which are a loathsome attack [ta‘n4]
on Islam?” one minister asked. Continuing, he exclaimed, “does he know how [Zwemer] arrived
to such shamelessness and insolence to dare to insult Muslims and wound their honor by
attacking Islam, and in the largest and most holy Islamic institution”? In reply, the interior
minister claimed that the government was taking steps to ensure such an incident did not repeat
itself, and applauded the Azhar students and the nation for their “composed and wise” stance
against this “act that stirs one’s feelings”—a stance that exemplified the Egyptian people’s
“desire for public security” (al-amn al-‘amm).5 The encounter caused outrage at missionaries and
the Capitulations, a set of treaties dating to the Ottoman period that guaranteed fiscal and legal
privileges to certain foreign nationals and protected subjects, missionaries often among them.6
The incident resembles another that occurred eleven years later, with one significant
difference. In 1939, a Protestant-converted Copt missionary, Hakim Wasif, was likewise

3

Beth Baron, The Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim
Brotherhood (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 144–45. See also Tariq al-Bishri,
al-Muslimun wa-l-Aqbat fi Itar al-Jama‘a al-Wataniyya (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2004), 572–73.
4
Ta‘n can mean “to attack with words,” “wound someone’s reputation,” or “divert from the right
path,” but also “to pierce, thrust, or stab (someone).” The action of ta‘n can thus induce what in a
post-Cartesian world are often considered two separate sensations of pain—psychological and
physical. Thus, I translate the word as “attack” rather than the more common “defamation,”
which connotes harm to one’s reputation through the written or spoken word.
5
Majlis al-Nuwwab: Majmu‘at Mudabit Dawr al-In‘iqad (Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-Amriyya, 1928),
Jalasa 50, 23 April 1928, 762.
6
The Capitulations were a set of treaties dating to the Ottoman period that guaranteed fiscal and
legal privileges to certain foreign nationals and protected subjects.
21

distributing Christian missionary material in public, though on the streets of Cairo rather than in
a mosque, and a short story rather than a tract. Titled La fleur de la forêt (The Flower of the
Forest), the story described a female prostitute who has been saved by Christianity.7 The
publication sparked public outcry because many understood the protagonist’s name—Fatima
Zohra—to refer to the Prophet Muhammad’s daughter Fatima al-Zahra’. The implication seemed
to be that Islam led women to licentiousness from which Christianity offered salvation.8 Unlike
Zwemer, who was a protected foreigner, Wasif, a local subject, was swiftly arrested.9
In contrast to the Zwemer incident, the discord sparked by Wasif’s actions was quickly
contained. By 1939, the Egyptian state, having gained greater sovereignty through the AngloEgyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Montreux Convention of 1937 phasing out the Capitulations,
had written protection from moral injury into law, banning anyone from “damaging, violating,
injuring, or desecrating religious practice” (kull man kharrab au kassar au atlaf au dannas …
sha‘a’ir al-din). Though neither the author nor the publisher of La fleur de la forêt, Wasif was
sentenced to one year’s imprisonment with labor based on Article 161 of the 1937 penal code,
which covered “misdemeanors related to religion.” By distributing this book, the court said, he
had not only desecrated Islam through the figure of Fatima, but he had also “intentionally
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alter[ed] part of this text [the Qur’an] from its intended meaning,”10 for La fleur de la forêt
allegedly misquoted the Qur’an and cited invented Qur’anic passages.11
This chapter traces how such perceived attacks (ta‘n) on religion came to be banned as
punishable crimes in modern Egyptian law. I show that this new legal proscription reputedly
protecting religion emerged through a contingent process whereby local communities,
missionaries, and the Egyptian state under the shadow of colonial rule claimed and articulated
the concept of religious freedom in ways that advanced their respective interests. A product of
sectarian conflict and the rise of the modern state in Western Europe, this secular concept came
to accumulate particular meanings in Egyptian public discourse and law. Historians have
observed that Protestant missionaries in Egypt long justified their attempts to convert local
Muslims through religious freedom, and that Egyptian Muslims drew on it as the right to protect
their religion.12 This chapter historicizes this interpretive divide and explores its consequences
for Egyptian society. Consistent with liberal doctrine in their home countries, Protestant
missionaries in Egypt equated religious freedom with the right to proselytize and the right of
autonomous individuals to change religion, for they felt that local law did not protect converts
from Islam. In addition to their proselytization efforts, missionaries focused on transforming
Egyptian law by reducing the jurisdiction of the shari‘a, perceived as the main obstacle to
conversion, and shaping and empowering Egypt’s modern, rights-based legal system. After
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Egypt gained nominal independence in 1922, by which time religious freedom had become an
international legal standard, missionaries pressured British authorities to ensure that religious
freedom guarantees explicitly protecting conversion were introduced into Egypt’s first
Constitution.
By contrast, the Egyptian legislators tasked with drafting this Constitution sought to
avoid explicit guarantees of religious freedom (hurriyyat al-‘itiqad al-dini) because they saw it
as a critical tool of missionary proselytism which in the past had repeatedly torn the social fabric.
During the late 1920s and 1930s, as a series of conversion crises rocked Egypt, Egyptians widely
came to articulate religious freedom not as the individual’s ability to choose her religion but as
the right of protection from moral injury produced by a perceived missionary assault on the
Egyptian nation, defined constitutionally as Islamic. Protection from such feelings had long been
the preserve of communal authorities in their role as upholders of the communal moral order.
However, I show that as part of the expansion of positivist law (i.e., “neutral,” or free of
“subjective” moral judgment) in the 1920s and 1930s, part and parcel of the emergence of a
sovereign state assuming regulative capacities over the population, the Egyptian state proscribed
offense to religion within criminal law, transforming what was once a moral issue into a modern
legal one carrying punitive consequences of the kind faced by Wasif and Na‘ut. Through the
1937 Penal Code and its successors, the Egyptian state authorized itself to define and police
offense to religion as part of preserving public order, that “‘active principle’ of secular power”
which authorizes the state to decide what counts as religious and what role it should play in
social life.13
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To help us understand why Egyptians tended to consider proselytism so deeply
threatening, I draw on the notion of seduction. Seduction refers to the manipulation of another’s
desire, though not in the limited sexual sense with which the word is most often associated today.
The verb “to seduce” (Fr. séduire), as Jean Baudrillard observed, has its etymological roots in
Latin, with the word se-ducere meaning “to take aside, to divert from one’s path.”14 Thus, to
seduce can mean “to lead the other from his/her truth,” and to be seduced “to be turned from
one’s truth.”15 According to Baudrillard, seduction is coercive because the seducer captures the
other without her consent by either performing as object of desire or letting the other believe
herself to be the subject of desire.16 As an intersubjective relationship, seduction involves the
play of power, with the seducer setting the trap and the seduced walking into it believing herself
to be pursuing her own desires. The Latin understanding of seduction described by Baudrillard is
strikingly different from the modern liberal version, which is associated with adept persuasion,
consent, and choice. As Talal Asad has shown, in liberal societies, from which missionaries
hailed, seduction is valued positively, especially in the marketplace, as a sign of individual
freedom because it is seen to involve reasoned choice. By contrast, coercion is illegal because,
rather than consent, it involves compulsion through the threat of or actual harm to another’s
property (including the body).
In Islamic theology, seduction, glossed in Arabic with terms such as fatana (to subject to
temptations, and the root of fitna, meaning captivation or, more often, disorder), rawada (to
entice, tempt, lure away, in a sexual sense), and gharra (to mislead, beguile, or make desire what
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is false, and the root of the noun ighra’, or to attract someone, often in a way that undermines
self-control), has been viewed with serious consternation due to how it combines coercive
inducement of desire with disorder or social unrest. As Talal Asad points out, “Muslim
theologians and jurists assumed that seduction in all its forms was necessarily dangerous, not
only for the individual (because it indicated a loss of self-control) but for the social order too (it
could lead to violence and civil discord).”17 Diverting one from the true path toward the pursuit
of individual pleasures and desires beyond the limits of self-control could produce anxiety and
peril seen to undermine the common social good (al-maslaha al-‘amma), the basis for a
righteous community.
As Egypt transitioned to the nation-state form, Egyptians across religious divides often
experienced missionary seduction, attempts to divert one from her truth into Protestantism, as an
attack (ta‘n) on the collective body that, despite its limited success, caused moral injury on the
communal level. Moral injury involves degrading the standing or status of an individual or
community, not in the law but in terms of moral being, value, and dignity, which in its most
radical form is actuated through bodily harm. Though moral injury is universal and
transhistorical, its form is linked to socially and historically conditioned moral experience, as is
the response to it.18 In the face of particularly aggressive forms of proselytism, Egyptians tended
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to express moral injury in a local ethical vernacular around blasphemy that, though embedded
within the Islamic tradition, was broadly shared. The experience of moral injury propelled novel
articulations of religious freedom as protection from moral injury (and thus protection of
religion). Yet the eventual entry of religious freedom defined as such into Egyptian public law
did not mean that moral injury became intelligible within Egypt’s legal system. Through
religious freedom, the state has sought to regulate public order rather than maintain the common
social good, ultimately producing rather than resolving religious divides.
This chapter intervenes in the historical scholarship on mission in Egypt and in recent
literature in anthropology on secularism.19 In terms of the literature on missionaries, it makes
three main contributions. First it focuses on the Egypt General Mission (EGM). Though it
became the second largest mission active in Egypt after its founding in 1898,20 it has yet to
receive a great deal of scholarly attention.21 I concentrate on the EGM due to its substantial
influence, leading the International Missionary Council formed in 1921, and its focus on Egypt’s
Muslim majority, making it an important participant in debates over religious freedom. However,
the chapter’s findings are generalizable to many of the other Protestant missionary groups that
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were active in Egypt. Though focused on different populations, Protestant missions in Egypt
generally sought to convert who they could and worked in concert toward this end, each claiming
a territory and careful not to step on another’s toes.22 Second, this is the first study on mission in
Egypt to apply a genealogical approach. Third, the chapter shows the important role missionaries
played in shaping secularism in Egypt.23 In this respect, and by offering a detailed account of
religious freedom’s formation that ties together the legal, political, and social realms, the chapter
also adds to recent anthropological literature on secularism that uses Egypt as a case study,
which has provided important analytical frameworks that inform this discussion.24

Constituting Religious Freedom
Prior to the emergence of the Egyptian nation-state, religious freedom (unlike other forms of
freedom, including of the press) was far from the minds of most Egyptians, who tended to view
as foreign the kind of sectarian discord and violence that gave rise to religious freedom as a
feature of modern governance.25 This was true even as Protestant missionaries had been framing
their proselytization efforts and conversion of locals in terms of religious freedom since the
nineteenth century. As early as 1861, missionaries from the American United Presbyterian
Church invoked religious liberty when one of their representatives in Egypt, a Syrian convert and
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lawyer by the name of Faris al-Hakim, was beaten in an Islamic court in Assiut and imprisoned.
Al-Hakim had been defending a Coptic woman whom he had converted to Protestantism and
attempted to marry to a Christian man some five years after she had converted to Islam, married
a Muslim, and given birth to a baby girl. The qadi, concerned less with al-Hakim’s internal
beliefs than with their effects, accused al-Hakim of having “deceived her, and enticed her from
her religion,” and then of “attacking the Mohammeden religion” in court and “causing
skepticism among the common people.” After coming under physical attack in the courtroom for
allegedly cursing Islam as an “infidelity,” he was placed in a prison cell only to be released
through the intervention of the US government and Abraham Lincoln himself who was
concerned about Faris’ “religious liberty.” Throughout the case, neither al-Hakim nor the qadi,
no less other locals involved, engaged with such language.26
This pattern would continue into the early twentieth century. In 1908, a missionary from
the Protestant Church Mission Society named Miss Elverson returned to Jerusalem from
“holiday” in Port Said to find out that the family of a missing young Muslim woman named
‘Ayisha sought to speak with her and had apparently threatened violence. It took the involvement
of the British consul in Jerusalem, Edward C. Blech, for her to admit that she had taken the
young woman to Port Said and deposited her at the Anglo-American orphanage. According to
Miss Elverton, ‘Ayisha had apparently converted at age five and been ill-treated by her family. It
is conceivable that, at least a decade later, her status as a Christian—assuming she did indeed
convert—had been in jeopardy, and Miss Elverton, with or without the young woman’s
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involvement, made plans to move her from Jerusalem. Hearing the news, ‘Ayisha’s brother
traveled straight away to Port Said to retrieve her. Likely encountering resistance from the
orphanage, and possibly ‘Ayisha, the brother appealed to the Port Said governorate, which
served as arbiter. ‘Ayisha’s fate hinged on her age. The governorate consulted two doctors who
determined she was seventeen—under the age of majority in civil law—and should be returned
to her family. However, Miss Lyons, in whose care she was, consulted two different doctors who
determined she was twenty-two or twenty-three, and thus an adult.27 The case eventually made
its way to the shari‘a courts, where a qadi ruled, on the basis of Islamic law, that ‘Ayisha was not
“of age” (musinna) and must return to her family in Jerusalem.28 Unlike very similar cases that
occurred in the 1920s, what does not appear to have been raised, neither by the missionaries, the
British authorities, ‘Ayisha, or the shari‘a court, is the issue of religious freedom.
In one last example from 1911, word spread that two Muslim boys living in an orphanage
in Shibin al-Qanatir run by the EGM, had converted to Christianity. The ‘Urwa al-Wuthqa
society, a branch of the masonic lodge originally established by the Muslim intellectual Jamal alDin al-Afghani, was able to intervene and extract twenty-one students, including the two boys,
from the orphanage.29 While outraged by the “forced” conversion of young children, the ‘Urwa
al-Wuthqa society did not contest it through the idiom of religious freedom.
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Like the social realm, religious freedom was absent from the political and intellectual
realms as well. When a group of largely Protestant Egyptian Coptic elites organized a Coptic
Congress in 1911 to make demands of the colonial state on behalf of the Coptic community,
including several related to religious practice, they framed their claims not in terms of religious
freedom but in terms of the liberal principle of equality.30 Similarly, in his writings on freedom
prior to World War I, the intellectual giant of liberalism in Egypt, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, had
little to say about this concept. In a 1912 article theorizing freedom, he addressed political
freedom and personal freedom, but not religious freedom.31 Nor did he address it in other articles
from the period.32
Absence gave way to presence with the global extension of the nation-state system after
World War I, which rendered religious freedom an essential component of the laws of states.
Part of the broader notion of protection of (religious) minorities, religious freedom became an
instrument with which the newly established League of Nations, dominated by the “Great
Powers,” could regulate states and national societies through law. For these new states, religious
freedom was perceived as an obstacle to full sovereignty, and thus an enticing terrain for
attempting to expand state authority through the regulation of religion. The minority rights
regime also enticed missionaries. With the specter of political independence threatening the
continuation of their work, missionaries embraced the banner of religious rights. In religious
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freedom, the interests of the League of Nations and missionary societies converged.33 Given this
background, when Egyptian legislators drafted Egypt’s first Constitution in the early 1920s, the
question was not whether but how to engage with religious freedom, answers to which were
powerfully shaped by Egypt’s encounter with Protestant missionaries. It was precisely in the
process of drafting Egypt’s first Constitution, introduced in 1923, that religious freedom first
came to be contested.
In 1921, as Egypt’s Constitutional Committee debated the contours of a new
constitutional order, the EGM petitioned the British High Commission to advance missionary
objectives. The petition initiated the language of religious freedom, a concept that would be
central to the EGM’s political program during the 1920s and early 1930s and become
increasingly available to Egyptians to make their own claims to religious rights. Realizing that
“the institutions of Egypt [were] being remodeled,” the EGM sought to expand the domain of
civil law and confine that of shari‘a.34 In the view of missionaries, whereas the new Constitution
would likely protect religious freedom, understood as the ability to proselytize and to convert
from Islam, the shari‘a clearly violated it. Believing firmly in law’s power to transform human
sensibilities, the missionaries insisted that empowering modern law, premised on the

33

The volume Religious Liberty in the Near East (London: Harper and Brothers Publishers,
1938), by Helen Clarkson Miller Davis, is evidence of this convergence. Clarkson Miller Davis
herself was involved over the course of her career in both the League of Nations and the
Presbyterian Church in the USA Board of Foreign Missions.
34
Throughout this chapter, “shari‘a” generally refers to Muslim personal status law as codified
in Egypt. On this subject, see Asad, Formations of the Secular, chap. 7; Kenneth M. Cuno,
Modernizing Marriage: Family, Ideology, and Law in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century
Egypt (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015); Iza R. Hussin, The Politics of Islamic
Law: Local Elites, Colonial Authority, and the Making of the Muslim State (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2016); and Mahmood, Religious Difference, chap. 3.
32

autonomous citizen, would also defuse the perceived irrational responses that their proselytism
inspired—what Egyptian Muslims understood as the expression of legitimate outrage.
Missionary objectives divided into three categories: the situation of Egypt’s Christians,
matters of conversion, and the ability to continue missionary work unimpeded.35 We will focus
on the first two. In regard to Christians in Egypt, the EGM demanded that “liberty be accorded to
all men to rest and to worship on the day prescribed by their several faiths,” and that
appointments and promotions in employment be based on merit rather than religious affiliation.
These objectives were intended to open a space for Egyptian Christians to claim religious rights
before the state. The EGM also demanded that legal procedures in which one or both sides were
non-Muslims be barred from taking place in the shari‘a courts. The parties involved, the EGM
argued, should have the liberty of agreeing on a mutually acceptable communal court, and if they
could not, their case should be settled not by a Muslim qadi (as had been common practice) but
in the Mixed Courts. The purpose of this objective was clearly to undermine the authority of
Islamic law.36 As William Paton, a British Presbyterian missionary who served as secretary of
the International Missionary Council, bluntly put it, “it was said to me in the Near East, not only
by missionaries but by foreign officials and other observers of different kinds, that ‘the Shariat
must go.’”37
In terms of conversion, the EGM demanded that “steps be taken in the new Constitution
to secure to all Egyptian subjects freedom in regard to change of faith, so that one who desires to
change from Islam to Christianity may not be liable to injury in person, family or estate.” The
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EGM saw the ability to convert as the litmus test of religious freedom. While a 1913 law had
established a state infrastructure for registering conversions, it assumed that conversions were
unidirectional, into Islam.38 Conversion cases from the period show how conversion out of Islam
was not illegal per se (as the EGM suggested) but unsustainable in an Islamic legal setting.39
Such cases, especially when involving girls and women, landed in the shari‘a courts as the
tribunal de droit commun (court of common law), with converts usually returned to their families
and Islam. Thus, the EGM sought an “official and departmental method … by which a
Mohammedian who becomes a Christian can have the fact noted and registered.” Put differently,
this organization, whose members worked to convert souls often with legal impunity under the
Capitulations, sought to empower a modern legal system to facilitate Muslim conversion to
Christianity in a Muslim-majority and nominally sovereign country defining itself as Islamic. For
this reason, some began to associate secular law with Christianization and the violation of the
national body.
Yet the missionaries also sought more. The EGM demanded that Muslims be able to
convert with security—and not only physical but also financial. “When the family property is in
the normal course being divided,” they urged, “the change of faith of one member should not per
se prevent him from inheriting his share, and … in signing he should not be forced to sign
exclusively his former Moslem name, thus forcing on him a virtual profession of a return to
Islam.” Exempting waqf inheritance, which they sought to eliminate, and a father’s own decision
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to “cut off his son with or without a shilling,” Muslim converts to Christianity, they argued,
should have the right to inherit as Christians. This right, they pointed out, had already been made
available in India through the 1832 Bengal Code. Although the EGM acknowledged that
granting inheritance rights to converts from Islam in Egypt would inspire Muslim opposition, in
India, it claimed, such opposition had been overcome by the “patent justice of reform.”40
The missionaries’ understanding of just reform, then, was an expansion of civil law that,
deaf to moral injury of Egyptians, enabled “freedom,” or an individual’s ability to choose a
religion. This understanding presumed both a normative understanding of religion based on the
individual’s cognitive choice to believe, and an ideal human, the autonomous citizen whose
inalienable property included not only his body, but also his belief, free speech (to profess), and
material possessions. On this basis, the missionaries concluded that shari‘a and the shari‘a courts
were impediments to freedom, forming a binary that, incidentally, has persisted until today.41
Their proposals for enshrining freedom in law represented a direct challenge to Egypt’s national
majority.
Egypt’s 1923 Constitution promised religious freedom, but not quite in the ways the
missionaries had advocated. Decided upon by a Constitutional Committee made up of Jewish,
Christian, and Muslim Egyptian members with the “input” of British advisors, it included five
clauses touching on religious freedom. We will discuss two that center on the regulation of
religious practice: Article 12, stating that “freedom of conviction is absolute” (hurriyyat al-
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i‘tiqad mutlaqa); and Article 13, declaring that the state protects the use of religious and creedal
slogans “according to customary practice in Egypt so long as that does not disturb public order
[al-nizam al-‘amm] or contradict morals [adab].”42 The first thing to note about these clauses is
that they did not guarantee what the missionaries had sought, and what the British had thought
the better of advocating—principally, the freedom to convert from Islam. In fact, they did not
make explicit guarantees of religious freedom at all. Article 12 guaranteed the protection of what
was vaguely termed “freedom of conviction” (hurriyyat al-i‘tiqad). This formulation was the
outcome of a debate within the Constitutional Committee. The clause’s original phrasing, based
on George Curzon’s articulation and combined with what became Article 13,43 was slightly
different:

freedom of religious conviction [hurriyyat al-i‘tiqad al-dini] is absolute [emphasis mine].
All residents of Egypt have the right to use with complete freedom, in public or in
private, the slogans of any community [milla], religion [din], or creed [‘aqida], so long as
these slogans do not contradict public order or general morals [al-adab al-‘umumiyya].44

The word “religious” was expunged because, as committee member Muhammad Khayrat Radi
pointed out, otherwise “it would be permitted for every person to leave his religion and embrace
another religion without bearing responsibility for that through civil or noncivil penalty, despite
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that there is no dispute that important outcomes related to inheritance, etc., result from it.”45 In
other words, instituting religious freedom would have enabled the conversions sought by
missionaries, which had proven so disruptive to the social fabric. The issue of religion was left to
the second part of the clause—a version of which later became Article 13—which stated that the
expression of religious slogans was protected but that the state could exclude religious speech
that “contradicts public order or general morals.” Whereas religious communal authority had
historically regulated the boundaries of acceptable speech acts as part of upholding a righteous
community, that power now belonged to the state, guided by its own conception of public
morality and the exigencies of public order.
Yet religious freedom was dangerous for other reasons too. For some, such as the Islamic
reformer Muhammad Bakhyat al-Muti‘i, the clause that would become Article 13 was too open
in its definition of religion itself. “I request that the text be limited to recognized religions,
whether heavenly or not heavenly,” the shaykh stated, “so as not to permit the creation of a new
religion, such as a person claiming, for example, that he is the mahdi and bringing a new
revelation.” Bishop Anba Yu’annis, the Coptic Church’s representative on the committee, shared
Bakhyat al-Muti‘i’s view, providing a specific example of what was at stake. A certain “Sirjiyus,
well-known to you all [committee members], left religion and truth in establishing a new
religion, and requested from the government authorization for that and was refused. This is
evidence that it is not possible to authorize unrecognized religions.”46 The Sirjiyus to whom the
bishop referred had not established a new religion; he was a Coptic Christian who had become an
early adherent of Baha’ism in Egypt, a religion that claimed to succeed (or encompass)
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Christianity and Islam and still is not recognized by the Egyptian state. Due to such concerns, in
the final version of the Constitution, the freedom to express “slogans of any community, religion,
and creed” was modified to the freedom to express “slogans of religions and creeds according to
customary practice [my emphasis].”47
This case conveys how boundaries of free speech tend to be drawn to accommodate
majoritarian populations within nation-states rather than minorities, who though they may draw
on the same legal instruments as majorities to prevent harmful speech acts, rarely meet with
success.48 With the formation of the Egyptian nation-state, Muslims became a majority
(akthariyya or aghlabiyya, though the latter term, connoting domination rather than numerical
superiority, eventually won out), with Islam the state religion, and Copts a minority (aqalliyya),
though some prominent Copts such as the Wafdist Wisa Wasif contested this label on the basis
that Copts were the “original Egyptians” rather than a separate group like Jews in Europe
deprived of national rights.49 However, majority and minority could easily coalesce into a
majoritarian front when it came to certain shared interests such as determining the legal
boundaries of religion, excluding other minorities (also aqalliyyas, though here “outsiders” to the
nation) such as Baha’is. The introduction of religious freedom into Egypt did not open space for
“free” religious thought, speech, and practice, which everywhere is no more than an ideal.
Rather, it propelled the legal codification of the boundaries of “legitimate” religious practice.
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“Strange Stories” of Converted Muslims
The complex and contingent translation of religious freedom into Egyptian law made this
concept more readily available to Egyptians. Egyptians came to articulate religious freedom
through a local ethical vernacular around moral injury, a statist project of public order, or both,
as a defense against missionary proselytism and conversion of locals, which were seen to
threaten the social fabric. Historians who have broached the subject of religious freedom in
Egypt have shed light on at least four cases involving conversion and polemical speech acts
about Islam that occurred in the early 1930s.50 While they are important, I focus on an earlier set
of cases because they have yet to be analyzed in detail (and not at all in English) and because
they provide important context for their successors.
In April 1926, a young woman named Zakiya Ahmad Salih from Alexandria entered the
EGM hospital in the Nile Delta region of Shibin al-Qanatir “of her own free will and at the desire
of her family” to be trained as a nurse. During the previous few years, Zakiya had attended an
EGM missionary school in Anfushi.51 Her father had passed away in 1924 and perhaps she and
her remaining family—her mother and two brothers—sought additional income. There are
conflicting reports of what occurred at the hospital. According to Zakiya’s younger brother
Yunus, about two years into Zakiya’s training, when she was about sixteen or seventeen years
old,52 she wrote to her family begging them to take her home. Responding to her plea, Yunus
arrived at the hospital to find that the staff would not permit her to leave. Worse still, “they [had]
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obliged her to change her religion to be a Christian.” The missionaries in charge, Yunus
explained, “feared she may return to her original religion” if they allowed her to rejoin her
family. By his account, when he insisted on taking his sister home to his mother, who was
“suffering … sorrow,” they forcibly removed him from the school. In a letter in broken English
to British authorities, Yunus pleaded for intervention, explaining that he had contacted the police
but they lacked the power to help him.53 The EGM, a British Protestant mission, was allegedly
hiding her under the cover of the Capitulations.54
The EGM described matters differently. In its telling, Zakiya’s family was intimately
familiar with the hospital, her cousin having already trained there and her mother having stayed
as a guest. In 1926, Zakiya had supposedly had a fight with a female coworker and wrote a letter
to her brother asking him to bring her home, which he did. On arriving, however, he admonished
her for leaving “‘good employment’” in “‘a good place.’” Zakiya soon returned to the hospital.
Then, in the spring of 1928, Zakiya is said to have written again to her brother, this time to
inform him of her “preference for Christianity, especially for Christian home-life.”55 After
receiving this letter, Yunus traveled to Shibin al-Qanatir intent on retrieving his sister, but Zakiya
refused to leave.56
According to an EGM memorandum, Yunus, frustrated by his sister’s intransigence,
lodged a complaint with the Interior Ministry. He also opened a case in the shari‘a court. In the
meantime, her other brother Muhammad and his mother reached out to the ma’mur (provincial
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subgovernor) for aid. The ma’mur, who was also contacted separately by Yunus, argued that
Zakiya was old enough to decide for herself what to do. On 5 May, Zakiya received a visit at the
hospital from the wakil al-niyaba (public prosecutor) who questioned the girl to ascertain her
true wishes. The wakil also called in Muhammad and told him “to do what he could to persuade
her to come with him.” With Zakiya still refusing to leave, the ma’mur concluded that his only
option was to consent to her remaining at the hospital.57
Just when the matter seemed settled, on 14 May the shari‘a court, where Yunus had
opened a case, ordered Zakiya to be returned home. The EGM hospital, outraged by the ruling
and arguing that it was based on false testimony, demanded postponement of its execution and an
appeal, both of which were granted. As word of the delay spread, the Wafdist deputy, Mahjub
Thabit, raised in the Chamber of Deputies the issue of Zakiya’s conversion and “the negligence
committed by the ma’mur” to Interior Minister (and future prime minister) Mustafa al-Nahas,
whose responsibility it was to execute judicial rulings.58 After communicating with British
authorities, and with the approval of the Coptic minister of foreign affairs Wassif Ghali and
Shaykh al-Azhar Mustafa al-Maraghi,59 al-Nahas ordered the shari‘a court’s judgment to be
implemented the following morning.60 Embracing the ruling, Mahjub Thabit explained that it
was guided by religious freedom, particularly Article 13 of the Egyptian Constitution protecting
religious slogans according to customary practice unless they disrupt public order or contradict
morals.61 Thabit invoked painful memories of missionaries having violated the public order and
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morality, including a particularly memorable case from 1911 mentioned earlier. “It is necessary
that the missionaries know,” Thabit argued, “that Egypt’s Muslims, Christians, and Jews, are but
different birds on the same one tree … they live in perfect harmony and do not take at all to that
which puts this serenity into trouble.” Concluding his remarks with hope that such incidents
would not repeat themselves, Mahjub Thabit received applause from the chamber.62
Al-Nahas and the Interior Ministry articulated a notion of religious freedom guided by
the logic of public order and protecting the social fabric from the dangers of seduction. This
notion contrasted with that expressed by the EGM in its memoranda “defending” Zakiya, which
privileged individual choice (and thus consent) protected by the Constitution. EGM Secretary
George Swan, in his own comments, recognized the legal indeterminacy of the case, where
constitutional protection of the individual’s religious freedom contradicted shari‘a. However, he
argued that it was constitutional law that should take precedence. “In the passage of a country
from the mediaeval political conception to the modern democratic conception, which the
Egyptians are now professing,” Swan suggested, “there will inevitably be difficulties, and that in
the meeting of them it is precisely the Shariat which will always rise up in the path.” The shari‘a
was an obstacle to be dismantled, not through its abrogation, “which is theoretically impossible,”
but through “the quiet substitution of civil statutes for its canon laws on the part of the State,
coupled with the staying of execution of such judgments as conflict with those civil statutes.”63
Swan and the EGM toed a secularist line in embracing modern law and seeking to fold
“religious” law into it, thus transforming religious law’s content—its conception of ethics.64
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Yet in its memorandum the EGM also tried to defend Zakiya’s conversion in terms of
shari‘a in an effort to undermine the ruling. The EGM asserted that Abu Hanifa, the founder of
the Hanafi branch of fiqh, taught that “a girl not having previously shown the ordinary signs of
womanhood was to be declared [an] adult at the age of 17.” And Zakiya, as an adult (though her
exact age at the time is unknown), was in charge of her own personhood with the full rights of an
adult, and, by extension, could choose her religion.65 One writer (likely a missionary) who
contributed an editorial on the issue to the Egyptian Gazette under the penname “Old Fashioned
Liberal” added that, according to Article 499 of Egypt’s Muslim personal status code, if a female
arrives at the age of adulthood and “is a virgin … and has both prudence and purity or is a nonvirgin to be trusted with herself none of her governors can take her to himself.”66 If this were not
enough, the Qur’an states clearly, the memorandum went on, that “‘there shall be no compulsion
in religion,’” and it was clear that Yunus was guilty of the “crudest and cruelest compulsion”
toward his sister.67 To this liberal, compulsion—though not seduction—clearly violated Islamic
law.
This reading of Islamic law is indicative of what Islamic law had generally come to mean
not only to missionaries, but also to the British administrators who shaped Egyptian law and
politics. On the one hand, Islamic law, similar to Canon law, belonged to a dark era that had been
superseded by rational enlightenment and, more particularly, liberalism, with the autonomous
individual at its heart. The liberty of the individual was the “mark of true liberalism; it indicates
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the highest degree of civilization and the triumph of moral ideas.”68 On the other hand, Islamic
law could not be completely dissolved, for it represented the true character of “Mohammedans,”
a mark of colonial difference.69 And it was the shari‘a courts that were tasked with upholding
that character. In part for this reason, Egypt’s (British) Office of the Judicial Advisor, made up of
legal positivists rather than evangelists, could push back against the EGM after the mission had
reached out to it for clarification, advising that “there is no doubt whatever that under the Sharia
Law a girl of the age of 17 can be made to reside with the person who exercises paternal power
over her.”70
Having ordered the execution of the shari‘a court’s judgment, parliament demanded that
missionaries respect the Constitution and its protection of the “sanctity of religions.”71 On 30
May Yunus accompanied Zakiya to Alexandria, where the police were instructed to ensure that
“no harm was done to her.”72 The EGM, though discouraged by British authorities who feared
public outcry and disturbances, pursued an appeal, but the initial ruling was eventually upheld.73
Zakiya would remain in the custody of her family.
The EGM missionaries felt bewildered by this outcome, but they knew one thing for
certain: Zakiya’s case had inspired others in Shibin al-Qanatir to act against the mission. Central
to this effort was a shadowy figure—a leitmotif in missionary discourse concerning Egypt’s
antimissionary movement74— the “well-to-do” local merchant ‘Uthman Fakhir, who was
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outraged by conversion cases in Egypt and nearby Palestine. According to George Swan, when
Zakiya “was handed over to her younger brother Othman Fakhr openly showed his triumph and
had a great celebration in his house.” Swan maintained that he had helped to “stir up bad
feelings” through the press, which followed Zakiya’s case closely. And now Fakhir refused to
rest “until he has made it [the hospital] close its doors.”75 He was part of an emerging movement
outraged by conversion cases that would lead to the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood.76
In July 1928, as Zakiya’s case waited appeal, ‘Aziza Taha ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Hadi,
a twenty-one-year-old woman who had spent four years working in the hospital in Shibin alQanatir, apparently with her father’s consent, received notice that the shari‘a court had issued a
judgment restoring her to his care. The qadi, possibly the same judge who was involved in
Zakiya’s case, had determined that the hospital “is a morally dangerous place for a young girl.”
About six months prior, ‘Aziza had been baptized—also with her father’s consent. She adopted
the name Phoebe, under which she registered in the Egyptian Protestant community’s al-Majlis
al-Milli (Millet Council). But now ‘Aziza’s father sought to remove her from the hospital,
apparently at the prodding of ‘Uthman Fakhir, the “menace to public security.”77 The EGM,
which oversaw the hospital, reacted by refusing to handover ‘Aziza to police authorities, and
launched an appeal. As with the judgment in Zakiya’s case, this one had been carried out without
prior notice to the young woman in question.78 The appeal was seen by some foreign legal
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onlookers as a test case pitting the Constitution’s apparent protection of conversion against the
shari‘a’s denial of it to Muslims.79
In the meantime, the missionaries considered trying to transfer the girl’s custody to the
“relations of another young girl,” but, given that before her baptism ‘Aziza had been married,
divorced, and finally remarried (to a convert), the involved legal obstacles seemed
insurmountable. Instead, they attempted to meet with the high commissioner to explore steps for
securing “the liberties of the Constitution” to converts.80 For their part, British authorities tried to
“defend” ‘Aziza as well. Searching for a legal rationale for reversing the judgment, they sought
and received several adjournments of the appeal. They had considered challenging the case on
the grounds that the twenty-one-year-old had legitimately converted and, as an adult, was subject
not to Muslim personal status law (and thus the shari‘a courts), but to that of the Egyptian
Protestant community, which enjoyed state recognition since the nineteenth century. However,
‘Aziza’s father had based his case in the shari‘a court on his daughter being a minor. Absent a
birth certificate establishing her age, it was the father who had the advantage because any legal
indeterminacy between religious courts meant deferral to the shari‘a courts. Another option that
the British explored was to interpret Muslim personal status laws in a way that paternal custody
(puissance paternelle) ceased at puberty or at latest when one is competent to handle property.
But after the judicial advisor, who “very carefully” explored legal questions involved in the case,
consulted Shaykh of al-Azhar al-Maraghi, he concluded that this argument would never stand in
court.81 With all avenues blocked, the British agreed not to oppose the execution of the shari‘a
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court’s judgment so long as arrangements were made for ‘Aziza to be placed in a government
hospital or institution, “where she should have the best chance of being free from molestation or
ill-treatment” by her family.82 In different ways, both the missionaries and British authorities had
sought ‘Aziza’s freedom from coercion and pain, whether spiritual or physical, even as
missionary attempts at seduction, often under the protective watch of British authorities, had
been a cause of collective moral injury.
Another kind of pain was at work in late 1928, in a case that recalled the Zwemer affair.
Rather than in Cairo, this case occurred in Isma‘iliyya where the Muslim Brotherhood was
beginning to take form; but like the case in Cairo, it involved what the local community saw as
the provocative distribution of missionary literature. As elsewhere, missionaries in Isma‘iliyya
routinely distributed bibles and pamphlets. Lately, however, they had “started to attack the
Mohammeden Religion openly and severely,” as Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, a judge in the
Isma‘iliyya shari‘a court, pointed out. “They go about with pamphlets and books containing
bitter criticism of the Moslem Faith,” he explained, “which no Mohammeden would tolerate.”83
The sting of this bitter criticism was worsened by a recent incident involving sixteen-year-old
Muhammad ‘Ali, who worked as a fireman with the Egyptian State Railways. For about a year,
Muhammad had been considering conversion to Christianity, until it was arranged that he would
be baptized publicly in the Church of Isma‘iliya.84 According to a complaint handed to the judge
of the Isma‘iliyya shari‘a court, Muhammad had also fallen in love with a local girl, the daughter
of an EGM preacher. The preacher was unwilling to allow him to marry his daughter unless he
publicly embraced Christianity. The demand that the embrace be public, if true, was likely an
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attempt to ensure that Muhammad’s conversion was genuine. With his baptism scheduled,
Muhammad notified the Ismai‘iliyya government of his intention to convert, notification that
was forwarded to the Ministry of Justice in Cairo.85
As the conversion date approached, word spread and outrage grew, as did the anxiety of
the local Isma‘iliyya government.86 In his complaint to the Shaykh of al-Azhar, the judge Ahmad
Muhammad Shakir wrote that “they intended to celebrate the occasion in a manner which would
have infuriated the peaceful Moslem population of Ismailia.”87 However, on the day of the
conversion, Muhammad’s family “kept him in the house by force so the public baptism never
took place.”88 According to the judge, Muslim notables and authorities had intervened.89 Though
a public ceremony had been avoided, Muhammad was apparently baptized outside the city at a
later date. Unlike Zakiya and ‘Aziza, this young man continued to live openly as a Christian,
reflecting the different discursive, ideological, and material entanglements that Egyptian men
and women experienced in their encounters with missionaries.90
As with the other two cases, this affair involved and reproduced divergent visions of
religious freedom. The missionaries advocated Muhammad’s “right” to change his religion based
on the Constitution. Judge Ahmad Muhammad Shakir and the Shaykh of al-Azhar al-Maraghi
felt differently. The judge emphasized not only the “indignation” and “infuriation” of local
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Muslims at the notion of the public conversion, but also the missionaries’ “disregard of our
feelings” and “attack on our religion and on the Koran.” The Shaykh of al-Azhar also
complained of the attitude of the missionaries, which “enrages the masses and hurts their
feelings.” Invoking the discourse of religious freedom directly, he argued that “it is not right,
from the point of view of freedom of conviction, that persons who tempt simple-minded people
and minors should be allowed to spread their teachings in a manner which offends the feelings of
the public.”91 Freedom of religion meant freedom from the pain caused by seduction, which both
the judge and the shaykh associated with coercion rather than consent. We now turn to how this
notion of religious freedom was embedded within and expressed through a local ethical grammar
around blasphemy.

Attack and Injury
The late 1920s and especially the early 1930s witnessed similar local–missionary encounters,
largely in the Delta region, that expanded the debate over religious freedom. These cases also
involved accusations of ta‘n (attack, here on Islam). Appearing in the Qur’an, ta‘n is one of
several words in the Islamic textual tradition associated with blasphemy, including sabb, which
also connotes injury.92 Without delving into that tradition, I would like to make two general
observations. First, prior to the rise of the modern state, the role of legal proscriptions regarding
blasphemy was less to maintain public order through the threat of punishment than to embody
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the ethics of a community and maintain the common social good.93 In other words, Islamic
jurisprudence regulating blasphemy, which was fluid and complex across time and space, should
not be confused with blasphemy laws of the modern state—even one that defines itself as
Islamic. Second, the language around blasphemy, such as the word ta‘n, though embedded
within the Islamic textual tradition, was used widely in early twentieth-century Egypt (and
elsewhere) to mean a serious accusation of attack on one’s religion. Thus, the Copts who
organized a congress in 1911 to demand rights based on a Coptic identity, complained of an
“attack [ta‘n] on the Christian religion and its people [i.e., Copts]” by certain Muslim-run
periodicals.94
By the mid-1920s, it was increasingly the state that made this charge. However, the state
linked ta‘n not to violation of the common social good but to violation of the public order, thus
transforming it from a moral offense into a criminal one punishable by law. The state’s target
tended to be another threat to what had recently become Egypt’s state religion, namely positivist
intellectuals. In 1926, with the encouragement of the palace, groups of ‘ulama’ associated with
al-Azhar, an institution long in the process of incorporation under the state umbrella, famously
charged the jurist ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq and the intellectual Taha Husayn with blasphemy for their
respective, recent publications. In his book Fi al-Shi‘r al-Jahili (On Pre-Islamic Poetry), for
example, Husayn had questioned the authenticity of much of the pre-Islamic poetry from which
the early Islamic tradition had differentiated itself, arguing it was fabricated by Muslims at a later
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date, and analyzed the Qur’an as a literary work. In response, the ‘ulama’ claimed he had
“seriously denied … the Qur’an, and attacked [ta‘na] the Prophet … and his noble lineage, and
in so doing incited the fury of the pious [al-mutadayyinin] and perpetrated what violates public
order and invites people to chaos [al-fawda], and it was requested to take successful effective
legal means against this attack on the official state religion.”95 Husayn’s alleged attempt to
seduce the pious had caused injury and chaos that threatened public order and demanded
criminal punishment.
Before long parliament chimed in. It debated not whether Husayn was in the wrong but
rather the extent of parliament’s ability to punish him. The main advocate for punitive action was
the ‘alim Mustafa al-Qayati, who put into question Husayn’s loyalty to the nation. Noting that
Husayn, as dean of Cairo University, received his salary from the public treasury, al-Qayati
exclaimed that “no one would have ever thought that the beneficence of the nation to him would
be met with this recalcitrance to the extent that he struck it [the nation] with a blow to the
religion of Islam, the religion of the majority.”96 Worse still, Husayn was disseminating his

denial of the truth of the Qur’an, ascription to the prophet … of deceptiveness, and
serious fabrication of history [among students]. I want to say to folks who … claim that
… we cannot limit the freedom of people to their opinions—I say to them that we are not
limiting their freedom to their convictions but we are limiting opinions dictated to our
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children and disseminated among members of the nation … [which are] inviting error and
iniquity.97

In other words, he took issue less with Husayn’s internal convictions than with the effects of
their public expression, a position consistent with stipulations around disbelief in the classical
law. Al-Qayati elaborated:

If I did not spend the night among you enumerating the statements contained in this book
and recalling the heinous words that indicate nothing but disbelief, it is because I do not
want to inject sadness into your hearts and because I do not wish to see your tears flow in
anguish over your religion and the honor of your country.

We are not talking about anything here but the motive to uphold religion, and that is
something important not to Muslims alone, for the honor of all of the religions should be
upheld.98

Moral injury expressed in parliament became an injunction for the state to define religion and
limit speech seen to undermine it. Husayn was eventually stripped of his position as dean (he
was later reinstated) and his book was censored. However, the chief prosecutor in his case,
Muhammad Nur, eventually acquitted him of all charges. In a long decision in which he
challenged substantively many of Husayn’s claims, Nur focused on intent rather than social
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consequences, concluding that though Husayn’s methods and ideas were erroneous and
misguided, his motive was not to attack Islam or divert Muslims to false ideas but rather to
pursue scientific research.99 Nevertheless, in subsequent such cases, including the well-known
1995 trial of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, the state would draw on al-Qayati’s logic in determining
apostasy, folding this Islamic notion into the regulation of public order.100
Despite the many accusations of ta‘n during the 1920s and early 1930s, and in part due to
their accumulation, bans on seduction and offense to religion entered into modern law only in
1937, when the Egyptian state expanded its sovereignty. As we will see, the Montreux
Convention effectively proscribed missionary seduction and advanced efforts to prevent
seduction between Egyptian Christians and Muslims. Meanwhile, translating offense to religion
into the neutral language of modern law, Articles 160 and 161 of the 1937 penal code authorized
the state to determine what constituted offense to religion, partly by discerning “the intended
meaning” of the holy books, and to regulate it as part of preserving the public order.

Sovereignty, the League of Nations, Sectarianism
The Anglo-Egyptian negotiations of 1929–30 inaugurated the specter of complete Egyptian
sovereignty. Though they failed in the short term, negotiations would eventually resume and lead
to the political settlement of 1936 that increased Egyptian sovereignty.101 The International
Mission Council, originally formed in 1921 to coordinate the efforts of Protestant missions in
Egypt, saw the negotiations as an opportunity to achieve its long-standing objective of codifying
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religious freedom, as the missionaries understood it, in Egyptian law.102 As the Council’s
president, missionary Charles R. Watson, concisely put it, “religious liberty to become effective
must be codified.”103 At the onset of negotiations, the council sought to persuade the Office of
the High Commission that if the British were to cede sovereignty, particularly protection of
minorities (one of the four reserved points in Britain’s 1922 unilateral declaration of Egyptian
independence), the Egyptian government should make a legally binding guarantee to protect
religious freedom (the aspect of minority protection of most interest to these missionaries).104
When it became clear in late 1930 that negotiations would falter, the International Mission
Council, understanding that these negotiations would serve as the basis for future talks, requested
that British negotiators, who had already formally acknowledged that protection of minorities
would in future be the exclusive concern of Egypt (as a sovereign state), put two points on the
record: first, that Britain was ceding protection of minorities on the assumption that Egypt will
ensure full religious freedom; and second, that the Egyptian government should provide “in its
codified laws” a more “exact and effective safeguarding of religious liberty in the fullest sense of
the word.” The “fullest sense” involved state protection of a converted Christian’s right to
inheritance, state recognition of conversion from Islam, and the ability of Muslim women to “act
as an independent and free personality in regard to her religious attachments.”105
The council was not alone in its demand for codification and its plan for realizing it. In a
widely cited letter to The Times of London, British lawyer and politician Robert Cecil, who had
been a major figure in the formation of the League of Nations, pointed to the discrepancy
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between Egypt’s protection of “freedom of conscience” in the Constitution, “which all civilized
States today regard as essential,” and how this guarantee was interpreted in Egypt. Like the
missionaries, Robert Cecil found it particularly anomalous that religious freedom in Egypt did
not protect conversion from Islam. “I understand,” he wrote, “that, by the law prevailing in
Egypt at the present time, an unmarried [Muslim] woman who is converted to Christianity may
be forcibly taken from any position she holds and restored to her Moslem parents, who may then
practically insist on a Moslem husband for her.” Cecil contrasted this obstruction of agency with
common practice in “Western nations.” “Is it too much to suggest to Egyptians,” he asked, “that
political freedom does not accord with the denial of the liberty to individuals in so vital a matter
as religion, and to hope that the Egyptian Government will, before Egypt takes her place in the
community of nations, remove this archaic blot from her legal system?”106 Egypt’s attainment of
sovereignty and acceptance into the community of nations (and, as I will show, the League of
Nations) was to be partly contingent on its acceptance of a certain normative arrangement of
public law and religion that was seen to threaten its majority religion and target in particular
young Muslim women.
As we have seen, the International Mission Council and Robert Cecil were correct to
suggest that Egyptians generally understood religious freedom differently than they did. Amid
the conversion crises that rocked Egypt in the early 1930s, two representatives of the
International Mission Council sat down with Egypt’s prime minister Isma‘il Sidqi, who was
accompanied by Coptic politicians Tawfiq Duss and Kamil Bulus, to convince him that press
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accusations directed at missionaries were unfounded. Isma‘il Sidqi reportedly defended
Egyptians for their outrage, pointing out that Egypt defined Islam as the state religion, was home
to the leading Islamic institution of learning in al-Azhar, and for many centuries played a leading
role in the Islamic world. “While evangelistic work might be in place in primitive countries like
Tanganyika [now part of Tanzania],” he argued, “it was not suitable in a Moslem country like
Egypt, especially as Egypt is firmly attached to a religion of its own, and is civilized.” Sidqi went
on to differentiate between two conceptions of religious freedom: the right to attack another’s
religion, which is unjustifiable, and the right of individuals to maintain and practice their own
religion, which was “the true conception of religious liberty.” Whereas the missionaries extended
this latter right to include the ability to change religion, Sidqi contended that such conversions in
Egypt were invalid because they occurred only among the “lowest classes” and as a result of
“ulterior motives.”107 He thus combined the widely shared feeling that Islam was under attack,
which he felt to be unjustified given Egypt’s place within a colonial civilizational hierarchy, with
the challenge that missionary conversions of souls were based on coercion not consent.
But many felt that the conversion controversies of the early 1930s demanded more from
the state than verbal critique. Egyptians already widely viewed the state to be sluggish in its
response.108 To spur action, the League for the Defense of Islam (al-Lajna li-l-Difa‘a ‘an alIslam), in which Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna participated, was formed in June
1933. The league’s founding document does not mention religious freedom, but its invocation of
“defense” in its title, its desire to protect the “weak” and the young, and its stated purpose to
“appeal to the government to prevent missionary attacks on Islam” were the products of a decade
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of the politics of religious freedom.109 Unable to ban missionaries from Egypt, in 1934 the
Egyptian government, and particularly Interior Minister Mahmud Fahmy al-Nuqrashi, pursued
legislative action by producing a “Draft Law on Religious Propaganda.” The proposed law—
never itself implemented—would have banned “religious proselytization,” including the
distribution of pamphlets and books and the hanging of posters, in “institutions assigned to
humane purposes” if such institutions accepted persons of different “creeds or religion,” and in
the homes, places, and institutions of people belonging to a different creed or religion.
Propaganda of this kind would henceforth require Interior Ministry permission. Moreover,
educational institutions in which there were students of various creeds and religions had to
guarantee “freedom and respect of faith” to all. In part, this meant that in schools with religion in
their curriculum, religious instruction could only be given to students in their own religion. “It is
forbidden to cause students to take part in prayers or sermons contrary to their creed,” the draft
law went on, “and it is likewise forbidden to distribute to them books or pamphlets containing
religious controversies or any criticism of their religion or creed.” The draft law also forbade
inducing with money, service, or “any other means of trickery,” including bribery and threats, a
person to attend a prayer or sermon contrary to that person’s creed or religion or to induce one to
renounce his faith. Contravention of the law could result in imprisonment.110
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In 1936 Anglo–Egyptian negotiations resumed. With Egyptian sovereignty seeming
inevitable, Protestant missionary groups increasingly understood that Britain’s negotiating
leverage was relatively weak and that it would be unable to gain the kinds of concessions they
had sought earlier. The British administration was as unwilling as ever to entertain missionary
policy schemes, which seemed unreasonable and potentially costly to its other military and
geopolitical goals.111 The missionaries thus adapted in several ways. First, they began to
emphasize minority rights and the supposedly worsening situation of Egyptian Christians (no
longer just converts) since the conversion crises of 1932–33; second, and relatedly, they called
for making Egypt’s entrance into the League of Nations contingent on it declaring on the
international stage that it guaranteed protection of minorities and religious freedom. In a meeting
with the British high commissioner Miles Lampson, Charles Watson of the Inter-Mission
Council (and the American University in Cairo) advocated this strategy, citing the Mandate
states of Palestine and Iraq as precedents. The high commissioner was “increasingly struck” by
the possibilities these presented.112 While Egypt was not a Mandate, “under the four reserved
points the United Kingdom arrogated to itself … an obligation to see to the protection of
religious minorities in Egypt.” In doing so, Lampson suggested, “his Majesty’s Government
have … virtually constituted themselves a mandatory.”113
But what may have been possible only a year earlier seemed in vain in spring of 1936, by
which time Italy had invaded Ethiopia and Germany had occupied the Rhineland. British
administrators and the Inter-Mission Council both conceded this point. “The countries which
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have [minority] treaty obligations … are becoming increasingly restless,” said Lampson. “The
policy of imposing permanent servitudes on sovereign states is not proving conspicuously
successful,” he went on, “and it seems wise … to avoid the creation of new ones [treaty
obligations].”114 Some in the Inter-Mission Council wondered, with good reason it turns out,
whether the League of Nations would even continue to exist.115 This skepticism notwithstanding,
the British opted to warn then-prime minister Mustafa al-Nahas that the issues of religious
freedom and equality were likely to be raised when Egypt was elected into the League of Nations
in Geneva. They hoped this warning would prompt him to guarantee publicly to uphold these
principles, thus providing “a locus standi for the Council to take the matter up” should Egypt fall
short of its promise.116 At the request of the high commissioner, the Inter-Missionary Council
even drew up a draft statement declaring, among other things, that “the citizen will enjoy
complete freedom in the choice of his religious affiliation.”117
On 26 May 1937, Egypt became the last state to join the League of Nations. Although alNahas initially agreed to make a variation of the statement desired by the British administration
and the Inter-Mission Council at Egypt’s League election,118 reportedly at the last minute he
chose to reverse course because, as missionary William Paton explained it, “any such statement
on their part would mean that they admitted the right of other bodies to enquire into what was for
them a matter of purely domestic policy.” Moreover, al-Nahas felt that Egypt already upheld
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religious freedom, rendering the statement unnecessary.119 With the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
already signed (1936) and the League of Nations increasingly powerless, al-Nahas likely felt
little pressure to cow to Britain’s or the missionaries’ demands.
Quite the contrary, al-Nahas was positioned to strike a fatal blow to missionary
institutions in the country and to concretize in law Egyptian conceptions of religious freedom.
Heather Sharkey has suggested that the Montreux Convention of 1937, which promised to phase
out the Capitulations over twelve years, was the death knell of missionizing in Egypt because it
removed tax exemptions and placed obstacles in the path of missionizing. Just prior to the
agreement, in January 1937, the liberal jurist ‘Abd al-Hamid Badawi made an exchange of notes
(i.e., an agreement) with the British Foreign Office’s legal advisor, William Eric Beckett,
concerning the future of missionary institutions, which was the basis for an additional exchange
of notes at Montreaux. The two agreed that missionary institutions would be permitted to
continue functioning in Egypt, subject to certain conditions, but that henceforth proselytization
would be illegal. Several months later, an Egyptian delegation led by al-Nahas signed, as part of
the Montreux Convention, multilateral agreements with several countries, including Britain,
France, and the United States, stipulating that foreign “charitable institutions” existing in Egypt
on the date of signing would be free to continue their activities subject to one qualification:
“within the limits of the customs recognised in Egypt regarding religions other than the state
religion, freedom of worship shall continue to be assured to all religious institutions … on
condition that there is no offence against public order or morale.”120 Interestingly, it was the
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Coptic delegate Makram ‘Ubayd who was said to have most vociferously rejected any statement
regarding minorities or religious freedom (as he had during the debates over the 1923
Constitution) and any notion that Egypt would allow proselytization.121 The British tended to
dismiss his position as a way for him (and the Copts) to avoid appearing as if seeking foreign
protection. Even if true, it is likely that he objected to this missionary practice, which was critical
to the terms of the Montreux Convention.
The missionaries from the International Mission Council may have been caught off guard
by this series of events in 1937. Though they tried to undermine the Egyptian position—at one
point arguing that they and the Egyptians had very different understandings of what constituted
proselytism122—their protests were directed at a British administration increasingly guided by
realpolitik and the prospect of dismantlement, even as it itself may not have realized it had
agreed to render proselytization illegal. “We seem at Montreux to have accepted the position …
that strictly speaking all proselytism in Egypt was illegal,” one legal advisor stated in response to
a missionary complaint to the high commissioner. He concluded that “it is difficult to see what
more precise instructions could be given on this point.”123

Conclusion
The banning of proselytism through the Montreux Convention, and of attacks on and offense to
religion in the 1937 penal code, established in law the state’s reading of religious freedom. As
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positivist modern law expanded at the expense of shari‘a, local notions of moral injury and
offense were channeled toward a state effort to maintain public order from the top-down. The
late 1930s and 1940s saw a slew of draft laws for expanding the state’s co-optation of these
sentiments. Only two years after the Montreux Convention, in 1939, the Egyptian senate (Majlis
al-Shuyukh) considered a new law drafted by ‘Abd al-Khalik Salim regulating “propaganda
susceptible to influence the religious conviction of adolescents.” The draft law was aimed at
“certain institutions having humanitarian and charitable appearances” that seek to divert the
religious convictions of children and adolescents. Justified with reference to Article 13 of the
Constitution, the law was deemed necessary for protecting not only Egypt’s youth, but also
public order.124
Though this draft law was shelved, the Egyptian senate discussed a new version in 1940
whose first article stipulated that religious proselytizing was permissible only in places intended
for such proselytizing (e.g., a church). The second clause proscribed anyone from proselytizing
to anyone other than the adherents of one’s own religion, including in schools and even with the
permission of a student’s guardians.125 The International Mission Council, feeling threatened,
proposed a “conscience clause” that would exempt students whose Muslim parents had chosen to
allow their children to receive Christian instruction. Such a clause was said to have worked in
India.126 But before this proposition went very far, the new draft law, like its predecessor, was
blocked. As parliamentarian Tawfiq Duss pointed out, it would have rendered illegal the call to
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prayer, not to mention the common practice of Muslims entering churches to visit or congratulate
Christian friends. The law, he felt, would contribute to sectarianism (al-ta‘assub al-dini).127
Despite Duss’ reservations, eight years later, in 1948, law number 38, combining
elements of each draft law, was passed and enacted, contributing to sectarianism in Egypt. Thus,
in a sense, the trail to the charge of izdira’ al-din discussed at the start of this chapter can be
traced back to the conditions that gave rise to the 1937 penal code and the article used to convict
Hakim Wasif for distributing La fleur de la forêt. It was this article that in 1982, soon after the
assassination of Anwar al-Sadat by an Islamist militant, was slightly revised to introduce the
notion of izdara’ al-din that further expanded the Egyptian state’s ability to regulate religion
under the rubric of public order. In the final analysis, Egypt cannot be said to have a deficit of
religious freedom as much as a particular trajectory of it, forged through a contingent process
involving missionaries, local communities, and the Egyptian state under the shadow of colonial
rule. As in other postcolonial contexts, this concept’s entangled history has helped to define and
delimit Egypt’s ethical and religious imaginaries. We will now turn from religious freedom, a
tactic of public order, to a related concept of expectation with its own particular genealogy—
public interest.
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Chapter 3
Whose Public Interest? Translations of Libel and the Elders of Zion

In 1890, an obscure Egyptian Christian named Habib Faris introduced his newly published
translation of a European text titled Les crimes rituels des Juifs by “affirming publicly” that “the
single purpose of the appearance of this book is to bring to light truths before the eyes not of a
nation or government only but of all without respect to national or doctrinal difference or to class
or rank distinction.” Faris had provided the first Arabic translation of this French work, which
only recently had been published in France. The original work gathered in encyclopedic fashion
the incidents of blood libel (al-dhaba’ih al-bashariyya, or tuhmat al-dam) claimed to have
occurred in both East and West. These included the recent alleged slaughter in Damascus of a
six-year-old boy named Henry ‘Abd al-Nur at the hands of a group of Jews said to have drained
his blood to mix it in the dough they used to make ritual bread (matzoh) for the Jewish holiday of
Passover. As Faris explained, “we clutched our hands on the only copy of this book in the world
and decided to translate it into the Arabic language.” What called him to this task, he pointed out,
was less an ancient form of fanaticism toward Jews, which many associated with the blood libel
accusation, than the spirit of reform: “if there was discovered among the religious groups
[tawa’if] and nations [umam] residing in the Ottoman Empire an evil commanding the
elimination or incineration of [justice], in this glorious age we must bring it to light in any way
possible.”1 In Faris’ view, it was Jews—or some of them anyhow—who had refused to leave old
habits behind.
Not coincidentally, about a decade later, in 1902, an actual blood libel accusation
occurred in Port Said, Egypt. The blood libel charge had a long history in Christian Europe, but
this incident was the most recent in a string of such charges in the Ottoman Empire that began
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only in the early nineteenth century. The accused, a twenty-six-year-old Jewish man named
Hayyim Daud Kahana, was convicted in court and then acquitted in appeal, largely thanks to the
skilled defense of his lawyer, the Egyptian Jewish reformer and intellectual Murad Farag. During
and after the affair, Farag countered the charge against Kahana and ridiculed the blood libel in
the press. Like Faris, he sought to reach a broad audience, and like Faris he made his case
invoking a new age of enlightenment and justice. But Farag offered a vision of the common good
that extended well beyond the boundaries of his community, encompassing even Kahana’s
accusers: “we have bias toward nothing but the truth, so [bias] is not stamped in our hearts by
religion and our vision is not clouded just to defend Jews [bani isra’il]—our … community gains
no benefit without humanity, zeal for the truth, and rejection of falsehood, slander, and
lethargy.”2
This chapter deals with the emergence of the secular concept of public interest in colonial
Egypt and its displacement of prior conceptions of the public good. Recent literature in
anthropology and history of the Middle East has described the translation and actualization of the
related, though significantly different, concept of public order within religious law in the colonial
Middle East, particularly Egypt, beginning in the late nineteenth century.3 Public order has
worked along the fissure between the public and the private, authorizing the state to intervene in
the seemingly sacrosanct realm of the private when and wherever it deems such intervention
necessary. One outcome was and continues to be the state’s increasing ability to regulate religion
especially when particular practices seem to transgress the perceived sensibilities of an assumed
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majority. As Hussein Agrama has observed, though “public order … is to apply equally to all
citizens … it expresses the sentiments and the values of the majority, even if they are rooted in
religion, so long as they have become integral to the cohesiveness of society.”4 Premised on a
unified national community whose features are defined in law, public order regulates and
displaces older forms and structures to facilitate governance in the nation-state.
By contrast, public interest, a vague secular legal concept that manifests differently
across liberal states but often authorizes judicial or executive power to implement a “common
good” when it conflicts with other laws, entered into Egypt’s public law in such a way that it was
intimately linked to issues of national security. This chapter explores public interest through a
focus on Egyptian Jews, who represent a logical case for two reasons. First, during the colonial
period Jews were the second largest non-Muslim religious group in Egypt numerically after the
Copts. And unlike the latter group, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, were included
among the nation’s elements (‘anasir), Egypt’s Jews were eventually excluded during the
1940s–1960s under the guise of national security. Second and relatedly, by the time Egypt
approached sovereignty in 1936–37, and especially over the ensuing three decades, Jews were
increasingly portrayed and identified as one of the main threats to public interest due to the
perception that their loyalty was to foreign capital and foreign powers rather than the Egyptian
nation.
To pursue this enquiry, the chapter traces in particular the translation of a set of texts and
related accusations often bundled together under the umbrella of anti-Semitism. The texts
include translations of western European works on the blood libel, which represent the tail end of
a very old form of anti-Jewish Christian polemics, and the paradigmatic anti-Semitic text, the
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fabricated The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The appearance of these works in Egypt and in
the Arabic language for the first time coincided with and inspired, in the former case, a string of
public accusations between the 1870s and 1920s that Jews murdered Christians for ritual
purposes, and in the latter case, the notion that the Jews sought to take over the main organs of
state to channel them toward their own interest (maslaha) and achieve world domination. Blood
libel accusations, almost unheard of in the Ottoman world prior to imperial intervention and the
expansion of Christian mission in the nineteenth-century, and almost exclusively leveled by
authors identifying as Christian, contended that Jews (al-ta’ifa al-isra’iliyya), allegedly guided
by Talmudic prescriptions, sought to drink Christian blood or to siphon it to make Passover
matzoh. Though in Europe this charge was often leveled in terms of Christian doctrine especially
in regard to Jews and Judaism, in fin-de-siècle Egypt it was lodged on the profane level in the
name of enlightenment, truth, and progress. The charge was born of suspicion, but in its textual
manifestation it tended to probe rather than state definitively, and did not impute essential
characteristics as it did in Europe. In addition to its consequences for Jewish individuals, who
could be imprisoned or worse, and for Jewish communities, the blood libel accusation often led
to a breakdown of communal relations and the actual spilling of blood.
Given their grave consequences, blood libel accusations attracted scrutiny and ultimately
scorn by some in Egypt. I focus on the efforts of the Jewish reformer Murad Farag to counter
them in both the courtroom and the press. Standing within his Jewish tradition, Farag dismantled
the logic of the blood libel by explaining Judaism and expounding moral Jewish subjecthood.5
As a modern lawyer, he drew on secular logic and the cultivation of empathy to successfully
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defend an accused co-religionist in the National Courts, where he encountered like minds. And
as a translator of modern legal knowledge, he presented a vision of public interest (al-maslaha
al-‘amma) marked by inclusiveness and sincerity (ikhlas). His efforts on all these fronts
coincided closely with the reform projects of many of his Jewish and non-Jewish peers, some of
whom addressed the ritual murder charge directly. Yet I show how their intersecting vision of
public interest, characterized by the cultivation of good morals through embodied practices, was
jettisoned by the implementation of secular public interest beginning in 1904. This latter project
sought to prevent mass violence and shedding of blood, but, through the logic of national
security, helped to render the local Jew (al-isra’ili) an undifferentiated universal Jew (al-yahudi)
whose interests were deemed suspicious and threatening to the national order. In conjunction
with the expansion of the Zionist project in Palestine, this Jew, gendered male, could be viewed
as a disease that was corrupting the national body and must be excluded. I use a translation of
The Protocols into Arabic from the late liberal period, when Arab nationalism was on the rise, to
illustrate the paradoxical operation of public interest and how it reconfigures modes of
identification, with Jews coming to be defined in essentialist terms. Although taking us
somewhat beyond the dissertation’s period of study, the work well encapsulates the distinction
between the common social good as a bottom-up cultivation of the moral community and secular
public interest as a top-down conception that is suspicious of the private and regulates it through
law.
Thus, in addressing the introduction of public interest in Egypt, this chapter also
addresses to some extent the contested issue of anti-Semitism in the Arab world. Broadly
speaking, this subject has been discussed in one of two ways. The first has understood antiSemitism as primordial to traditions of Islam, often channeling it toward a polemical defense of

69

Zionism and Israel.6 The second has viewed it as a modern European phenomenon that is
transplanted to the Ottoman world and the Middle East.7 Though this chapter takes the latter
perspective, it also contends that in both strands of literature anti-Semitism is presumed a stable
universal concept that stands outside of history, precipitating a Kantian categorical imperative. In
other words, anti-Semitism in Europe is anti-Semitism in the Middle East is anti-Semitism
anywhere, demanding in all cases an equal moral response. Assuming a distinction between antiJudaism and anti-Semitism, this chapter analyzes these concepts as objects of translation, similar
to public interest and the other concepts that are the focus of this dissertation.8 My intention is
not to dilute the seriousness of the forms of anti-Semitism we will encounter, for they had severe
consequences, but rather to suggest that they are indelibly shaped by the contexts in which they
accumulated meaning. If the emergence of anti-Semitism in Europe was inseparable from the
rise of the nation-state, in the Middle East it was also inseparable from both colonial
intervention, which enabled certain materialities of its translation, missionary discourse, as well
as Zionist and Israeli politics.
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Translating the Blood Libel
Habib Faris’ choice to translate an anti-Semitic French text into Arabic was perhaps not as
serendipitous as he suggests. His recognition of the book and interest in it were likely
conditioned by news he had recently heard of the blood libel accusation in Damascus. Even
before he began curiously flipping through the pages of Les crimes rituels des Juifs, he had likely
known that the 1890 affair was only the latest such case to have occurred within his Ottoman
scale. The most well known of these is what has come to be known as the Damascus Affair of
1840. In February of that year, the monks of a Capuchin monastery in Damascus accused local
Jews of kidnapping and murdering their friar Father Thomas, an Italian who had long lived in the
city, and his local aid Ibrahim ‘Ammara when the pair went missing. According to the monks,
the Jews had killed the father in order to siphon his blood for use in the making of matzoh. The
French consul Ratti-Menton led a joint investigation with the Ottoman governor-general Sharif
Badi‘a that, through the forced “confession” of a local Jewish barber, produced a group of
unsuspecting Jewish culprits. Though their fate of imprisonment and in a few cases death had
already been decided, the discovery of bones in a sewer in the Jewish quarter of Damascus that
the monks believed to belong to the friar, and then of more bones thought to belong to the aid,
did not help their cause, even as a local Italian doctor who conducted a forensic examination
refused to identify the bones as human. Ultimately, however, those accused who had survived
imprisonment and torture were released (without formal exoneration), in part through the
intervention of prominent British and French Jewish figures such as the banker and
philanthropist Moses Montefiore and the lawyer and statesman Adolphe Crémieux. Seeing in the
affair the haunting specter of a medieval European past, they traveled as a delegation to Egypt to
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plead with its viceroy Mehmet Ali to transfer the investigation to Alexandria or to the
jurisdiction of European judges.9 When Mehmet Ali agreed only to free the accused without an
acknowledgement of innocence, the delegation embarked for Istanbul to request of
Sultan Abdülmecid I a firman declaring blood libels spurious and banning them as a basis of
accusations. This he did shortly thereafter through the Tanzimat rubric of protection, though the
firman did not prevent the accusation from resurfacing.10
In what is often considered the most authoritative historical account of the affair,
Jonathan Frankel highlights its consequences for late nineteenth-century European and Jewish
politics. On the one hand, the incident revealed the persistence of anti-Jewish sentiment in two of
Europe’s most liberal states, Britain and France, where belief in the veracity of the accusation
was widespread. It was Klemens von Metternich of Austria and Nicholas I of Russia rather than
their Western European counterparts who expressed doubt that Jews in Damascus had a role in
the disappearance of the father and his aid. On the other hand, Frankel sees the affair,
particularly the intervention of Montefiore and Cremieux, as precipitating Jewish crosscommunal connectivity and solidarity that, in turn, made possible the Alliance Israélite
Universelle (AIU) and, later, perhaps even Zionism.11
What Frankel does not address is the consequences of the affair for Damascus, Egypt, or
the Ottoman Empire generally. One way to view this incident is as an act of translation, with
European Christian anti-Judaism being encoded into local intercommunal politics and
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vernaculars at a time when these were being reconfigured along modern lines. It was Western
European Catholic monks who launched the accusation against Damascus’ Jews, stoking fear of
Jews throughout a city that was already experiencing heightened intercommunal rivalry due to
the Egyptian occupation and the prospect of religious equality’s implementation throughout the
empire. It was also the Catholics who, in response to the investigation, unshelved a text by the
eighteenth-century canonist of the Franciscan Order Lucius Ferraris titled La prompta
bibliotheca, which described Jews’ supposed murderous hatred of Christians, and shared it with
the French consul in Damascus. According to the Austrian consul Merlato, a witness to the
events in Damascus, the French consul in turn “made public an Arabic translation of some
execrable doctrines imputed to the Jews and drawn from a Latin book, entitled Prompta
Bibliotheca,” which was “furnished through the zeal of our Christian missionaries of the Holy
Land.”12 A copy of the text, perhaps the first translation of what might be called the “blood libel
genre” into a language of the empire, was also forwarded to Syria’s Egyptian governor Ibrahim
Pasha.13
The Damascus Affair was in many respects a local, small-scale event, but one that
attracted a global audience. Occurring about one year after the announcement of the Gülhane
Hatt-ı Şerif (Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber, 1839), and almost simultaneous to another
blood libel accusation directed at Jews in Rhodes, it produced a sense of crisis in a moment of
expectation in the Ottoman Empire and in Western Europe—and in both over the dismantling of
religious communities and the binding of subjects to the sovereign state as equals. Damascus and
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Rhodes produced an explanatory logic that, due to the attention they received in the new age of
print, was quickly adopted elsewhere.
The first ritual murder accusation to occur in Egypt happened roughly three decades after
Father Thomas’ death. In 1870, an elderly Jew was arrested in Alexandria and rumors spread,
particularly within the Maltese community, that he had intended to kill a young Christian boy
and use his blood to make matzoh. In response, the Jewish community appealed to the then
British consul-general.14 This was followed by another accusation in Damanhur in 1878
involving an Italian child, and then yet another in Alexandria in 1881 involving a young Greek
boy, both activating local police, state authorities, and foreign consulates.15 In 1882, a “Greek”
woman in Port Said witnessed her daughter wander into the home of an “Ottoman Jewish
family” (i.e., Ottoman subjects), and the door shut behind her. The mother notified passers-by
and riots broke out among “Greeks and Arabs.” The father of the house, an elderly man, was
allegedly dragged from his home and trampled to death. Sixty Jews in Port Said, who were
“citizens of various countries,” signed a petition addressed to Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi and British
Consul-General Evelyn Baring in which they demanded, among other things, that the consulgeneral ensure those responsible be punished.16 And, in 1902, a Greek family in Port Said
accused Hayyim Kahana of the attempted kidnapping and ritual murder of a young daughter in
their household. In contrast to the prior cases, however, the Jewish community involved in this
one appealed not to Baring, who was still Egypt’s consul-general, but to an emerging star of
Egypt’s legal profession, Murad Farag. The case conveys how by the turn of the twentieth

14

The event was described by British officials in Egypt. Reprinted in Jacob Landau, Middle
Eastern Themes: Papers in History and Politics, 1st ed. (Oxon: Routledge, 1973), 105.
15
On these cases, see Archives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (hereafter AIU), Egypte I C
o1; and AIU Egypte I C 03.
16
Landau, Middle Eastern Themes, 105.
74

century many Jews had been absorbed into Egypt’s nascent National Courts and, by extension,
into Egypt as a polity in formation under colonial rule.17 The ritual murder case, rather than
sunder Jews from Egypt, was part of the process of binding them to the colonial state. And
Murad Farag, in his role as a producer and disseminator of legal knowledge and an employee of
the courts, was critical to this process.

Murad Farag and Colonial Law
Born in Egypt in 1866, Murad Farag lived a life that spanned ninety years during which his natal
Ottoman province became British-occupied territory, a British protectorate, and finally a semisovereign and—just before his death in 1956—a sovereign nation-state. Farag’s intellectual and
professional trajectory bears the marks of Egypt’s shifting cultural, political, and social terrain.
Having graduated from the Khedival Law School in 1889—the first Jew to do so—he served as a
lawyer in the National Court of Appeals and wrote a series of manuals on Egyptian law.18 Farag
was thus the product of a key colonial legal institution and in the state’s employ, disseminating
legal knowledge. In fact, after gaining notoriety as a lawyer, he worked directly for Khedive
‘Abbas Hilmi as a legal advisor. By the early 1900s, Farag had been drawn to the linguistic,
literary, and cultural revival of the nahda, and in its spirit established the Karaite reform journal
al-Tahdhib (Edification). Farag was a dayan on the Karaite bayt din in Cairo, and helped codify
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Egyptian Jewry’s personal status laws as part of the overall secularization of law.19 By 1908, he
began to advocate patriotic ideals and constitutionalism in Egypt’s nationalist press, considering
himself part of an emerging Egyptian nation.20
After World War I Farag encountered the emergence of an Egyptian nation-state and the
growing acceptance of a powerful European discourse coupling Jewishness with nationality,
which raised suspicion about the loyalty of Jews to Egypt. In contrast, Farag saw Egypt’s Jews as
an ethnic group (ta’ifa) within the Egyptian nation. In the 1920s and 1930s, he sought to bring
Karaites and Rabbanites together and to highlight commonalities between Hebrew and Arabic
and Jews’ place within Arab and Islamic culture and history.21 He also served on the committee
that wrote Egypt’s first Constitution.22 In the 1940s and 1950s, Farag watched as the subjectivity
and politics he had forged over a lifetime became increasingly foreclosed due to contingent
circumstances and events in Egypt, in Palestine/Israel, and globally. Farag died several years
after the Free Officers’ Revolution of 1952 that ended the monarchy. He was largely forgotten
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thereafter, for he fit into neither the logic nor the telos of Arab and Egyptian nationalism and
Zionism.
Farag approached adulthood at the time of Egypt’s colonization. In 1882, Britain
established control over Egypt militarily; by 1883, the legal colonization of Egypt was
underway, with British and Egyptian administrators and lawyers devising and implementing
reforms to expand and empower positivist law, a codified set of abstract rules with no necessary
relationship to morality that applied to all cases publicly and equally.23 The spread of positivist
law vis-à-vis the newly established National Courts confined the shari‘a and the milli legal
systems to the private domain (i.e., family law), transforming their content and, arguably, their
conceptions of morality.24 Moreover, detaching subjects from these legal structures and
subjecting them to colonial law meant refashioning their historical memories and temporal
sensibilities to produce loyalty to the state over the religious community. The ideology of legal
reform presupposed a past characterized by chaos and despotism, and a civilized present that
progressed toward a future of justice and “rule of law” (always in the offing).25 Established soon
after the National Courts, the Khedival Law School in which Farag was trained produced the first
generation of lawyers who, equipped with fluency in the national codes, filled the National
Courts. Embodiments of a new kind of legal expertise, these lawyers competed with legal
practitioners of displaced traditions.26 It is no wonder that many of Egypt’s future nationalist

23

Esmeir, Juridical Humanity, chap. 1; Talal Asad, “Thinking about Law, Morality, and
Religion in the Story of Egyptian Modernization,” JISMOR 1 (2006): 13. For a modern legal
history of Egypt, see Nathan Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and
the Gulf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
24
Asad, “Thinking about Law.”
25
Esmeir, Juridical Humanity, 21–23.
26
See Amr Shalakany, “‘I Heard It All Before’: Egyptian Tales of Law and Development,”
Third World Quarterly 27 (2006): 833–53.
77

leaders, including Mustafa Kamil and Sa‘d Zaghlul, were among those to attend the Khedival
Law School.
Three of Murad Farag’s works published between 1893 and 1901, or from his last days in
law school until he established his communal journal al-Tahdhib, illustrate his entanglement
with colonial law—an entanglement that his Christian and Muslim colleagues shared. These
works were a drop in the bucket of a massive corpus of typeset and easily reproducible legal
manuals published starting in 1883, the purpose of which was to explain the law—its origins, its
raison d’etre, its content, its workings. In their structure and language, and in their endless
repetition, they helped to produce the authority of the law and, by extension, the state.27
The three works— Risala fi Sharh al-Amwal ‘ala al-Qanun al-Madani al-Ahli
(Commentary on Property in National Civil Law), Kitab al-Majmu‘ fi Sharh al-Shuru‘ ‘ala alQanun al-Misri al-Ahli (Collected Work on Explaining the Inception of Egyptian National Law),
and Da‘awa Wada‘ al-Yad (Possessory Actions)—deal with various aspects of Egyptian law and
engage with a legal corpus.28 The first two, as Farag points out, are based upon the works of
jurists and legal theorists—largely French—to whom he had been exposed in law school. In the
earlier work, Farag explains that he “drew upon among the most well-known French
commentators.” The book, he goes on, “will be succeeded, God willing, by the publication of
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many other theses prepared on various topics of law.”29 For Farag, Egyptian law is an open field
of knowledge in need of explication. In his third book, by contrast, he suggests that a tradition of
positivist law in Egypt had formed, for he engages not foreign works alone but also texts by
jurists from Egypt’s National and Mixed Courts.30 Revealing his attachment to Egyptian law and
to an emerging notion of the Egyptian nation, Farag refers to “our national law” when providing
a genealogy of possessory actions (a proceeding to recover lost property), which he connects to
the heavenly holy books.31
Farag contributed to the hegemony of Egypt’s legal system in other ways too. On their
introduction in 1883, Egypt’s National Courts claimed jurisdiction over all commercial and
criminal cases, confining the shari‘a and milli courts to family law.32 In the early twentieth
century, Egyptian nationalists saw the National Courts as a medium through which to forge a
sovereign and unified Egypt. This involved abolishing the Mixed Courts (and the Capitulations),
which were obstacles to Egyptian sovereignty, and, for some, integrating the hitherto
autonomous “religious” courts into the National Courts. The shari‘a and milli courts survived
until 1955, three years after the 1952 Free Officers’ Revolution (though communal personal
status codes persisted within national law), but heated debates continued throughout the first half
of the twentieth century over whether to regulate or abrogate them. Legal thinkers, intellectuals,
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and the state, which had the power to approve non-Muslim communal codes, developed a keen
interest in personal status law.
In this context, Farag helped to found and participated on the Karaite communal council
established in 1901, whose purpose was in part to organize and manage the community’s
personal status affairs.33 In 1912, he translated Rabbi Mas‘ud Hay Bin Shim‘un’s compilation of
the Rabanites’ personal status codes from Hebrew into Arabic.34 In 1917, Farag translated and
commented upon personal status statutes in Elijah Bashyatchi’s fifteenth-/sixteenth-century
codification of Karaite law, Aderet Eliyahu (The Mantle of Elijah).35 After the passing of the
1923 Egyptian Constitution, as personal status law was again a focal point of debate, the Karaite
rabbi Ibrahim Kuhayn commissioned Farag to codify the Karaites’ laws.36 The manuscript he
produced could not be approved by the communal council due to some community members’
opposition to his reformist rendering of statutes on lineage and intermarriage between Jews of
different sects. However, in 1935, the council reached out to Farag after Egypt’s Ministry of
Justice requested the community’s still unpublished codes. Farag provided a copy, which was
eventually approved by both the council and the Egyptian state.37 In this way, Farag played a
critical role in the legal formation of the modern Egyptian nation. It is Farag’s location within

33

Murad Farag: Bi-Munasibat Dhikra Murur Khamsin ‘Aman ‘ala Wifatihi (n.p.: Albert Gamil
and [HSJE] Historical Society of Jews from Egypt, 2007). See Landau, Jews in NineteenthCentury Egypt.
34
See Mas‘ud Hay Bin Shim‘un, Kitab al-Ahwal al-Shar‘iyya fi al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya li-lIsra’iliyin (Cairo: Matba‘at Kuhayn wa-Ruzintal, 1912).
35
Farag, Shi’ar al-Khidr: Adoret Eliyahu, Statut Personnel Israelite Caraite (Cairo: n.p., 1917).
36
The work, eventually published in 1935, was titled al-Ahkam al-Shar‘iyya fi al-Ahwal alShakhsiyya li-l-Isra’iliyin al-Qara’in (Personal Status Legal Statues of Karaite Jews).
Apparently, attempt had already been made to compile the codes in Hebrew. See Mourad ElKodsi, The Karaite Jews of Egypt, 1862-1986 (n.p.: n.p., 2006), 77.
37
See Murad Farag: Bi-Munasibat Dhikra Murur Khamsin ‘Aman.
80

both Jewish tradition and Egypt’s secularizing society that we will now explore through a
dramatic court case from the early twentieth century.

Blood and Resolve
In December 1902, as Farag was hard at work in Cairo editing his communal reform journal alTahdhib, he learned of the indictment of Hayyim Daud Kahana, a Rabbanite Jew living in Port
Said, for attempted kidnapping. The family of a six-year-old Italian Catholic girl named Pépina
Papassi had accused Kahana of trying to abduct her from the family home in order to use her
blood to make Passover matzoh.38 According to the ruling of the Zaqaziq National Court where
the case was assigned, on the afternoon of 2 October 1901 Kahana had appeared at the apartment
of the child in the European district. He was already familiar with her due to his frequent visits to
the shop of a Jewish watchmaker named Pinhas Albert that neighbored her father’s own shop. At
the time of Kahana’s arrival, young Pépina was playing on the outside steps with other children
her age. He approached the girl and attempted to lure her to his home by offering her sweets.
Falling for the ruse, the girl began descending the stairwell toward him when a certain dame
Marula, the family’s Greek governess (khadima) who lived in the same building and had been
observing the scene from behind the front door window, opened the door abruptly and called the
girl’s name. Frightened, Kahana quickly fled.39 Marula then told the mother about the incident,
who screamed in horror.40
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On 31 October, the Port Said Parquet, after recording depositions from Pépina and
Marula, as well as the bawab (doorman) ‘Abduh Sulayman who confirmed their accounts, asked
the Zaqaqiq court to convict the accused based on articles of the Egyptian Penal Code covering
attempted kidnapping. Meanwhile, the Baghdad-born Jew Samuel Somekh, founder of an AIU
school in Alexandria, was following events closely and kept the AIU abreast of developments.
According to Somekh, Cairo’s chief rabbi had left for vacation in Lebanon amid the affair—an
act that angered Somekh.41 In his absence, the community’s leaders sent Kahana to a son of the
influential Mosseri family. The son could do no more than provide a lawyer, whom Somekh
accused of neglecting the case.42 Though the court was supposed to convene a criminal hearing
that November, it was delayed until September of 1902. When the hearing date arrived, the
judges, ‘Abd al-Shahid and Muhammad Zaki, heard the testimony of the girl, her father, the
Greek governess, and the bawab. They also heard the testimony of the watchmaker Pinhas
Albert, though discounted his statements because he was Jewish (“relations d’amitie [lisez sa
qualité de Juif]”) and sought “without hesitation” and with “what ingenuity” to exonerate his
coreligionist. The judges reasoned that because Kahana had persisted in offering Pépina sweets,
he had a premediated plan, and because he had her descend the stairwell, he intended to take her
with him and perhaps to kill her for her blood. Only causes “independent of his will,” namely
Marula, had prevented him from carrying out the act. The court declared Kahana guilty of
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attempted kidnapping, sentencing him to one year of hard labor and charging him for the cost of
the court proceeding.43 Though an innocent person would have found the sentence harsh, the
court seemed to be taking a middle position by not charging Kahana with attempted murder.
Stunned by the ruling, Somekh decided to contact Murad Farag, the well-known Karaite
lawyer. Farag took the case and the very next day brought it to the National Court of Appeals in
Cairo where he was confident he could win an acquittal “so long as foreign pressure did not
weigh on [the judge’s] judgment.”44 His confidence may signify, on the one hand, his familiarity
with and investment in the National Courts—an institution critical to his vision of Egypt’s
future—and on the other, his trust in relationships he had forged with fellow nahda reformers in
Egypt. Farag had surely been aware that it was the influential Muslim social reformer Qasim
Amin who headed (ra’is) the appeals court in Cairo. The two had likely met at the Khedival Law
School from which they graduated at roughly the same time; in any case, they were aware of
each other’s writings and saw each other as partners in reform.45 On 15 December 1902, only
three months after the initial verdict, Qasim Amin and two judges, including eventual prime
minster Ahmad Ziwar (r. 1924–26), would hear Farag’s defense of Kahana.
The hearing underway, Farag dismantled the testimony of the three witnesses by
exposing gaps in their stories. How was it, he asked, that on witnessing the incident Marula
could call out indignantly to the bawab, as he had testified, that “a Jew was trying to take the
girl,” when she had only had a quick look at him and couldn’t have determined his Jewishness
(jinsiyyatuh)? Likewise, how could the servant of a neighbor to the Papassi’s, who had just
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witnessed the incident and rushed to the father’s store, have told Mr. Papassi, as the latter
testified, that “a Jew wanted to take your daughter,” when he did not know this man no less his
religion (dinuh)? And how could the governess claim that Kahana was foolish enough to return
to the scene of the incident the next day and ask her whether there was an Italian (rumiyya)
woman living in the house with young children, thus implying that he had sought the blood of
Christians and especially Italians? It was this latter allegation that most offended Farag’s
sensibilities, and the governess had backed it up in her initial testimony in Zaqaziq by pointing
out that Kahana had married the rabbi’s daughter, suggesting he was pious, and that it is “a
custom of Jews to take a Christian girl every year.”46 Thus, much of Farag’s defense of Kahana
in appeal was to explain Judaism, the content of its sacred books, and the meaning of moral
Jewish subjecthood within the secular space of an Egyptian courtroom that, it turns out, was
receptive to his message.
Indeed, the court’s judgment—signed by Qasim Amin himself—reflects Amin’s
sympathy with Farag’s reasoning and representation of his tradition. To begin with, it found
inadmissible the accounts of all witness testimony other than that of the bawab, the girl, and the
governess. It concluded that the bawab had been playing backgammon nearby the family home
and was unaware that anything was happening until Péppina’s mother screamed and he went to
the house. The mother had raised her voice only when the governess had told her what happened
to her daughter, by which time Kahana had long fled. In other words, the bawab’s testimony that
he encountered Kahana on the stairs was inconceivable. Turning to Marula, the court, echoing
Farag’s logic, concluded that her testimony was not dependable because the glimpse she had of
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Kahana was insufficient for her to commit his features to memory and recognize him. And the
young girl was probably seen to have been unduly influenced by her family and the governess.
Attempting to reconstruct the likely course of events, the court suggested that a man other
than Kahana had approached the girl to abduct her. The bawab, wanting to absolve himself of
responsibility for not being on guard at the time and influenced by the ideas and opinions of the
Papassi household (Marula in particular) and the neighbors, decided to declare that the person
who approached the house was a Jew who wanted to kidnap Péppina and kill her as part of a
“religious ceremony [hafla diniyya], as is rumored about the Jews.” Then the bawab “went on
his way searching for a Jew, encountered the accused, and identified him.” When the bawab
showed Kahana to Marula, “she thought that this is who she saw and she must have been
influenced by the words of the bawab and was sure that he truly saw the accused just as the
bawab had been influenced by her words, and it would not be surprising if this mutual influence
happened without knowledge … and with good intentions.” On this basis, the court acquitted
Kahana and ordered the state to reimburse him for his legal fees.47 Farag praised the decision,
stating, “we can almost imagine a definitive general ruling against the lie of the [blood]
accusation as [this decision] fills people with infallible and elevated understanding.”48
Yet, rather than a conclusion, Kahana’s acquittal only opened a new chapter. Three
months later, when Judah Aron Mecha, the son of a Jewish merchant from Aden, disembarked in
Port Said to conduct business, a group of Greeks in the city reportedly sparked a rumor that he
had come “with the sole aim of abducting a Greek child for the ritual needs of the Jews.” As

47

Ibid. Farag reproduced the Court of Appeals’ decision in al-Tahdhib. See also Murad Farag:
Bi-Munasibat Dhikra Murur Khamsin ‘Aman ‘ala Wifatihi. For the French translation, see AIU,
Egypte XE 182, “Jugement de la Cour d’Appel indigéne du Caire.”
48
Al-Tahdhib, 31 December 1902, “Hadithat Bur Sa‘id – Tuhmat al-Dam – Tab i‘a.”
85

word spread “like wildfire,” according to an AIU report, Mecha was attacked, “first by Greek
children and then by grown-ups, and put in a sad state.” Only through police intervention was he
able to escape the onslaught. Meanwhile, as the afternoon went on, a crowd of over 3,000
“natives and Greeks” gathered, forming themselves into bands to attack Jews in the streets. Some
of these went to the Port Said synagogue to vandalize it, and several valuable Yemini Hebrew
manuscripts went missing. As local and state government as well as the British and Greek
consulates got involved, the police again intervened to disperse the rioters. A subsequent
investigation turned up four culprits. The main perpetrator, a Greek subject named Poriazi, was
tried in the Greek consulate and given a slap on the hand of twenty days in prison. The three
other perpetrators were all local subjects, however, and like Kahana their fate was determined by
the National Courts, which sentenced them to three months in prison. Meanwhile, the incident
forced the Governor-General of the Suez Canal, Husayn Wassif, to resign.49 The accusation
against Mecha and attack on the Port Said Jewish community, which preceded the much more
well-known Kishnev pogrom in the Russian Empire by weeks, propelled Farag to level further
critique of the blood libel in his journal. What he could not have known is that this would
probably be the last such incident in Egypt’s history.50 Through the establishment of a new
secular legal regime, the colonial state may have stopped the flow of blood—both imagined and
real—associated with ritual murder accusations. But as we will see, this same regime would
enable new and more pernicious danger to Egyptian Jewry in the decades ahead.

49

Bulletin l’Alliance israélite universelle, no. 28, 1903, 162–64.
The insinuation that Jews drink blood or used it to make matzoh did resurface, but it does not
seem to have been directed at an individual, except for a 1908 incident that proved relatively
minor. On this, see Journal du Caire, 2 and 3 April 1908. For invocations of the blood libel, see,
for example, the 1925 case of a teacher at Saint Catherine’s College in Alexandria described in
l’Egypte Nouvelle, 16 May 1925.
50

86

Like Minds against the Libel
Seeing the blood libel accusation as a “contagion” that had spread from “ancestors to
descendants,” and that suddenly had become so widespread that even Jews had begun to wonder
whether they were true, Farag, though exacerbated, decided to take action. While “difficult to
write letter after letter with [his] pen shaking so intensely,” he composed a series of editorials for
his journal al-Tahdhib rejecting the blood libel and defending Jews and Judaism.51 Observing
that it was almost always Greeks who leveled such accusations, Farag called them the “most
hateful” because they “think they are the intended target in particular and that their blood is more
suitable for the Jews than the blood of other Christians.” He attributed this hatred to an old form
of Christian anti-Judaism. On the most general level, “it is sufficient for me to say one word by
way of an answer to the first reason [for the accusation], which is that the Jews did not say that
the messiah came … and that they are still not Christian.” More particularly, it was believed that
Jews had been the ones to kill Christ. As for the accusation itself, Farag protested that “there is
nothing uglier, more abominable, more repugnant, more far from reason, the imagination, and
humanity generally than what’s been said [about us].” “What we are seeing,” he went on, “is old
religious thinking inherited from some five thousand years ago.”52
To correct the misinformation, Farag wrote from within his tradition, explaining Jewish
law and practice. For example, in one article he played role reversal by adopting a Christian
persona and turning his accusers into Jews so that he could instruct them morally on how to
speak about his tradition respectfully while educating his readers: “if they were Jews they would
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follow their Torah, pray to God for it, pray to our Master Moses who descended from heaven
with the revelation in his hand … celebrate the holidays, circumcise, marry, divorce without sin
… and in none of this is there murder or shedding blood.” Countering the logic of the libel, he
went on to explain that the Torah is the mother of the Christian Bible, and according to the Bible
one shouldn’t even kill a mosquito no less a child. Farag also clarified Jewish legal prescriptions
around consumption of blood and the slaughter of animals, revealing the accusation to have no
basis in Jewish law or custom.53 Yet in countering the rumors, Farag also sought to make the
point that it was not just Jews who were their victims; the blood libel accusation caused damage
to the moral society—characterized by enlightenment, decency, and refinement—that he and
other reformers were working so hard to create and sustain.
Some of these reformers joined him in publicly rejecting the blood accusation. The
journal al-Hilal (The Crescent), edited by the reformer and intellectual Jurji Zaydan, had a
history of denouncing it in its pages, with an editorial on the subject appearing in 1895 and
another in 1896. Soon after the 1902–3 accusations, al-Hilal published a question and answer on
the subject. In a letter to the editor, an individual from Alexandria by the name of Salim Effendi
As‘ad—perhaps a penname of the editor—asked:

The chatter has increased lately on the issue of the Greek child whom a Jewish man was
accused of kidnapping, and I heard some say that the Jews kidnap Christian children and
withdraw their blood in order to use it in bread for a religious purpose, so what do you
say?
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The editor sought to dispel such rumors:

It’s not appropriate for us when we are in the age of enlightenment to believe something
like this accusation. [This is] not because the Jews don’t kill anyone, for they do so just
like people from other [religious] groups [tawa’if]. They kill a Christian or Muslim child
just like some Christians and Muslims do, whether on purpose or out of ignorance or for
other reasons that propel people to commit crimes.

What Zaydan rejected was not the premise that Jews can commit the crime of murder, but that
“Jews carry out that act as a religious injunction recorded in their books or spread among them
through indoctrination [emphasis mine].” He suggested that, instead of textual or doctrinal
injunctions, the blood libel accusation could be attributed to the writings of Jews who converted
to Christianity and, wanting to ingratiate themselves among their new co-religionists and take
revenge on their old tradition, invented scandalous stories. The effect of these stories, he
suggested, was aggravated by people’s tendency to believe oddities and to gossip about them,
made worse by “remaining grudges from the dark ages and ignorance that does not befit folks of
this age.”54
Al-Hilal’s dismantlement of the blood libel accusation and defense of Jews elicited some
readers to respond with disapproval and to accuse the journal of apology, causing Zaydan to take
up the issue again. In a 1905 editorial titled “al-Talmud wa-Tarjamatu ila al-‘Arabiyya” (The
Talmud and Its Translation into Arabic) that again responded to a question from the same Salim
Effendi As‘ad, the journal, observing that over the past ten years people in Egypt had been
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chattering about “blood atrocities” (al-faza’i‘ al-damawiyya) attributed to the Jews and their
attempts to hide their legal prescriptions, reiterated its earlier position. But it also went further.
“It came to our mind … to transfer the Talmud into Arabic and abridge it, and its pages [would
take up] not less than one thousand pages [published] in sections in al-Hilal.” The project was
still in waiting when Zaydan met in the home of one of Egypt’s rabbis with the Moroccan Jewish
author Shim‘un Moyal, who was in Egypt with his wife Esther al-Azhari Moyal—herself an
author and editor of the women’s journal al-‘A’ila (The Family) in Egypt—studying medicine.55
In the rabbi’s home Zaydan caught a glimpse of a copy of the Talmud in Hebrew in his book
collection. Reminded of his translation project, he mentioned the idea to Moyal and proposed
pursuing it together. Moyal eventually accepted the invitation and involved the rabbi as well.
However, several days later Moyal informed Zaydan that he and the rabbi preferred to translate a
complete rather than abridged Talmud, with side-by-side Arabic translation and Hebrew original.
Zaydan was hardly disappointed, for “our original goal [was] the appearance of this book in
Arabic after the Arabs remained aloof from it for 1,300 years.”56 The rabbi later backed out
entirely for uncited reasons, but Moyal eventually published his translation from Palestine in
1909, making it accessible to a public of modern subjects who he felt would read it and find it
edifying.57 Zaydan’s idea to publish the first translation of the Talmud in Arabic to counter blood
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libel rumors had come to fruition, and contrasts sharply with the impetus behind later translations
of the Talmud into Arabic that we will encounter.
In retrospect, Zaydan’s response to the blood libel charge proved ironic. Soon after the
publication of Moyal’s translation, Zaydan found himself at the center of a contentious
Christian–Muslim public dispute. The 1908 Coptic Congress, in which a group of elite Copts had
demanded collective rights from the colonial state on behalf of their Coptic identity (see Chapter
5), and the Muslim Congress organized in response to it, had inaugurated a period of volatile
sectarianism that lasted through 1911. In 1910, the newly established Cairo University, whose
development Zaydan contributed to, had invited Zaydan to teach a class on Islamic history and
civilization, which he excitedly accepted. But, given the simmering tensions, Cairo University
quickly began to reconsider its decision. The university council feared that the idea of a Greek
Orthodox Christian, who though well-versed in the Islamic literary tradition was deeply
influenced by Orientalist approaches to the Islamic past, teaching such a course might offend
Muslims and cause unrest. His status as a member of a minority and link to colonial knowledge
made him suspicious at best and disloyal at worst in the eyes of the majority. When the
periodical al-Mu’ayyad (The Supported) reported on the story, it gave rise to widespread heated
debate in the press over whether a Christian could teach the religion of a majority community.
Taken by surprise, Zaydan withdrew from the role, and the university replaced him with the Dar
al-‘Ulum graduate Muhammad al-Khudari.58
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Underlying Farag’s critique of the blood libel, his reform project generally, and Zaydan and
other reformers’ defense of Jews was, I contend, a shared notion of public interest (al-maslaha
al-‘amma, al-nafa‘ al-‘amm, and similar expressions) that persisted into the colonial period.
Public interest is a concept within Islamic law intended to promote the common social welfare
and, relatedly, the sustenance of a moral community. Modern Muslim reformists have found it a
particularly useful tool because it is determined through reasoned judgment and not always
directly from the revealed texts. In other words, deeds in the public interest, made in context, did
not necessarily require legal justification. In her reinterpretation of Muhammad ‘Abduh’s project
of reform, Samira Haj has shown how ‘Abduh, embedded within Islamic tradition rather than
traditions of liberalism, sought to promote a modern Muslim subject “capable of being
incorporated into the fabric of modern structures of power and governance,” but also, through
habituated ritual and disciplinary practices, “fundamentally moral with a concern for the public
good.”59 In this spirit, ‘Abduh sought to extend the individual obligation (fard ‘ayn) to determine
public interest—previously the domain of the ulama’—to every educated member of the
community, a possibility made available by the spread of modern education. The notion of public
interest that he advanced was fundamentally different from utilitarian public interest, which he
rejected.60 This utilitarian notion is premised on the happiness of self-possessing individuals as
individuals, rather than the human as a moral subject within a communal setting, and the
formation of national sensibilities rather than the cultivation of a moral community. The
extension of fard ‘ayn, Haj points out, was “meant to promote and benefit the community as a
collective, rather than advance the selfish interests of its individual members.” “As members of
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the community,” she goes on, “individuals are accountable not only to themselves for their
beliefs and actions … [but also] to others, while … putting others’ beliefs and actions into
question.”61
In his journal, published during the years 1902 and 1903, Farag does not invoke maslaha
per se, but his notion of reform was similarly centered on the construction of moral subjects, in
his case Jewish, toward the achievement of a moral community and a moral society to which he
and other Jews felt connected. In other words, in Farag’s writing the promotion of the moral
subject is indivisible from that of the moral community, which is indivisible from that of the
moral society. Some of Farag’s articles published half a decade later do contain the term maslaha
and related terms. For example, in a 1908 essay titled “Harb al-Watan” (The Nation’s Struggle),
written amid the Copt–Muslim sectarian crisis described earlier (see also Chapter 5), Farag
describes the public interest of the Egyptian nation not in secular terms, but as prevention of
moral injury (al-idha’ al-ma‘nawi) toward a sound national collective. Concerned about relations
between Egypt’s religious groups, he advocates acts of sincerity (ikhlas) that will unravel coiled
feelings.62 In 1909, in response to growing sectarianism and nationalist activity, Consul-General
Eldon Gorst reinstated the 1881 Press Law restricting freedom of the press. In response Farag
wrote a series of articles evaluating the role of the journalist and journalism in society. In one
Article titled “Fi al-Hurriyya Ma Hiyya” (On Defining Freedom), Farag articulates a notion of
freedom that is bound to the moral subject as part of a community rather than the self-owning
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individual: “the human’s freedom is confined if the diamond of excellent morals, upright
conduct, and general rights, or mutual rights, are confined ... [this] damages the prisoner and
others aside from him.”63 The role of the journalist was to cultivate such morals and conduct in
society by speaking truth with equanimity, or in other words by focusing on the “public interest
of the country” (al-maslaha al-‘amma li-l-balad).64
Yet alongside this shared effort to sustain al-maslaha al-‘amma, another vision of public
interest (also al-maslaha al-‘amma) rooted in the liberal tradition was being effectuated and
would gradually displace it. As I eluded to in the introduction, Hussein Agrama has recently
described how the notion of public order, which intersects with but is substantively different
from public interest, was first introduced in Egypt in 1897 through sweeping reforms of shari‘a.
In order to make space for the National Courts, these reforms restricted shari‘a to what was now
defined as “family” issues. Thus, “religion” and “the family,” increasingly understood as a
nuclear group tied together by intimate relationships, came to constitute a new private sphere.
But since these reforms also required that shari‘a court hearings be public, they introduced a
contradiction that the state was authorized to resolve. Through its definition of public order, the
state possessed the power to regulate the boundary between public and private, and thus what
constituted religious practice.65
By contrast, in 1904 public interest was introduced for the first time as a separate branch
of public law, part of a broader reorganization of the National Courts. In Egypt, public interest
law was folded into criminal law (qanun al-‘uqubat) and tied to issues of security. Thus, in the
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1904 penal code, public interest law was divided into two parts: offenses and crimes harmful to
the security of the state from outside, and those harmful to the security of the government from
inside (al-jinayat wa-l-junh al-mudarra bi-amn al-hukuma). The law authorized the state to
determine what constituted harm to its security.66 Through the new code, public interest came to
be associated with loyalty to the nation-state, while its opposite, al-maslaha al-khassa (private
interest), became a cause for suspicion. This arrangement remained remarkably consistent over
the course of Egypt’s twentieth-century legal reform.67 In sum, whereas the Islamic concept of
al-maslaha al-‘amma, uncodified and open, was intended to cultivate practices generative of a
moral society from the bottom-up, secular public interest, set down in law, was intended to
cultivate obedience to the laws of the nation through the top-down threat of punishment. And
whereas the former presumed no division between public and private, the latter was yet another
component to that divide’s realization, with the private realm subject to the gaze of suspicion for
the threat it posed to the common social good.
As this legal architecture of the nation-state was put into place and modified over the first
half of the twentieth century, Farag and his autochthonous Karaite community as well as some
rabbanite Jews largely remained within a communitarian frame.68 As discussed in Chapter 3,
Egyptian Jews, unlike Coptic Christians, never firmly associated themselves or were associated
with the category of the minority after it was translated into Arabic in the early twentieth
century. Instead, forces beyond their control worked to transform their communitarian
identifications as isra’ilis into the undifferentiated and universal Jew (yahud), and local Jewish
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ta’ifas into a homogenous enemy nation. In stark contrast to Farag’s vision of the relationship
between Jewish moral reform and the moral society in Egypt, Jewishness was gradually
constructed as a private interest that, especially after the 1948 war, was presumed to be
threatening to public interest and particularly national security. This transformation was
contingent, fluid, and gradual. We will thus analyze it in its starkest “late” form through the story
of the 1951 translation of the paradigmatic anti-Semitic text, the fabricated The Protocols of the
Elders of Zion. This will convey the stark difference between the notion of the common social
good and that of secular public interest.

The Elders in Egypt
The first translation of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as a published volume in Arabic was
Taymur Muhammad Khalifat al-Tunsi’s 1951 al-Khatar al-Yahudi: Brutukulat Hukama’ Sahyun
(The Jewish Peril: Protocols of the Elders of Zion).69 The translator, al-Tunsi, was born in the
village of Tunis in the muhafiza of Sohag in 1915. After completing his primary education in a
religious institute in Asyut and his secondary education in a Dar al-‘Ulum preparatory school, he
enrolled in Dar al-‘Ulum college in Cairo from which he graduated in 1939 and earned his
graduate diploma in 1955, soon after completing al-Khatar al-Yahudi. Al-Tunsi was a disciple of
the eminent Egyptian intellectual ‘Abbas Mahmud al-‘Aqqad, who embraced his translation
project. In addition to this work, al-Tunsi composed books on philosophy and language, poetry,
and short stories. He sustained an interest in Jews and Judaism throughout his intellectual career.
In 1985, three years before his death in Kuwait, where he had been employed, he translated an
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obscure 1925 work titled Treasures of the Talmud by British Jew Solomon Levy, describing the
Talmud as a “holy book for the Jews” that occupies a “significant place in their hearts and
minds.”70 His focus on the Talmud as a driver of nefarious Jewish acts reflected the persisting
effects of the Christian anti-Jewish translation described earlier, though viewed in a wholly
different context and serviced toward different ends.
The story of al-Tunsi’s translation of The Protocols, as told by al-Tunsi himself in his
introduction to the work, is one of a Muslim lay scholar of Judaism refashioning an anti-Semitic
idiom that had traveled to Egypt via pathways of British colonization. As the category of “the
Jew” (al-isra’ili) was transformed from a marker of communal identification (al-ta’ifa alisra’iliyya) into a homogenizing national identification (al-yahud or al-sahyuniyun)—the result
of both Zionist politics as well as the legal and conceptual shifts described in this dissertation—
al-Tunsi and other Egyptian intellectuals, needing to frame and explain a new enemy, found and
adapted a European discourse on the Jew steeped in Christian eschatology but undoubtedly the
product of processes of modernization across nineteenth-century Europe. Whereas it was largely
Greek Orthodox Christians who thought to pursue blood libel accusations, this new profane
secular discourse was available to both Christian and Muslim Egyptians.
Al-Tunsi describes the shadowy origins of The Protocols in the vague terms typical of the
genre: a French woman meets with a secret masonic cell in France, records some of their stated
goals (the so-called protocols), and shares them with a large landowner in Russia named Alex
Nikolai Niftish. Then, Niftish, “realizing their danger,” hands them over to the “revered Russian
scholar” Sergei Nilus who he knew was positioned to publish them.71 In fact, Nilus, the Moscow-
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born son of a minor noble landowner, had been trained in law at the University of Moscow and
had worked in the Russian judicial system, but he withdrew from this track well before working
on The Protocols. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, saturated with the apocalyptic
fervor that had set in across Russia especially among those left behind by state modernization
schemes, Nilus forged his own brand of Orthodox mysticism, inspiring him to publish the
teachings and apocalyptic prophecies of the popular saint Serafim of Sarov (1754–1830) in 1903.
In the second edition of the work, published in 1905, Nilus included The Protocols. He framed
this fabrication in terms of a cosmic struggle between the forces of Satan—Jews and
freemasons—and those of the divine—the Russian Orthodox Church—that would culminate
imminently in the second coming of Christ.72 Nilus’ belief in his own prophetic vision,
embedded in Christian eschatology, was adapted by al-Tunsi, who saw him as presaging some of
the “dangerous events” that would occur in the years ahead. These included the fall of the
Islamic caliphate “at the hands of the Jews,” the fall of monarchies across Europe as a result of
World War I, whose “spoils were seized only by the Jews,” and the return of the Jews to
Palestine and the creation of Israel.73
Al-Tunsi goes on to describe how in August 1906 a copy of the 1905 edition of Nilus’
work arrived in the British Museum in London, where it remained untouched until 1917. During
that year, he explains, the book was accessed by a Russian reporter for the politically
conservative London Morning Post. This reporter, Victor Marsden, also “realizing its danger,”
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decided to translate it into English.74 It is no coincidence that Marsden made this decision on the
heels of the 1917 Russian Revolution, which was widely attributed in England to Jewish
machinations and inspired frenzied belief in an international Jewish conspiracy to control the
world. In 1920, the Britons, an English nationalist anti-Semitic group that had stirred this fervor
and supported the creation of a national homeland for Jews largely to rid England of its Jewish
minority, published his text, which became the standard English-language version.75 Copies of a
subsequent edition of Marsden’s book published in 1921 made their way to Cairo, likely in the
hands of colonial officials.76 Because India was a main target of Bolshevik propaganda, which
encouraged Indians to rise up against British colonial rule, many British politicians, journalists,
and officials came to believe that a network of Jewish plotters was actively seeking to dismantle
the British Empire. Thus, The Protocols, newly available in English, proved a popular read
among British colonial officials, including in Egypt. For example, Zionist leader Chaim
Weitzmann, who spent time in Egypt during World War I, reports that Wyndham Deedes, a
Christian Zionist who served as brigadier general in Cairo during the war and later chief
secretary of the high commissioner in Palestine, showed him a copy of the text and reported it
was a common sight among British personnel in Egypt.77
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Yet The Protocols did not appear in Arabic translation in Egypt until 1951, decades after
the first copies had arrived in the country. According to al-Tunsi writing in the early 1950s,
copies of the book at the time were “few, nay rare, nay rarer than rare.” The notion that The
Protocols was scarcely available and nearly impossible to find tied into a trope paralleling the
alleged secretive nature of the protocols themselves. In explaining the text’s history, al-Tunsi
repeats time and again that the copies of each new edition, regardless of language or country,
went missing under mysterious circumstances. He accused “the Jews” (al-yahud) of undertaking
a campaign to buy up as many copies as possible and burn or otherwise destroy them, to kill their
translators, and to shut down their publishers. Al-Tunsi’s narrative is contradicted, however, by
Abbas al-‘Aqqad’s comments in his acknowledgment of the publication of the translation. In
addition to al-Tunsi’s book, al-‘Aqqad had seen three versions with his own eyes. The first he
had borrowed from “one of our military officers who pursue rare books on topics of war and
strategies of invasion and conquest and the like.” The second he had bought secondhand and all
cut up (marju‘ wa-maqtu‘), the seller having no knowledge of its title no less its meaning. He
claims the copy was stolen from him along with other books and papers by employees in the
National Library. The third, a copy of the 1921 Marsden version inscribed with the word souveni
[sic] (gift), he found among the items left behind (mukhallifat) by a prominent doctor (tabib
kabir).78 Clearly old copies of the text, brought to Egypt initially by British officials, were lying
around in neglect among Egypt’s elite.
According to al-Tunsi, initial attempts in Egypt at translation into Arabic began in 1947,
about the time when the UN Partition Plan for Palestine was announced. He reports that the
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Egyptian daily newspaper al-Asas (The Foundation) came across a copy of The Protocols and
commissioned one of its editors, Anis Mansur, to translate it, but Mansur, after much
consideration, declined out of fear of the potential consequences. As Mansur describes it,

I began reading the book, and I discovered that those who translated it into English,
French, Spanish, [or] Italian were killed, and the newspapers that published it were blown
up … I hesitated a little … and then a lot … and I asked al-‘Aqqad about the veracity of
these words, and he affirmed them laughing.79

Between 1949 and 1950, al-Tunsi himself published translations of a number of the individual
protocols in the newspaper al-Risala (The Message), and later in 1950 and in 1951 others of
them in the newspaper Manbar al-Sharq (Pulpit of the East).80 Al-Tunsi reports that
independently an Egyptian diplomat in one of the “Eastern regions” whom he knew informed
him that he had purchased a used French copy of The Protocols in France “after much
searching.”81 The popular periodical Ruz al-Yusuf reported of another Egyptian official who
purchased a copy somewhere in “the East” for an extraordinarily hefty price: “he paid 500
Egyptian pounds ... and the copy that this Egyptian official obtained is perhaps the only in the
East and one of three copies in the world.”82 Later in 1951, al-Tunsi’s book was published, and
over the next decade three editions would follow.83 While, as I have described, groups of
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protocols had already been published in and outside Egypt, this was “the first complete,
trustworthy Arabic translation” of the original.84
The majority of al-Tunsi’s text is a translation of an English translation of a Russian antiSemitic text. In this respect alone it is ripe for analysis, particularly for what it tells us about antiSemitism. Here I will address the portion of the text that diverges from and frames the project of
translation, al-Tunsi’s introduction. In somewhat generic terms, al-Tunsi describes the alleged
danger of The Protocols, the elements of the “Zionist plot,” the meetings of the elders, the
protocols that emerged from them, the story of how they spread, and Jewish attempts to prevent
that spread—some of which we have already covered. But this conventional narrative builds to a
crescendo when al-Tunsi, writing as an Egyptian Arab to an Arab audience, defines the Jew,
explains the danger he poses, and appeals to readers to meet that threat.
In contrast to the texts discussed earlier, including those that adapted Christian antiJudaism, al-Tunsi represents Jewish identity in unmistakably essentialist terms: “The Jew [alyahudi] is a Jew before everything else, regardless of his nationality or whether he adopted
certain creeds or principles on the surface.”85 And what distinguishes the Jew, above and beyond
his doctrinal commitments, is his exclusive claim to chosen status and superiority: “In ancient
times, the Romans divided the world into two parts: Romans and barbarians, and the Arabs
divided [the world] into two parts: Arabs and non-Arabs [‘ajm], and thirty-five centuries ago the
Jews [al-yahud] divided [the world] into two parts: Jews and guyim or nations [umam], meaning
non-Jews, and the meaning of guyim for them is pagans, infidels, beasts, and the impure.” As the

84

Al-Tunsi, al-Khatar al-Yahudi, title page. For the first partial translation, see al-Khuri Antun
Yamin, al-Mu’amira al-Yahudiyya ‘ala al-Shu’ub: al-Muqarrarat al-Sahyuniyya au Mudabit alJalasat al-Sirriyya li-Hukama’ Isra’il (n.p., n.p., 1925). Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was published
in Palestine.
85
Al-Tunsi, al-Khatar al-Yahudi, 35.
102

Torah and Talmud make clear, he goes on, “God gave them the human image in honor of them,
whereas he created the non-Jew guyim from devilish or impure animal clay, and the guyim were
created for nothing but to serve the Jews…. understanding between the ruling chosen group and
the scorned slave group is not possible.” Yet the Jews are different from the Romans and Arabs
in one important respect. These latter groups “preferred themselves over others in some mental
and physical aspects, but they considered humanity to be of one origin and saw others as having
rights that morally they must give them.” The Jews, by contrast, took the more radical step of
“excluding [the guyim] from inclusion in the origins of creation and general human
characteristics.”86 This mentality has persisted until the present. Al-Tunsi points out that “their
conscience is the conscience of the Bedouin—it does not develop over the ages—and despite
their contact with different civilizations their life is the life of the nomadic Bedouin tribe … and
their clannish (milli) soul is the tribal Bedouin soul [that is] not able to relate to others and does
not want to.”87 Though this Bedouin soul was rightly praised in Jahili poetry, he goes on, “the
Jews lack the honor of the Arabs [i.e., the Bedouin], their courage, their fulfillment of promises,
their good neighborliness, and their hospitality to their neighbor and guest.”88
Having set out this essentialist and all-encompassing category of the Jew centered on the
notions of internal unity and chosenness, al-Tunsi segues to the related and more pressing claim
that the insular Jew invariably pursues Jewish interests (al-maslaha al-yahudiyya) exclusively
rather than the interests of the society (al-maslaha al-‘amm) or humanity (al-insaniyya). Thus, in
the national context, the Jew necessarily lacks the characteristic of loyalty to the nation essential
to membership in the national body. As al-Tunsi puts it, “he may adopt any nationality and will

86

Ibid., 15–16.
Ibid., 21–22.
88
Ibid., 22n1.
87

103

even serve the nation but only as long as doing so is in Jewish interests [al-maslaha alyahudiyya]. Otherwise, the Jew will revert to some other nationality.” Moreover, against the
universal ideals of brotherhood, freedom, and equality stands the Jew who puts his private
interests above these aims, even attempting to sabotage them. In both cases, the Jew is cast as
suspicious and a threat to public interest. Presenting Jews as a disease within the Arab body, he
states: “the disease does not kill the strong body but weakens it … I advise [Arabs] to realize the
danger they are living in … with speed and resolution … [and] to remove the danger from
themselves before the passing of time.”89 Rather than spill the blood of the individual Christian,
now the Jew enters into the blood stream of the nation as a disease that threatens the integrity of
its collective body.

Conclusion
Al-Tunsi did not complete his translation in a bubble. As mentioned earlier, the work was
supported and warmly embraced by the prominent Egyptian intellectual ‘Abbas al-‘Aqqad. It
also enjoyed the support of Esther Fahmi Wisa, whom al-Tunsi thanked in his introduction to the
fourth edition for assisting in the book’s production and dissemination.90 Wisa was the daughter
of Akhnukh Fanus, a prominent Protestant-converted Copt who organized the Coptic Congress
of 1911 (see Chapter 5), and herself a longtime supporter of the Wafd and women’s rights.
Having made it through the censors, al-Tunsi’s translation likely had the tacit approval of the
state as well. Yet even if it never reached the censor’s desk, we know that sometime during or
after the 1948 war the Egyptian state began to sponsor anti-Semitic texts. In 1961, for example, a
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new edition of Habib Faris’ al-Dhaba’ih al-Bashariyya al-Talmudiyya, originally published in
1890, boasted the state seal on its inside flap.91 Finally, we can assume that al-Tunsi’s book had
the support of a readership, for it was reissued three times.
If the translation of Christian anti-Judaism had largely been limited to Greek Orthodox
Christians, the translation of anti-Semitism, made available by pathways of British colonization
and inseparable from the emergence of Zionism and Zionist/Israeli politics, was a more general
phenomenon. Once war broke out in 1948, it proved a powerful tool for transforming local Jews
into a homogenized universal Jew whose private interests, casted as suspicious, could only be
seen to conflict with the public interest of the Egyptian nation. Secular and profane public
interest, intended to police sites of disloyalty to the nation, authorized the state to exclude such
identifiable private interests through the law.
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PART 2: CATEGORIES OF CLASSIFICATION AND POLITCAL IDENTIFICATION

Chapter 4
Ordering the “Land of Paradox”: The Fashioning of Nationality, Religion, and Political
Loyalty

Reflecting on his rule and the art of governance in colonial Egypt, former consul-general Lord
Cromer posed ethnic, racial, and/or national difference as a problem:

It might naturally be supposed that, as we are dealing with the country called Egypt, the
inhabitants…would be Egyptians. Any one who is inclined to rush to this conclusion
should remember that Egypt…is the Land of Paradox. If any one walks down one of the
principal streets of London, Paris, or Berlin, nine out of ten of the people with whom he
meets bear on their faces evidence…that they are Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Germans.
But let any one who has a general acquaintance with the appearance and physiognomy of
the principal Eastern races try if he can give a fair ethnological description of the first ten
people he meets in one of the streets of Cairo…He will find it no easy matter.1

Cromer’s remarks reflect the centrality of population to the political rationalities of what David
Scott, expanding upon Michel Foucault’s Europe-centered theorization, calls “colonial
governmentality,” a modern form of power “concerned above all with disabling old forms of life
by systematically breaking down their conditions, and with constructing in their place new
conditions so as to enable—indeed, so as to oblige—new forms of life to come into being.”2 In
nineteenth- and twentieth-century Egypt and elsewhere, the colonial refashioning of subjects and
construction of political community involved the flattening of heterogeneous identifications and
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affiliations toward a homogenous polity that, in a national context, demanded loyalty to the
nation. For Cromer, Egypt is a “Land of Paradox,” with its different kinds of and differently
affiliated people living in one bounded territory, only in contrast to Europe’s then-homogenizing
and unitary nation-states. Egyptian subjects would adapt this normative view of political
community, viewing nationality as, in one jurist’s words, having “simple, singular meanings that
do not tolerate mixing or overlapping.”3
This chapter provides a genealogy of the “Egyptian national.”4 Drawing on periodicals,
legal compendia, and British and Egyptian state records, I show how the “Egyptian” as a
juridical category was initially established by the British-dominated colonial state as part of
governing Egypt, and took form within the vestibule of colonial politics. I also show how the
Egyptian national, first articulated in the 1920s, inherited prior definitions of Egyptian
subjecthood. However, I argue that this category was also shaped by what Eric Weitz, referring
to the Paris peace settlement of 1919–23, calls the “Paris System,” in which populations,
conceived as racially, ethnically, and/or nationally homogenous units, became central to
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governance and were linked to sovereignty.5 After the British unilaterally granted Egypt limited
independence in 1922, Egyptian legislators and British advisers, needing to devise nationality
codes, adapted earlier colonial definitions of the Egyptian to an emergent global system of
bounded national territories. Through the case of Egypt, a country that was not beholden to the
settlement’s treaties but whose laws and public discourse reflected a translation and
interiorization of their central concepts, this chapter points to the global scope of Paris’
capillaries.
In telling this story, my focus is on religion as a category of identification, for the Paris
System lent religion particular salience in the “Middle East,” a region that was just being
consolidated in the minds of international policymakers. Scholars have traced the politicization
of religion in Ottoman and post-Ottoman contexts, with outside Christian powers, missionaries,
and Ottoman state reform efforts exacerbating religious difference by making religion the basis
of politics.6 They have also shown how secularism as a political process less confined religion to
a presumptive private sphere than rendered it a site of state intervention and control.7 But
scholars have only begun to consider how religion was also shaped by modes of international
governance that emerged after World War I and whose role was in part to transform colonies into
“sovereign” (as we will see, the word struck upon different registers in colonial contexts than it
did in Western Europe) states, which, managed by mandate regimes, might join the community

5

Eric Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled
Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” The American
Historical Review 113 (2008): 1313–43.
6
See, for example, works by Bruce Masters, including Christians and Jews in the Arab Ottoman
World: The Roots of Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
7
See, e.g., Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2003).
109

of “civilized” nations.8 The creation of an international legal system coincided with the invention
by European scholars of a new taxonomy of religion, a term increasingly used to refer to what
they viewed as the world’s “great traditions”—Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam, etc.—all
understood to be fundamentally alike but also dissimilar in important ways. This taxonomy, part
of a broader transformation of European identity in the nineteenth century, extolled the
superiority of Christianity, with its supposed Aryan and Greek Hellenic origins, as the universal
religion of freedom, in contrast to parochial, tribal, and static Islam, with its semitic origins.9 The
postwar treaties could only have proceeded from these epistemic foundations.10 In Egypt, the
treaties and Paris System thinking generally, grafted categories inherent to nation-state politics
(i.e., majority and minority) onto religious groups and, in many cases, affixed these groups to
outside, racialized nations.
This reconfiguration of religion, its flattening out through a linkage to national categories,
both entered Egyptian law and became meaningful to subjects. Thus, the chapter maps how the
ascription of nationality in the postwar Middle East was, to use Michel Foucault’s phrasing, a
process of subjectification, refracting prior religious identifications.11 Scholars have shown how
nationality, as an “instrument and object of social closure” critical to the rise and sustenance of
bounded nation-states, allowed for legal and social distinctions to be made between “insiders,”
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“outsiders,” and those in between.12 Yet it also reordered individual and collective pasts, as well
as the horizon of the future. In defining national subjecthood, nationality laws constructed the
past of the nation and state, often before historians did so, in codified form, establishing a
juridical-historical narrative that served as a basis and impetus for future nationality law and
subjective practices. These subjective practices, never bound to the code, shaped, in turn, how
the national was defined, a looping effect that helps to explain how the boundaries of national
subjecthood, insider and outsider, remain always in flux.13

The Ottoman Imperial Citizen
Egyptian nationalism saw itself as a repudiation of Egypt’s Ottoman past. Yet the country’s first
effectuated nationality law of 1929 laid overtop the Ottoman Nationality Law of 1869, applied in
Ottoman Egypt. The two laws involved complex processes of translation and reflect uneven
linguistic transformation, shedding light on the manifestation of nationality in Ottoman and postOttoman contexts. For the French term nationalité, the 1869 Ottoman nationality law used the
Arabic/Ottoman Turkish word tab‘iya/tabiiyet, related to the noun tabi‘/tabii, which means
“follower,” and in an imperial legal context referred to a subject of the sultan or state.14 Use of
this word, which coexisted with the term ra‘aya/raya, meaning “subjects” (again, of the sultan or
state), particularly non-Muslims, arguably reflected a transfiguration of Ottoman political

12

Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1992), 75.
13
Ian Hacking, “The Looping Effects of Human Kinds,” in Causal Cognition: An
Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. D. Sperberet et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 351–
61
14
Will Hanley, “When Did Egyptians Stop Being Ottomans?: An Imperial Citizenship Case
Study,” in Multilevel Citizenship, ed. Willem Maas (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2013), 93.
111

community defined in part by the vertical relationship between sultan and subject into a form of
citizenship.15 The 1869 law was one of a number of Ottoman reforms concerned with state
centralization and bureaucratization in the face of the interconnected problems of incipient
nationalism and imperial encroachment. Reformers promoted a new ideology of Ottoman
constitutionalism in which an undifferentiated Ottoman imperial citizen would supersede
religious and/or ethnic difference, even as Islam continued to be the basis of state identity and a
factor in naturalization after implementation of the law.16
Among the Ottoman state’s aims in pronouncing the law was preventing loss of subjects
to foreign powers, which could offer them privileges sanctioned by long-standing Capitulatory
agreements (e.g., exemption from local courts, taxes, or conscription). Going forward, Ottoman
men who married foreign women were unable to adopt foreign nationality, instead retaining
Ottoman nationality. However, as part of fitting the empire into a world system of nationality,
the 1869 law followed the idea upheld universally at the time that women follow the nationality
of their husbands. This was a shift in the Ottoman province of Egypt as elsewhere, where women
had always been legally referred to as daughters of fathers or mothers of sons (e.g., “Umm
Muhammad,” or mother of Muhammad).17
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Thus, when Princess Saliha (later Diana) of the Egyptian royal family married Vladimir
Yourkevitch, a Catholic-turned-Lutheran Russian who became a well-known shipbuilder, at a
church in St. Petersburg in 1909, she became a Russian national. In fact, nationality law seems to
have trumped personal status law in cases such as hers where a marriage violated Islamic law.
Yourkevitch himself had originally been an Orthodox Christian but converted to Protestantism
due to the Orthodox Church’s proscription of marriage between Christians and non-Christians.
After the Grand Mufti of Egypt issued a fatwa nullifying the marriage, Yourkevitch converted to
Islam and took the name ‘Abd al-Rahman Shaykh Jalal al-Din Muhammad. He then remarried
the princess in an Islamic marriage in London. The couple had likely needed their marriage to be
legally recognized in Egypt, perhaps for social reasons or to secure an inheritance.18 Princess
Saliha was one of many Ottoman women who lost Ottoman nationality and gained foreign
nationality through marriage.
The articulation of nationality laws across nineteenth-century Europe was influenced by
French nationality as defined in the 1804 Civil Code, which combined jus soli (rights by birth or
residence on national territory) and jus sanguinis (rights by bloodline or filiation) but
emphasized the latter.19 In the 1869 Ottoman law, the first article stipulated that individuals born
to an Ottoman father and mother, or to an Ottoman father and foreign mother, were Ottoman
subjects. Unlike in later Egyptian nationality laws, both father and mother were seen to confer
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nationality on children, even though the law’s privileging of the father strengthened notions of
the patriarchal family in a context where, historically, women enjoyed relatively broad property
rights.20 The 1869 law presumed everyone on its territory to be Ottoman unless demonstrated
otherwise and was relatively liberal in terms of naturalization. Every individual born on Ottoman
territory to foreign parents could acquire Ottoman nationality within three years of reaching
majority. Further, foreign adults who resided five consecutive years in the empire could obtain
nationality by applying to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in exceptional cases the
latter could confer nationality sooner. While rendering acquisition of Ottoman nationality
relatively easy, the law required Ottoman subjects wishing to naturalize abroad to first obtain
Ottoman state permission, a caveat that later proved significant in Egypt.21 Thus, while it
produced a new category of governance—the Ottoman imperial citizen—this category’s terms of
inclusion/exclusion had less to do with perceived characteristics of populations than with
geopolitics.
The Arabic term for “nationality” used in later Egyptian codes and common today,
jinsiyya, has a very different connotation that tab‘iya/tabiyet. This word was likely a neologism
of the nineteenth century deriving from the word jins, itself an Arabization of the Greek genus
that eventually became the Arabic trilateral root janasa, meaning “to make homogonous” or
“classify.” Over time, jins has taken numerous meanings such as “kind,” “species,” “category,”
“sex” (male, female), “gender” (in grammar), and, more recently, “race” and “nation.”22 In the
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mid-nineteenth century, jinsiyya referred to “common origin,” a meaning with flexibility to
absorb various associations. Thus, in an 1879 speech in Alexandria, the Muslim intellectual
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani could refer to the jinsiyya of “Eastern peoples” as a shared civilizational
origin that was being attenuated by the imperial division of Eastern lands into territorial units and
by “backwardness.”23 In 1884, however, al-Afghani refers to jinsiyya in the sense of national
origin and in contrast to cross-territorial Islamic unity.24 By the turn of the twentieth century, it
still carried this meaning, sometimes in a national sense, but was overlaid with race, as racial
theory was popularized in Egypt through scientific journals such as al-Muqtataf and its
competitor al-Hilal (The Crescent).25 When the Egyptian colonial state sought to articulate a
distinct political category of “Egyptian local subjects” in 1900 (see below) in order to more
effectively govern, the word jinsiyya, rather than tab‘iya, was perhaps seen to best capture the
political community it sought to produce.

An “Internationalist Nationality”: The Egyptian Local Subject
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The shift from Ottoman tab‘iya to Egyptian jinsiyya was precipitated in part by the British
occupation of Egypt in 1882, which brought a shift of suzerainty over the province even as a
veneer of Ottoman control and links between Egypt and the empire remained. Colonial
governance in Egypt involved in part the reconstruction of Egypt’s legal system through the
establishment of the National Courts in 1883.26 This new institution was accompanied by new
governing structures and associated legal codes that first produced the legal category of the
Egyptian local subject.27 Announced in the Egyptian government’s official journal, the 1883
Organic Law replaced what had been the Council of Notables, established under Khedive
Isma‘il, with a new, quasi-representative Legislative Council and General Assembly based on
models from India.28 These bodies had a largely advisory role and little authority. According to
then-British ambassador Lord Dufferin, who first proposed them, their purpose was to “erect
some sort of barrier, however feeble, against the intolerable tyranny of the Turks.”29 The British
also viewed them as pedagogical tools for self-governance, though they refrained from
conferring real authority on them until politically expedient.
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The deputies who were to fill these new governing structures would be elected according
to the Electoral Law, which, announced on the same day as the Organic Law, stated that eligible
voters were limited to “Egyptian local subjects.” This new category included male Ottoman
subjects in Egypt at least twenty years of age, certain “undesirables” aside.30 The articulation of
the Egyptian local subject was part of a colonial effort to render Egypt governable by defining
and categorizing its territory and population, though without explicitly threatening Ottoman
suzerainty, Capitulatory powers, or the international balance of power. The inclusiveness of the
category—excepting gender—is indicative of the modus operandi of the colonial state, which
was intent on appending all subjects to itself.31 Lord Cromer echoed this purpose when he
asserted repeatedly that Egypt contained an assortment of peoples who should be fused into what
he paradoxically termed an “internationalist nationality.”32
In the 1890s, this first articulation of the Egyptian local subject would be followed by
others delineating eligibility for service in government posts and the national courts. These
decrees introduced a new condition excluding any male Ottoman subjects who had lived in
Egypt for less than fifteen years.33 The exclusion of newcomers was intended to assuage local
outrage over British favoritism toward “Syrians,” who received a disproportionate number of
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high government positions.34 This largely Christian group from Ottoman Syria was one of many
Ottoman and non-Ottoman groups to arrive in Egypt in the second half of the nineteenth century
seeking economic opportunities and/or refuge from state repression, and some Syrians came to
play important roles in Egyptian society.
As the category of the Egyptian local subject expanded from the electoral to other
domains of eligibility, subjects began to claim and adapt it, widening the new divisions it had
introduced. One example involves a group of six Syrian Effendis (middle-class professionals)
residing in Egypt who in 1898 applied to the Cairo Governorate (muhafizat misr) to register their
names on the electoral roll to vote. On 2 June 1898, the head of the National Court of Appeals in
Cairo, Ahmad ‘Afifi, and two judges, considered their application in court. The Syrians based
their claim to Egyptian local subjecthood not only on their continued residence in Egypt, but also
on their payment of taxes to the Egyptian government and their subjection to local Egyptian law
and courts. Further, it was clear to them that the Egyptian government defined the term (lafza)
“Egyptian local subject” in the Electoral Law so as to include all Ottomans residing in Egypt (a
definition that, conveniently, had been adopted in the 1886 Conscription Law). If they reside in
Egypt, pay taxes, are subject to Egyptian law and courts (unlike many Europeans), and can be
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conscripted, this groups of Syrians reasoned, how could they be excluded from Egyptian local
subjecthood?35
‘Afifi, who seems to have been a liberal Egyptian protonationalist, refuted the Syrians’
claims by arguing that residence, taxes, and subjection to law and courts each represents its own
legal domain and has little to do with Egyptian local subjecthood, a legal category he viewed as a
nationality and critical to public law. Further, he maintained that Egypt, though still under the
suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire to which it pays tribute, is independent in its internal affairs
(he did not mention the British occupation). In his view, this independence was initially achieved
in 1841 by Egypt’s rebellious viceroy Mehmet Ali, who extracted a firman from the Ottoman
sultan granting him and his male bloodline right of rule over Egypt. Because any independent
nation must have its own nationality, ‘Afifi reasoned, Egyptian nationality, even if unrealized in
law, existed and was distinct from Ottoman nationality. In the context of local–“nonlocal”
competition under colonial governance, ‘Afifi defined Egyptian nationality by adapting earlier
definitions of the Egyptian local subject, now including only residents of Egypt since 1841.36
Thus, he established an origin point for the birth of the modern Egyptian nation and inscribed
Muhammad ‘Ali as its “father,” well before Egyptian royalist historians did so in the 1920s.37
This early “nationalist” reading of Egyptian nationality would be repackaged by later jurists.
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Further, within the category of the Egyptian, ‘Afifi Bek distinguished between natives
(al-ahali al-asliyyin) and those who arrived in Egypt with the “late resident of paradise
Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha” (i.e., prior to 1841). In his words, the Egyptian includes

the bishop, the archbishop, the saint, the priest, the rabbi, and the legislator … and
[included] among the Egyptians is the Orthodox, the Jew [isra’ili], the Catholic, and the
Protestant, and these religions [adyan] and denominations [madhahib] are not particular
to non-Egyptian Ottomans … because the Egyptian is not confined to the native Egyptian
but includes others who … became attached to [the Egyptians] in the period of the late
Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha.38

This divide between “native” and “non-native” Egyptians would become increasingly operative
in the social realm during the years ahead.
The colonial administration issued a new Electoral Law on 29 June 1900 that seems to
have been a response to lack of clarity and confusion over how to define the Egyptian local
subject. The new law’s preamble stated that it was concerned with attribution of “Egyptian
nationality” to diverse categories of persons. Although this was the first law to invoke Egyptian
nationality, its clauses were confined to voter eligibility and it in no way replaced Ottoman
nationality. Egyptian voters now included Ottoman subjects settled and habitually residing in
Egypt since 1848 (chosen because it was the year of the first country-wide census, illustrating the
importance of the census to nation-building even in the minds of nation builders themselves39);
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those born in Egypt whose parents settled and resided there, as well as those who performed
military service or paid the exemption tax; and orphans with unknown parents. Male Ottoman
subjects having resided in Egypt for at least fifteen years now had to declare their desire to be
Egyptian local subjects to local officials and to have completed military service to be eligible.40
This decree law was followed by a myriad of others—e.g., a civil employment law in 1901, a
conscription law in 1902, and the 1904 Penal Code—each defining the “Egyptian local subject”
according to the needs of its issuing office. In short, this category had no singular definition, and
related to eligibility rather than nationality.
In a final installment of the Egyptian local subject, Herbert Kitchener, a successor to Lord
Cromer as consul-general, issued a new Organic Law and Electoral Law in July 1913 in attempt
to enhance the authority of Egypt’s legislative bodies to appease Egyptian nationalists and check
the power of then-khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi II. The Organic Law replaced the Legislative Council
and General Assembly with a Legislative Assembly comprising the Council of Ministers (itself
part of the executive branch), sixty-six elected members, and seventeen government-nominated
members. The Electoral Law determined election procedures and voter eligibility, this time
making no mention of Egyptian nationality. Voters were limited to male Egyptian local subjects
as defined by the 1900 decree law (according to British officials, this amounted to roughly one
million potential voters out of a population of seven million), a tiny minority of whom would
actually vote.41 Meanwhile, the seventeen government-nominated members had to be, according

Source for Social Historians,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 24 (1997): 193–216. On
the census and the nation-state, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 2nd ed.
(London: Verso, 2006), chap. 10.
40
For the 1900 law, see al-Waqa’i’ al-Misriyya, 4 July 1900.
41
The law also used the term misriyin (Egyptians), but one jurist of the 1920s explains that its
authors understood this term as commensurate with “Egyptian local subjects.” For the laws, see
J.-A. Wathelet and R.- G. Brunton, Codes égyptiens et lois usuelles en vigeur en Égypte
121

to the Organic Law, from underrepresented social and professional groups, including Bedouin,
doctors, engineers, as well as educational and municipal employees, along with one religious
community, the Copts.42
The inclusion of Copts, but no other religious group, partially relates to the emergence of
Coptic minority politics several years earlier.43 Often considered by the British and themselves to
be “original Egyptians,” the Copts were Egypt’s only potential minority that could not be
associated with a nation/ethnicity elsewhere. In Europe, this association was the best protection
minorities had from majority-ruled nation-states when the League of Nations proved inept at
enforcing minority protection treaties, and thus groups such as Armenians and Jews, which
nowhere formed a majority, were vulnerable to becoming refugees and/or stateless.44 In Egypt,
where the nation-state took form under the shadow of colonial rule, the opposite was true. As we
will see, during and after World War I, Christians from Ottoman Syria and others became linked
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to new racialized nation-states that the British and French carved out of the Ottoman Empire,
largely writing them out of Egyptian nationality, whereas the status of Armenians (whose
numbers were small) and Jews would remain as nebulous as that of the Armenian and Jewish
national projects.45

Protected Nationals, Foreign Ottomans
Britain’s announcement of a Protectorate over Egypt in November 1914, after the Ottoman
entrance into World War I, formalized Egypt’s separation from the Ottoman Empire, raising
thorny legal questions around sovereignty, jurisdiction, and nationality. Egypt became an
independent, nonsovereign state, a shift that required “Egyptian local subjects” to become
“Egyptians.” The Protectorate state considered all inhabitants—men, women, and children—of
what was now a distinct national territory to be Egyptian nationals unless demonstrated
otherwise, though while abroad they were British-protected persons. Ironically, however, until
Egyptian nationality laws could be written and effectuated, the 1869 Ottoman law remained in
use, as reflected in a range of Mixed Courts cases.46 The split between “Egyptians” and
“Ottomans” in the political-legal realm would soon become axiomatic, shaping subjectivities and
conceptions of national community.
In theory, Egypt’s national formation meant that “Ottomans” could be classified as
foreigners, or, given the war’s battle lines, enemy foreigners. The question of who was an
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Ottoman remained unclear and complex, and the category became available to subjects to claim
or disclaim. Legal debates during the war focused on whether the Mixed Courts, historically
reserved for disputes between litigants of different nationalities, were now competent in cases
between Egyptians and Ottomans. In a 22 February 1916 Mixed Courts case, a judge ruled in the
affirmative because, “Egypt, being independent now, is no longer part of Turkey, and, in
consequence, there is a difference in nationality between an Ottoman subject and a local
subject.”47 In 1917, a different judge ruled oppositely when a certain Georges Farah demanded a
sum of money from Wahid al-Fahakni, who denied the Mixed Courts were competent in the case
because, “my adversary, like my humble self, has the honor of being a local subject.” According
to reports, Farah responded indignantly that he was a Greek subject and could prove it.
Moreover, he claimed that if his evidence should be deemed insufficient, he had originally been
an Ottoman subject, making him a foreigner in Egypt since the announcement of the
Protectorate. The court rejected his evidence and refused to classify him or other “Ottomans” as
foreigners.48 Ultimately such subjects would remain under the jurisdiction of the National Courts
but became foreigners by law. A conceptual wedge had been inserted between the Ottoman and
the Egyptian. This wedge reverberated in the social realm when, for example, a group of Syrian
Jews in Egypt petitioned the British to treat them as “friendly aliens,” a new category to appear
in wartime Egypt.49
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With the start of the Protectorate, the British Office of the Judicial Advisor in Egypt’s
Ministry of Justice set out to draft a law establishing the Egyptian subject/national as an
internationally recognized legal subject, producing at least four draft decrees during the war. The
task was critical not only to confirming Egypt’s independent status and thus forcing foreign
powers to recognize the Protectorate, but also to ordering a nationally heterogeneous population
along a grid of “friend” and “foe.” In fact, the two drafts on which I focus reflect a gradual shift
toward a concern with loyalty, a concept that would be central to the postwar Paris project to
expand the nation-state system globally. The first, stamped 25 November 1914, was by British
Judicial Advisor William E. Brunyate, a trained lawyer who would have a major hand in postwar
Egyptian legal transformation. Although the draft was titled “Draft Law Defining Those Who
Are Entitled to Egyptian Status” (rather than Egyptian nationality), it acknowledged in its first
line the end of Ottoman suzerainty. On a copy of it in the British National Archives, the last two
words of the title are crossed out in pencil and replaced with “Egyptian Nationality.”50 British
legal experts and administrators were hesitant to call this a “nationality law,” exposing the
paradox of establishing a nation-state under a Protectorate.
In a similar vein, Brunyate’s draft preserved the language of subjecthood used in prewar
decrees, invoking the “Egyptian subject” rather than the “Egyptian national.” Brunyate’s
definition of this subject mirrored earlier definitions of the Egyptian local subject in its
inclusivity. For him, “Egyptian subjects” included Ottomans previously recognized as Egyptian
local subjects or domiciled in Egypt and maintaining residency. However, for the first time
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Egyptian status now implied “allegiance to the khedive” (and soon, the British-installed sultan
Husayn Kamil). Unlike the Ottoman Nationality Law, Brunyate’s proposal also explicitly limited
the transmission of nationality to men, contributing to a shift toward the notion that national
belonging, though it could be represented as a woman, was essentially bequeathed by men.51 The
draft was eventually sent to the Egyptian Council of Ministers, which despite the Protectorate
still had to review new legislation. On receiving the proposal, the council, made up of Egyptian
nationalists, lawyers, and landowners, rejected it, reportedly because its members opposed
granting Egyptian nationality to “Syrians and other Ottomans” in Egypt, whom they viewed as
competitors.52 Colonial politics had again shaped the boundaries of the Egyptian as a legal
category.
The second draft was released by the Office of the Judicial Advisor on 29 December
1918. After the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the British felt new urgency to define Egyptian
nationality so as to mitigate ambiguities over national status after the pending breakup of the
Ottoman Empire into new states. Based on suggestions by Albert Balfour, best known for the
1917 Balfour Declaration, the draft was the first to refer to the “Egyptian” in a national sense,
opposite to the “alien.”53 It regarded all Ottoman subjects residing in Egypt on 5 December 1914,
the date when the Protectorate was declared, as Egyptians. But unlike prior decrees and draft
laws, this one stipulated that Ottoman subjects who repudiated Egyptian nationality would have
to leave Egyptian territory within an unspecified period of time. This innovation was consistent
with the logic of collective plebiscites and individual options emerging out of the concurrent
negotiations at Versailles, which would reorder the populations of Central and Eastern Europe
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along lines of national loyalty. According to then-high commissioner Edmund Allenby, who
would later be involved in drafting the Egyptian Constitution, the new provision was directed at
those in Egypt with strong Ottoman sympathies, “whose presence … might be politically
embarrassing.”54 These included members of the family of ‘Abbas Hilmi II, the former khedive
whom the British deposed and banned from returning to Egypt.55
Aiming for homogeneity, the British also wished to avoid the presence of permanent
foreign residents, particularly Syrians and Armenians, on Egyptian soil. As George Lloyd,
Allenby’s eventual successor as high commissioner, pointed out: “Our object is to set up an
independent Syria and Armenia and not independent Syrians or Armenians elsewhere. If Syrians
or Armenians in Egypt want to adopt the nationality of their mother country, should they not be
required to leave and qualify by residence?”56 Lloyd’s use of the phrase “mother country” is
reflective of how, given that a Syrian nation-state had yet to be formally established and the
Armenian nation-state had only just emerged, religion in the region had come to be linked to
sovereignty and territory. Hence, Brunyate, the author of the 1914 draft law, would state in 1919
that,

My impression … is that an Armenian will always regard himself as an Armenian,
although habitually resident in Egypt, and that if an Armenian state is erected he would
desire Armenian subjection. So, too, to a certain extent with the Syrian—and I should
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suppose with the Hedjaz Arab. To a considerable extent the feeling is the same as our
own when we live in a foreign country, and, to adopt legal terminology, I believe that
there is often a much realer animus revertendi than one would at first sight suppose.57

By the end of 1918, British administrators saw Armenians and Syrians not as part of a patchwork
that would congeal into modern Egypt, as prior British administrators had, but rather as tied to
outside, sovereign, and racialized nations. This shift of perception was reflected in the 1917
census, the first to introduce national/racial categories, all of which were deemed “foreign.”58
It should thus come as no surprise, then, that the 1918 draft was also the first to
emphasize jus sanguinis through the father’s line in defining Egyptian nationality, even as the
basis of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914 was jus soli. Given the
preponderance of British nationals and subjects in Egypt, and of “Europeans” generally whom
the British sought to protect, defining the Egyptian this way allowed control over the attribution
of Egyptian nationality. The idea was seconded by Alfred Milner’s Special Mission of 1920,
which London had dispatched to Egypt to report on the situation there after the 1919 revolt.59
The definition would reappear in the eventual Egyptian nationality law.
Paradoxically, the understanding of peoples as sovereign and racialized did not preclude
“non-Egyptians” from becoming Egyptian. After all, the 1918 draft presumed Ottomans to be
Egyptians in the first instance. This was partly attributable to the endurance of an old colonial
strategy of sponsorship in a new age. Thus, one British official suggested that Christian Syrians

57

TNA FO 141/552/II, “Brunyate to Hurst,” 15 June 1919.
See Ministry of Finance, The Census of Egypt Taken in 1917.
59
Alfred Milner, Report of the Special Mission to Egypt, no. 1 (London: H.M. Stationery Office,
1921), 5.
58

128

who became Egyptians could “exercise a moderating influence, and as they will be able to
continue to enter Government Service as at present, they will by their superior intelligence and
hard work play a very important role and will … secretly favour Great Britain as against the
more extreme and antiforeign Egyptian Moslems with whom they can never really coalesce.”
Similar ideas were held about “semi-European” Jews.60 But some viewed assimilation as
possible. Despite his assertions about the national sympathies of Armenians and Syrians in
Egypt, Brunyate maintained his earlier position that Ottomans residing in Egypt should be
Egyptian, for “in any case, a change will come in the next generation.”61 At issue was not
whether homogeneity was desirable, but rather how it should be achieved.
British officials suspected that, as with the 1915 proposal, Egyptian ministers would
likely view the 1918 draft, or a slightly revised version of it that was produced in 1919, as “too
liberal to Syrians and other Ottoman Christians whose immigration and competition is feared.”62
In frustration, George Lloyd wrote, “We cannot create Egyptian subjects and then refuse to admit
bona fide residents of non-Egyptian birth.”63 To allay these fears, Allenby suggested inclusion of
a caveat that attribution of Egyptian nationality to Ottomans did not confer political rights absent
certain conditions, an idea which reappeared in the eventual Egyptian nationality law.64 Other
Ottomans could be subject to a different kind of exception. A different Allenby proposal was to
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afford special authority to certain Ottomans, such as Nubar Pasha, the influential Armenian
statesman who played a major role in the founding of the Mixed Courts, or Faris Nimr, the
Syrian editor of the pro-British daily al-Muqattam—both of whom, it was thought, could
potentially opt for Egyptian nationality, the nationality of the new states of Armenia and Syria,
respectively, or even British nationality—to remain in the country.65
A final innovation of the 1918 draft was the idea that children of “illegitimate birth”
followed the nationality of the mother, unless the child became legitimate during his or her
minority, in which case the child would follow the father’s nationality. If, as we saw previously,
defining the Egyptian national could be productive of certain hierarchies within the family, this
draft differentiated between “pure” and “impure” Egyptian families, depending on “licit” or
“illicit” relations. Further, if the authors of the draft meant to produce Egyptians who were loyal
to the state (we saw how “disloyal” Ottomans were to be excluded), the draft law granted the
state the ability to deny some “Egyptians” nationality: those born in Egypt but living abroad on
the law’s date of publication would have a year to return and acquire nationality, but the
Egyptian government reserved the ability to rescind that right.66 In short, the state would have
the power to include or exclude based on loyalty to its nation.
The revised draft was put to the Consultative Committee for Legislation made up of
British administrators in Egypt, which reviewed the text in April 1920. This committee made
further revisions, some incorporating principles that were emerging out of the concurrent Allied–
Ottoman settlement negotiations in Sevres, France, including the notion that anyone who
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renounces the nationality of a new state must leave it within six months.67 Swept aside
temporarily by postwar treaties and events as well as the specter of Egyptian independence, the
draft never became law, but it foreshadowed how international postwar treaties, law, and
institutions would shape Egyptian nationality.

Sovereignty, Imperial Politics, and the Paris System
The British unilaterally declared Egypt independent in 1922, initiating a struggle over the
boundary between British control and Egyptian sovereignty, one site of which was nationality.68
The British retained authority over, among other domains, “foreign interests” and “protection of
minorities” at about the time when the minority was rendered a legal subject by the new, postwar
international legal order. Locals in Egypt had long associated “foreigners” (ajanib)—correctly or
incorrectly—with imperial politics, and groups that now could be identified as minorities shared
this dubious distinction, only they did not necessarily enjoy access to privileges such as legal
immunity that had often come with British protection. Thus, in Egypt no group would uniformly
embrace this fraught category of inclusion/exclusion in the nation-state, and, due to its
implications for national sovereignty, neither was it imposed on any group. In fact, in the name
of unity Egyptian legislators eschewed it altogether in drafting the 1923 Constitution (see
Chapter 5). Interiorizing the logic of Paris, such legislators saw the cultivation of a loyal nation
as their overriding aim, and the establishment of a nationality regime as the primary means of
achieving it.
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A significant and lengthy nationality dispute arose in August of 1922, when the vice
governor of Cairo, Mahmud Fahmy al-Nuqrashi, approached the British Consulate about the
status of two “military recruits,” sons of a certain David Abraham Khoury, who was born an
Ottoman subject in Bilad al-Sham in 1864. Khoury served as an interpreter for the British army
in Egypt between 1882 and 1922—his whole adult life—and by 1908 he was able to naturalize
as a British subject along with his children, who had been born in Egypt and were now four and
six years old (no information is available on their mother). As with most Ottomans who
naturalized, however, Khoury did not first obtain permission of the Ottoman state, required by
the 1869 Ottoman nationality law. The Ottoman government had therefore never formally
recognized Khoury or his sons as British subjects, and Egypt, as the inheritor of this law, could
not do so either. In its view, the Khourys had remained Ottoman and then become Egyptian. The
British Consulate replied to al-Nuqrashi’s inquest by confirming the family’s British status.
There the matter lied until September 1924, when the consulate received another note from the
vice governor threatening arrest of the Khoury children as “deserters” of the army, a message
they forwarded to David Khoury advising him to keep his children at home until the matter was
settled.69 As al-Nuqrashi explained, “The laws in force in Egypt, and especially the recruiting
laws of 1902, insist that every Ottoman subject born in Egypt from parents of Ottoman subjects
and residing in Egypt is dealt with as an Egyptian and has the right to election and is subject to
military service.”70 The father Khoury denied this claim, producing naturalization papers as
evidence.
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As the affair escalated, the Egyptian government renounced its claim to the father in what
it said was a gesture of “compromise,” though the British perceived that because he was “a
person who was Syrian born, [Egypt] did not take any special interest in him.”71 Egypt did claim
the children, however, because, unlike the father, it viewed them as assimilable. For this claim,
the law was on its side, a point on which the British Judicial Advisor Maurice Amos could only
agree.72 The children were born in Egypt, making them Egyptian by the terms of the Ottoman
Nationality Law (of Egypt), and while they may have naturalized as British subjects, they had
not obtained required permission of the Egyptian or Ottoman state for change of nationality. This
conclusion did not nullify their earlier naturalization. Rather, it made them dual nationals, with
their primary nationality, according to recent international legislation, being that of the territory
on which they resided.
As for the British, their concern was to not set a precedent whereby Egypt could claim
British subjects and “foreigners” more generally. Being the first of its kind, the Khoury case was
seen to be determinative of similar cases, many centering on Egyptian-born and Britishnaturalized children and young adults. Advised by the Judicial Office of the legality of Egypt’s
claim, the Foreign Office sought a diplomatic solution to the crisis through the creation of a list
of subjects whose status would be mutually agreed upon by British and Egyptian authorities.
Although the British produced this list, which contained the names of some thirty individuals
along with their family members living in Cairo alone, the two sides did not come to terms
before the pronouncement of an Egyptian nationality law in 1926, which reshuffled nationality
politics. By that time, the youngest Khoury had decided to retain Egyptian nationality so as not
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to lose a position in one of the Egyptian ministries, which was closed to foreign nationals, while
the older child still sought to preserve his British nationality.73 It is unclear what came of the
Khourys because their archival trail ends, but their story illuminates the relationship between
nationality and questions of sovereignty during the 1920s. As one parliamentarian put it, defining
the Egyptian national was important to “show to other countries that we are an independent
country and have our own sovereignty (siyada).”74 Egypt’s path to sovereignty involved
excluding subjects with Capitulatory privileges and access to the Mixed Courts, leaving a more
loyal and governable population. During the 1920s, the Egyptian state and Egyptian nationalists
increasingly called for disbanding the Capitulations and integrating the Mixed Courts into the
National Courts, though both persisted until 1949.
Through its extension of the nation-state system across the globe, the Paris System helped
render sovereignty a universal aspiration of “peoples” that did not yet possess it. But, as with
nationality, the translation of sovereignty into various languages and contexts was a contingent
process that gave rise to a multitude of meanings. In Egypt, nationalists did not associate
sovereignty with, for instance, the overthrow of absolute monarchy, as in revolutionary France.
In fact, Article 1 of Egypt’s first Constitution of 1923 emphasized that Egypt’s celebrated new
government was a hereditary monarchy with a parliamentary form.75 Rather, nationalists
associated sovereignty with the stripping away of colonial and imperial control over Egypt’s
affairs, a process that Egyptians often saw as perpetually incomplete.
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At the level of language, Egyptian officials needed to find a word relatively equivalent to
“sovereignty” in Arabic and ascribe it new meaning. This was the task of the Egyptian
Constitutional Committee, which, in writing an early draft of the Constitution, defined Egypt as
“an independent, free, and sovereign country,” with the adjective sayyida used for the French
souverain. However, one committee member, drawing on a fourteenth-century Arabic dictionary,
objected to this translation because sayyida’s historical meaning was “one who exercises
authority over the great majority” (alladhi yamlak tadbir al-sawwad al-‘azm), which in his view
inadequately expressed the collective active will and capacity (qidra) associated with the French
original. Another committee member, al-Shaykh Bakhit, agreed, adding that the word sayyida
also means honorable (sharif), and this second meaning may sow confusion. Incidentally,
sayyida is also an honorific title for women (i.e., lady, Mrs.), and whereas Egypt was often
represented as a women during this period, the nation’s natural, indispensable companion—
sovereignty—likely had to be expressed in masculine terms.76 Al-Shaykh Bakhit preferred the
phrasing tamat al-qidra, as in, Egypt has “complete capacity” or “complete ability.” But not all
on the committee agreed. “We spent much time searching for a word that indicates the meaning
Souvrainté and we did not find its equivalent. Perhaps the word is unfamiliar [to us Egyptians],”
argued al-Shaykh Bakhit’s colleague Mahmud Abu al-Nasr. Favoring the original term sayyida,
he contended that “there is adequate time to mitigate its peculiarity to the mind” and that its other
meanings (e.g., honorable) would not interfere.77
Uneasy about sayyida’s multiple meanings, al-Shaykh Bakhit countered that the
committee seeks a word that “bears no resemblance” to any other word, that is entirely clear and
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decisive in meaning. He proposed al-siyada, from the same trilateral root as sayyida but with two
meanings that could not be confused: su’dud (dominion, rule) and nifadh al-qawl (effective in
speech). “For this reason,” he concluded, “I request its adoption because we want to write a
Constitution [whose meaning] every person understands.” This emphasis on clarity, that the
Constitution be legible to all national subjects, was reiterated later in the debate when another
member suggested that the word al-siyada needed to be modified by the word tama (complete)—
tamat al-siyada (complete of sovereignty). The added noun may have signified Egyptian
administrators’ desire to challenge Egypt’s limited independence. But perhaps because Egypt
could hardly be described as completely sovereign, the phrasing that won out was more
ambiguous: misr dawla dhat siyada (Egypt is a country possessing sovereignty). The word alsiyada became the common Arabic translation of sovereignty.78
In addition to maximizing sovereignty, Egypt’s nationality project had to adapt to a new
world spanned by contiguous, bounded nation-states regulated by emergent, international modes
of governmentality. On 10 August 1920, the Allies and the defeated Ottoman Empire signed the
Treaty of Sevres, which partitioned large parts of the empire into separate states. Although the
Turkish nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal later rejected the treaty, forcing the Allies back to the
negotiating table, it had important effects on nationality in Egypt (and Ottoman successor states).
For one, the Ottoman Empire formally recognized the Protectorate and renounced all rights over
Egypt effective retroactively to 5 November 1914. It also abandoned claims to Ottoman subjects
habitually residing in Egypt on 18 December 1914, while those who came to habitually reside in
Egypt after that date and remained there until the signing of the treaty could opt for Egyptian
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nationality—an option Egypt could lawfully reject presumably based on the question of loyalty.
European “experts” of international law viewed the right of option as complimentary to the
plebiscite that granted individual subjects the ability to choose between nationalities. But in
making this available, it adhered to the Paris ideal of homogeneity by discouraging the
constitution of minority populations. Thus, the Treaty of Sevres stated that only former Ottoman
subjects not belonging to the “majority race” where they lived could opt for another Ottoman
successor state, but on the condition that they were part of that state’s “majority race.”79 As we
shall see, this clause would soon be adapted by Egyptian legislators.
The Treaty of Lausanne replaced the Treaty of Sevres in 1923, establishing the Republic
of Turkey, but it dealt with the nationality question similarly to its predecessor. The treaty did
not apply to Egypt, which was already independent, but as one legal observer noted, Egypt could
not ignore it.80 The right of option forced Ottoman successor states to settle the status of some
subjects on their territories cooperatively. Already by the start of World War I, Egypt had come
to terms with France and Greece over the national status of subjects from French Tunisia and
Greece. Between 1923 and 1927, Egypt reached a settlement with Italy over subjects from
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, and with France over subjects from Morocco and Mandate Syria and
Lebanon (though Syrians and Lebanese established in Egypt prior to the treaty’s signing were
left out). It also negotiated with the British over “Iraqis,” “Palestinians,” and “Transjordanians.”
While each settlement was different, foreign consulates in Egypt were generally expected to
create lists of subjects to claim, which the Egyptian government and subjects themselves could
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approve or challenge based on claims about the subject’s past.81 Egypt fought, and generally
succeeded, in preventing subjects appearing on these lists from enjoying Capitulatory privileges.
The status of now former Ottomans not covered in these arrangements could not be
determined until Egypt pronounced a nationality law. In the meantime, subjects began to adapt
new national categories operative in international legal treaties. On 22 February 1924, the
satirical weekly al-Kashkul (Scrapbook) ran two articles describing separately the nationality
status of “Syrians” and “Lebanese” in Egypt. In the first article, the author divided Syrians in
Egypt into four categories: merchants and capitalists who want to be French for Capitulatory
privileges; bank and shop employees who generally want to be Egyptian, except for some who
seek “status as well as moral and material benefits” linked to French nationality; government
employees, who generally wish to be Egyptian, except for a minority who desire French
nationality if afforded the “rights of foreigners”; and youth, who “refuse everything but to be
Egyptian.”82 The second article, written by a self-identified “Egyptianized Lebanese” (lubnani
mutamassari) named Farid Hubayshi, suggested that most like him— “Lebanese” born or having
long lived in Egypt—desire Egyptian nationality “if the Egyptian nation makes up its mind to
absorb the Egyptianized [Lebanese] mutamassarin and to treat them as brothers.”83
Egypt’s nominal independence rendered the passing of an Egyptian nationality law more
urgent. However, when the Constitution was passed in 1923, it stated only that “the law defines
Egyptian nationality.”84 On 31 July 1925, the Egyptian government formed a committee under
the leadership of Minister of Justice Sa‘id Dhu al-Fiqar to draft a law. This committee was
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composed largely of a generation of French-educated jurists and legislators who generally shared
an inclusive view of citizenship articulated by the likes of the liberal Egyptian intellectual
Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. It also included a British “advisor” who communicated British
interests.85 In fact, a copy of a draft of the law in the British National Archives is replete with
cross outs and revisions for the committee’s attention, though in many cases this “advice” was
unheeded.86 The new law was pronounced by royal decree on 26 May 1926.87

The Egyptian National
Based largely on the 1920 British draft, the 1926 law was the first legislation to define the
Egyptian national. However, as the jurist Paul Ghali pointed out, the law’s priority, reflected in
the order of its articles, was to determine the status of Ottomans whose loyalties were thought to
lie outside Egypt.88 In this sense it was a product of Paris thinking. Different from prior British
draft laws, whose purpose was to create Egyptian nationals out of a population presumed to be
Ottoman, this law assumed a priori the existence of “original Egyptians,” while producing the
new category “Ottoman nationals” which it subjected to special legislation.
The law’s first article defined “Ottoman nationals” as all (non-Egyptian) nationals of the
former Ottoman Empire before the Treaty of Lausanne came into effect, meaning that only
Tunisians, Libyans, and others subject to bilateral nationality agreements concluded prior to 24
July 1923 were excluded. Among the rest, those habitually residing in Egypt on 5 November
1914 who maintained their residency until the date of the decree law were deemed Egyptian,
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while those who did not could apply to the Interior Ministry within a year. Those who came to
habitually reside in Egypt after 5 November 1914 and preserved their residency until the date of
the decree law were also Egyptian. Meanwhile, any Ottoman born, or whose father was born, in
territory that had been incorporated into an Ottoman successor state could opt for that state’s
nationality within one year, after which he or she would be required to leave Egypt within six
months. If that person failed to leave Egypt or returned within five years, the option would be
canceled and he or she would automatically become Egyptian. Ottoman nationals filling none of
these conditions had a year to make Egypt their place of habitual residence, and could then apply
for Egyptian nationality after five years. In general, the law presumed everyone on Egyptian
territory to be Egyptian until his or her nationality was established. Yet absent the latter, political
rights were disallowed, leaving many as neither full citizens nor foreigners with access to the
Mixed Courts.89
Similar to the 1920 British draft, the 1926 law’s definition of the Egyptian favored jus
sanguinis through the father’s line. The Egyptian included anyone born in Egypt or abroad to an
Egyptian father, unknown parents, or a foreign father also born in Egypt. Importantly, however,
this law specified that the foreign father had to belong “in his ethnicity” (bi-jinsihi) to a country
with an Arabic-speaking or Muslim majority.90 In fact, echoing the logic of the Treaty of Sevres
and other Paris treaties, the 1926 law’s main innovation was the insertion of Arabic and Islam as
terms of inclusion. Thus, for example, it stipulated that those wanting to naturalize needed not
only ten years of residency in Egypt, good behavior, and the ability to earn a living, but also
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knowledge of Arabic.91 The category “Egyptian” also included those born in Egypt who
established habitual residence there prior to reaching “majority,” at which point he or she could
opt for Egyptian nationality.
The 1926 law was only partially enacted. After Sa‘d Zaghlul’s Wafd Party dominated the
1924 parliamentary elections and British Governor-General of the Sudan Lee Stack was
assassinated, King Fu’ad disbanded parliament. Having no opportunity to review the law, it
deemed it unconstitutional.92 In consequence, the Interior Ministry, which now handled issues of
nationality, never systematized naturalization. Still, the law was referred to in the courts and used
as a basis for resolving interstate disputes over nationality. It also elicited a range of reactions
among former Ottomans. Al-Kashkul reported on one case involving Princess Na‘mat Mukhtar,
daughter of the former khedive Isma‘il, sister of King Fu’ad, and aunt of the future king Faruq.
The princess’ lawyer appeared before the National Courts to declare that she had become
Turkish based on her marriage to Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, son of the former Ottoman High
Commissioner in Egypt, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, and himself a former commander in the
Ottoman army. The princess was presumably Egyptian, but the 1926 law stated that Egyptian
women follow the nationality of their husbands, which caused her to become Turkish on the
consummation of her marriage. On this basis, Princess Na‘mat’s lawyer sought to clear the way
for her to access the Mixed Courts because in his view, “the National Courts are not competent
in the affairs of the princess.” The matter drew great surprise from the public, with many feeling
that, given the princess’ status, it was her husband who should naturalize.93 But these were new
times, when the authority of the law of the nation was increasingly paramount. The case shows
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how the new law opened space for some locals to bypass the national courts and access the
Mixed Courts, a move widely seen as a violation of Egyptian sovereignty.
Other reactions emanated from outside the courts. In the pages of Le Revéil, a Lebanese
lawyer in Egypt named Bishara Tabbah, who had recently opted for French protection, expressed
dismay at being forced to leave Egypt. He made a passionate plea for Egypt to allow optants of
other countries to remain in its territory.94 Others sought Egyptian nationality. Likely unaware
that applications were not being processed, Egypt’s Chief Rabbi Haim Nahum, who hailed from
Manisa in the Aegean region, tried to convince his Sephardic Jewish community to submit
applications to the Interior Ministry, part of an effort to emphasize his and his community’s
loyalty to the Egyptian nation. Unlike many of his coreligionists, the chief rabbi was able to
naturalize immediately after the 1926 law was replaced by its successor law.95
This successor law appeared in 1929 as the brainchild of ‘Abd al-Hamid Badawi, a
graduate of the Khedival Law School who later studied in France and had a long career in
Egyptian and international law.96 Though generally following the previous law’s logic, this one
introduced several changes to address parliament’s concerns. Most notably, it prioritized the
definition of the “Egyptian,” which the committee felt should be explicated in the first clause
(instead of the status of “Ottomans”). The “Egyptian” included first and foremost members of
the royal family, a new insertion that likely allayed King Fu’ad’s fear that some in his family
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would not qualify for Egyptian nationality. It also included Egyptian local subjects according to
Article 1 of the 1900 decree law (though not the more lenient Article 2), meaning residents of
Egypt since 1 January 1848, their offspring, and those with military recruitment certificates.
Legislators chose the 1900 decree as a basis for Egyptian nationality rather than prior Ottoman
law out of national pride. Despite the decree’s colonial origins, they saw it as a national past for
Egyptian nationality, even as the committee head, Salama Mikha’il, understood that the 1900 law
was not a nationality law.97 Members of the committee who supported an exclusive definition of
Egyptian nationality even saw those meeting the first article’s criteria as “pure Egyptians” (almisriyin al-samimin), a new concept that, as we will see, would make its way into the popular
imagination.98 While not all committee members shared this view, they did all believe that
defining the Egyptian national was critical to achieving a purified national body.
Parliament was split over how to deal with “Ottomans” and “foreigners.” The committee
had a relatively inclusive view of Egyptian nationality based generally on the French model. It
favored including those for whom assimilation (indimaj) was possible, and thus sought to
preserve the 1926 law’s clause rendering naturalization of former Ottomans available only to
those from a country with an Arabic-speaking or Muslim majority. As the parliamentarian ‘Abd
al-Salam Fahmy Muhammad put it, “there is no debate that we complain about the large number
of groups (tawa’if) that are minorities (aqalliyyat), but there are groups that are not minorities, so
why don’t we permit the integration of those into the Egyptian nation so it is not said in the
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future that they are minorities that require protection.”99 (Notice how the minority is outsider.)
Opposing the committee’s recommendation was another group of parliamentarians led by,
among others, future prime minister Isma‘il Sidqi. In this group’s view, such an approach would
“open the flood gates to naturalization” in a country with an already large and growing
population. Moreover, it would render it too easy for those who “live a sectarian life” to
naturalize, and their inability to integrate would cause them to become “another Balkans.”
Decrying Egypt’s openness in prior centuries, one parliamentarian argued: “Enough of what was
inflicted upon us due to the generosity that we are known for and that makes us proud—that
generosity which was the reason for granting the Capitulations that we are still unable to get rid
of.”100
Ultimately the 1929 law accepted the principle of assimilation, maintaining its
predecessor’s preference for jus sanguinis and its construction of a “majority ethnicity.” The law
considered former Ottoman nationals habitually residing in Egypt on 5 November 1914 who then
maintained residency until the publication of the 1929 law to be Egyptian. Perhaps due to outside
pressure, it dropped the requirement that optants for Ottoman successor states had to depart
Egypt, though the Interior Ministry maintained the ability to lawfully expel them and, in any
case, opting periods for most subjects had already expired. For former Ottomans wishing to
become Egyptian, conditions became more difficult. Those who fixed their habitual residence in
Egypt after 5 November 1914, or who had done so prior to that date but did not maintain it, were
no longer automatically Egyptian; they had to request nationality within one year from the
Interior Ministry.101 Despite such restrictions, some considered the law too lenient. In al-Siyasa
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(Politics), one writer with the penname “pure Egyptian” (misri samim)—which echoed the
discourse of the committee that drafted the 1926 nationality law—complained that the new law
rendered Egyptian nationality wide open. In his view, its effect would be to create new
minorities out of subjects of the old Ottoman Empire who, unlike the “pure minority” (aqalliyya
samima) of the Copts, have no allegiance to Egypt—and this at a time when minorities in general
have become a complicated international problem.102 In this writer’s view, the Copts were
unquestionably Egyptian, but other minorities should depart to their majority states, for their
loyalty was questionable and their ability to claim “minority rights” would sow division. The
“pure Egyptian” had interiorized the equation of difference with disloyalty.
By the time the 1936 Anglo–Egyptian Treaty afforded greater sovereignty to Egypt (as
mentioned earlier, the last British soldiers left Egypt only in 1956), inspiring attempts to
gradually “Egyptianize” (tamsir) Egypt’s public and private sectors, the “pure Egyptian” had
become synonymous with the “Egyptian,” ironically excluding already “Egyptianized”
(mutamassir) subjects. Thus, when in 1937 the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian
government agreed to gradually Egyptianize the company’s staff, it was “pure Egyptians” (as
understood by some of the committee members who wrote the 1929 nationality law) who were
the intended beneficiaries.103 When it was discovered that a certain employee of the Suez Canal
Company was born in Egypt to a father born in Lebanon, he was forced out of his position and
was unable to regain it through legal avenues. His father, while having worked for the Egyptian
government since 1915, having been confirmed as a local subject by the Egyptian government
after demonstrating more than fifteen years of residence in Egypt, having been excused from
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army service due to his employment with the state, having been issued an Egyptian passport to
travel to France to study law, having been eligible to vote and served as head of the election
council in the mudiriyya (governorate) of Aswan, and even having been appointed by the
Ministry of Justice to the Mixed Courts in attempt to increase Egyptian representation in its halls,
was Egyptian by residence rather than blood.104 The 1929 legal construction of the Egyptian
national had come to shape definitions of the Egyptian in other domains.
The 1929 law remained in place until 1950, when a more restrictive nationality law was
passed that rendered obsolete the earlier, automatic conferral of Egyptian nationality on many
Ottoman subjects. Unlike its predecessor of 1926, the 1929 version was put into effect by the
Interior Ministry, but the latter processed few naturalizations during the 1930s and 1940s.105
According to al-Ahram, by late August 1929 the Interior Ministry still had not explained to the
public how to resolve nationality issues. By 1930, the names of those who managed to naturalize
were being published in the official state periodical al-Waqa’i‘a al-Misriyya (Egyptian Gazette)
each month, but their numbers gradually decreased.106 In a context of emergent leftist politics,
the state was arguably more concerned with denaturalizing nationals, a new power it granted
itself in Article 13 of the 1929 law and later enhanced in a 1931 revision of this article.107 As late
as 1951, the United Nations could report that “a considerable number of former Ottoman
subjects, through neglect, ignorance or for other reasons, lost their opportunity of becoming
Egyptian nationals through option, and many of them are to-day still legally stateless and can
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become Egyptian only through the more difficult, time-consuming and costly process of
naturalization.” Neither was the Egyptian state very eager to process applications.108
I have argued that such conditions, which created conditions of possibility for the mass
dislocations of the late 1940s through 1960s, were the outcome of the emergence of the
“Egyptian national” as a legal subject. By the 1920s, the boundaries of Egyptian national
community were largely drawn, encompassing a Muslim majority and a Coptic minority, even if
some Copts and the 1923 Constitution resisted this category. The rest, mostly non-Coptic
Christians and Jews, were constructed as semi-foreign “Ottoman nationals” and then, through a
global Paris episteme, tied to racialized nations emerging after World War I, making them
minorities with questionable loyalty to Egypt. After Lausanne, they were classified as “former
Ottomans” and became a new type of human produced and managed by the Egyptian state and a
postwar international legal system: the stateless person. If, as Hannah Arendt argued long ago,
the nation-state is inherently exclusionary, the conceptual architecture for exclusion in Egypt was
established in the colonial and liberal periods, and proceeded through a looping effect involving
heterogeneous subjects and colonial, national, and international regimes of governance.109 As we
will see, a very similar dynamic was at play in the emergence and transformation of one of
nationality’s constituent categories—the minority.
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Chapter 5
Elusive Minorities: “Between the Devil and the Deep Sea”

In the spring of 1908, the Coptic lawyer and reformer Akhnukh Fanus announced the
establishment of the General Coptic Egyptian Reform Society (Mujtama‘ al-Islah al-Misri alQibti al-‘Amm) whose aim was to “search for the causes of the backwardness [ta’akhur] of the
Copts and methods of treatment to facilitate for them a path toward modern progress [altaqaddum al-‘asiri].”1 Fanus was both a likely and curious messenger of “Coptic awakening.”
Born in Anbub in 1854 to a Coptic Orthodox family, while in his twenties he earned a law
degree from the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut (later the American University of Beirut).2
During his studies in Beirut, he also converted to Protestantism and later became a leading figure
in Egypt’s Anglican community, maintaining close ties to American and British missionaries.
With the rise of Egyptian nationalism in the early twentieth century, Fanus would join Mustafa
Kamil’s National Party which called for Egyptian independence from the British within an
Ottoman framework. However, like many other Copts, Fanus left the party after Kamil’s death in
1908 citing its shift toward pro-Ottoman and pan-Islamic politics in the context of the Young
Turk Revolution in Istanbul. It was at this point that Fanus set out to establish his new reform
society. While he was careful to emphasize that his movement sought “to strengthen the love and
unity between the two elements [Copt and Muslim] of the Egyptian nation,” Fanus’ Protestant
faith made him suspicious to many Copts, and proximity to British power a potential traitor to
nationalists.3
Soon after its establishment, Fanus’ society morphed into a new organ called al-Ahrar alAqbat (the Free Copts), the first political party in Egypt claiming to represent Copts.
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Historically, Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant denominations in Egypt had existed within a
communal frame, but recently there had emerged a notion, heavily informed by new European
understandings of civilization and approaches to antiquity, of “the Copts” as an “originally
Egyptian” nation whose Pharaonic roots could be scientifically proven. Although Egyptian
nationalist in orientation, Akhnukh’s new party, which he would rename the Independent
Egyptian Party to allay accusations of sectarianism, aimed to “defend the general rights of the
Copts.”4 By asserting “Coptic rights” at a time of Egyptian nationalist ascendance and British
attempts to sow division, Fanus unfurled a backlash that even this known provocateur may not
have anticipated. What began as a squabble between the Coptic communal and the nationalist
presses turned into a three-year sectarian war of words that would culminate in competing Coptic
and Muslim Congresses and the birth of the “minority” as a contested category of political
identification in Egypt.
This chapter analyzes the translation of the category “minority” during this weighty
historical moment in Egypt, and traces how individuals and groups in Egypt claimed it and
transformed it into the national period. Recent historical literature on minorities and minority
politics has begun to chart the breakdown of what European Orientalists came to term the
Ottoman “millet system” and its replacement by the minority rights regime during the interwar
period.5 They have shown how minorities and minority politics represented a significant break
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with prior group formations and political practices. Millets were non-Muslim communities (e.g.,
Armenians, Greek Orthodox, Jews) that the state recognized and granted a large degree of
autonomy in exchange for payment of a special tax called the jizya. As millets, they could
practice their religion, collect communal and state taxes, manage their own affairs (e.g.,
education and welfare), and administer their own courts (though they could and often did access
shari‘a courts). Moreover, members of millets were not conscripted into the army, instead paying
an exemption tax (bedel askari) that later became optional and after the 1908 Young Turk
Revolution unavailable. More significantly, religious difference did not form the basis of state
politics until the nineteenth century—and then only gradually. State politics was the domain of a
Muslim Ottoman elite that, as Ottoman censuses reveal, was concerned less with regulating
religious difference than with property, taxation, and conscription, evaluated through the male
head of each household. The only operative religious distinction in Ottoman state censuses was
that between Muslim and non-Muslim, which determined whether the state could tax and
conscript particular households.6 For their part, millets pursued political objectives, mainly
through the intercession of religious elites, but, unlike the minority, the millet itself was not a
category of political identification and was not associated with rights. The nineteenth century
witnessed the gradual politicization of religion due to European imperialism and Ottoman
reform, which rendered subjects equal before the law regardless of religion.
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Scholarship on the concept of the minority in Egypt has suggested that this category first
appeared in the context of the postwar emergence of a semi-independent Egyptian nation-state.7
Extending that genealogy into the colonial period, this chapter argues that the consolidation of
the nation-state was not the start of minority politics in Egypt but rather its culmination, setting
the contours of minority–majority relations going forward. To carry out this analysis, the chapter
traces the myriad understandings of the minority after its translation into Egypt, when its
meaning was still opaque and unsecured, and how its significations shifted over time through the
contingent looping effect described in the last chapter involving the colonial state and Coptic and
Muslim elites.8 Egypt’s other numerically substantial religious group, the Jews, does not seem to
have embraced the category of the minority. The autochthonous Karaites largely remained within
a communitarian frame (ta’ifa), while the belonging of rabbinate Jews—most of them Ottoman
Sephardim who did not speak Egyptian Arabic fluently—within the nation remained tentative
throughout the period under study. Nevertheless, I explore how, unbeknownst to themselves,
Jews played a role in debates over minority rights at the level of discourse.
Likely the first to attach the “minority” to non-Muslims in Egypt, British officials tended
to associate the category with religion and to see minority status as a condition of permanent
disempowerment that necessitated colonial intervention. Egyptians had a very different, if not
unified, view. The Arabic equivalent of “minority,” aqalliyya, was used for the first time to
describe Copts and other non-Muslims in relations of unequal political power with a new Muslim
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majority during the sectarian crisis introduced earlier. During this initial period, Copts tended to
see it as a neutral avenue of nationalist participation and political empowerment toward equality.
Muslim Egyptian nationalists, by contrast, likened it to a cleaver that bifurcated the nation and
threatened its future existence. Copts and Muslims alike distinguished between political and
religious minorities, though they tended to agree that Copts, unlike other groups, were a “pure”
or “original” minority that belonged in the nation. Nevertheless, inclusion was contingent upon
the acceptance of a normative secular understanding of the relationship between religion and
politics, public and private. In other words, the act of becoming a minority would have
transformative effects on religion and religious subjectivity. After the minority was transformed
into an international legal concept following World War I, the British made “protection of
minorities” a condition of Egyptian semi-independence. Analyzing debates over whether
protection of minorities should be included in the Egyptian Constitution, I show how
associations between the minority and the violation of sovereignty shaped conditions of
possibility for the minority’s legal manifestation in Egypt. This association grew only stronger
when missionaries adopted the banner of minority rights in the 1930s.
The birth of the nation-state heralded an era of homogenous ethnic, national, and
religious political communities defined by citizens’ rights, with individuals having a direct
relationship to the state. National communities were and remain anathema to difference within
the public sphere. Yet the post-World War I minority rights regime demanded that certain states
(excluding the “Great Powers,” which often had their own problems with minorities) grant
special privileges to officially recognized minority groups. In other words, minority rights swam
against the current of the nation-state by differentiating certain groups within national
communities desiring homogeneity. As the last state to join the League of Nations (in 1937),
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Egypt was affected by the minority rights regime only indirectly. Associating the minority with
national fissure, Egyptian legislators excluded minority rights from the Constitution. Undefined
in law, the term remained vague, opaque, and available to be deployed in a range of contexts.
Most significantly, while a communal frame remained in place in Egypt principally through its
configuration of personal status laws, newly constructed minority communities were left without
avenues of collective political participation.

Minority in Translation
The English word “minority” comes from the middle French minorité and the post-classical
Latin minoritat-, minoritas. Until the mid to late nineteenth century, its noun form referred to the
period of one’s life prior to attaining adulthood (as in, “being a minor,” or in one’s youth); “the
condition or fact of being smaller, inferior, or subordinate in relation to something else”; or a
“group or subdivision whose views or actions distinguish it from the main body of people” (i.e.,
a political party), or more generally, the smaller number or part. The third meaning (a group or
subdivision), according to the Oxford English Dictionary, dates to about the mid-eighteenth
century and its appearance likely relates to the then-increasing power of parliaments in the Anglo
world. Portions of all three meanings seem to have converged into a new one by around the
1850s, when “minority” could also refer to a group whose religion was different from that of the
rest of a society—a “religious minority.” Not until the World War I period was the word
“minority” connected explicitly to groups constructed as ethnicities and/or nations as well.9 After
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the war and the establishment of the League of Nations, such groups could also claim legal rights
within international law.
A similar definitional shift centered on one word does not appear to have occurred in
Arabic. The contemporary Arabic equivalent of “minority”—aqalliyya—does not appear in pretwentieth-century Arabic dictionaries, even if it may have been in use during the latter part of the
nineteenth century. To my knowledge, the word aqalliyya was used in the Egyptian press to refer
to a minority for the first time in the context of the Coptic and Muslim Congresses of 1911, to be
discussed shortly. However, in staggered fashion the term displaced, though in some cases never
fully, prior terms used to refer to non-Muslims, including dhimma, milla, ta’ifa, and umma.
Whereas after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire dhimma and milla faded, the word ta’ifa
continued to refer to “group” or “sect” and umma to “nation,” while aqalliyya made explicit
reference to a minority—in the context of Egypt, a politically disempowered non-Muslim or
perhaps non-Arab group.10 At one point, a group could have been a ta’ifa, umma, and aqalliyya
at once, but the meanings of these terms diverged with the establishment of the nation-state
system in the region.
Despite this seemingly direct definition, the meaning of aqalliyya has been unstable in
Egypt since it first appeared. As in English, the word often takes adjectival modifiers, such as
“political” (siyasiyya), “national” (wataniyya), or “religious” (diniyya) that add meaning. During
the Egyptian Congress of 1911, for example, participants took great pains to clarify that not all
minorities were the same. Whereas political minorities (aqalliyyat siyasiyya) could pursue
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politics in the public sphere, religious minorities (aqalliyyat diniyya) had no public role. Their
religious identifications and practices had to remain confined to the private sphere lest they
violate public interest (al-maslaha al-‘amma).11 More significantly, as we saw in Chapter 4,
debates over the meaning of the term aqalliyya itself, and questions over to whom it applied,
continued well into the 1920s, especially because no legal definition of it was ever established.
In consequence, aqalliyya ultimately took on a range of meanings specific to Egypt’s history,
and different from the minority’s significations within European languages. Thus, some groups,
while perhaps fitting the definition of a minority or the category of ta’ifa, are never associated
with this vocabulary. Nubians, for example, are referred to as ahl al-nuba (the people of Nubia)
and almost never in other glosses.
Relatedly, the Arabic term in use today to designate a majority, aghlabiyya, appears to
have emerged around the same time as aqalliyya, but in early twentieth-century Egyptian texts
the counterpart to aqalliyya is more often, and logically, another neologism—akthariyya. This
term comes from the trilateral root verb kathara, meaning “to outnumber, to exceed in
number.”12 Its use reflects an increasing awareness of the science of population and
demography.13 However, the term akthariyya, with its quantitative quality, may have proven
inadequate in the long term for conveying the political dynamics associated with majority
identification. The word aghlabiyya, by contrast, whose trilateral root ghalaba means “to
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predominate” or “to conquer,”14 implied not numerical superiority but rather political domination
in the nation-state. As Talal Asad has pointed out, that minorities are typically smaller in number
than equally historically constituted majorities is accidental: minorities are defined as minorities
less in terms of their relative quantity than in terms of structures of dominant power.15 By the
1920s, when Egyptians began to debate the contours of a new Egyptian national polity
independent of the Ottoman Empire (though not yet of British control), aghlabiyya began to
displace akthariyya. However, the word aqalliyya persisted. Normativizing majority dominance
was logical where highlighting relative powerlessness would not have been, particularly in an
anticolonial national context where colonial and imperial powers portrayed themselves as
protectors of aqalliyyat.

Sectarianism, Equality, and the Birth of the aqalliyya
The word aqalliyya made its initial appearance in Egypt during the sectarian discord that would
give rise to the Coptic Congress of 1911. While it may be impossible trace the immediate
circumstances around the act of translation that produced it, this act was clearly prefigured by
use of the English term “minority” by British officials in Egypt to describe Egyptian Copts in
unequal relations of power to a Muslim majority. Lord Cromer did not use the term in his many
annual reports as Egypt’s consul-general, but he did use it in his political memoir Modern Egypt
published in 1908 after he stepped down. Explaining that Copts are stagnant because of their
Islamic cultural milieu rather than any qualities inherent to themselves, Cromer asserted that
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the Copt has been arrested by barriers very similar to those which have applied in the
case of the Moslem. It is, indeed, natural that such have been the case. The minority must
of necessity submit to the influence of the majority.16

Cromer’s Coptic minority is characterized by submission, whether cultural or political, to
Muslim-majority sovereignty. This characteristic, perhaps reflecting an English or a Western
European concept of the minority with which he was familiar, justified British claims to be the
natural protector of non-Muslim groups and the only available conduit to awakening and
progress.
Whether British discourse shaped Egyptian discourse is an open question. But by 1910,
some Copts began to demand political rights based on a minority status. To chart the emergence
of such demands, I draw on a description of events leading to the Congress that appeared in its
published proceedings. Immediately after the Congress, the proceedings were printed in Arabic,
English, and French for dissemination in Egypt and Europe.17 The author of the description,
Tawfiq Hunin, was a Copt who had been commissioned to write it by Tawfiq Habib, the then
editor of the Coptic newspaper al-Akhbar who also had a role in the Congress.18
Hunin attributed the emergence of these demands to two factors. The first factor was the
political revolts (al-inqilabat) that had occurred in Egypt since the late nineteenth century that
“defined the public obligations of individuals and made clear their rights.” Through these revolts,
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the “enlightened class [al-tabaqa al-mutanawwira] realized its rights in the face of the ruling
group.” Hunin pointed out that whereas in an earlier era Egypt’s various groups (fi’at) had been
assigned their roles in society, recently they began to demand equal access of opportunity.19
Most significantly, in 1879–82 Colonel Ahmad ‘Urabi had led a group of Egyptian Muslim
officers to challenge the Turko-Circassian elite officer class that had dominated the army since
its founding under Mehmet Ali. However, according to Hunin this revolt, which eventually
spread well beyond army ranks, had benefited only Muslims, and the Copts “did not enjoy any of
its seeds.”20 Following on Muslim gains, Copts felt a need to assert their own rights: “the silence
of the Egyptian in [such a] situation—regardless of his creed [madhhab]—from protest and
complaint becomes lethargy that renders him unworthy of national life.”21 Copts’ assertion of
rights was thus an act of nationalism rather than disloyalty to the nation that sowed division.
According to Hunin, the second factor that led Copts to demand rights was the British
occupation that had put down the ‘Urabi revolt. Hunin claimed that the occupation introduced
“religious distinctions [al-tamiz al-dini] between the Muslim and the Copt in public affairs as a
principle.” Specifically, the British had opened positions in the state bureaucracy historically
monopolized by Copts, such as in accounting, while restricting high administrative and military
positions to Muslims.22 After the start of the occupation in 1882, the Coptic awakening (istayqaz)
occurred gradually. Hunin cites two critical events. The first occurred in 1897 when a group of
Coptic lay leaders including Akhnukh Fanus and Tadrus Shanudah, an Orthodox Copt who
founded the Coptic daily Misr (Egypt), delivered a formal petition to the government on behalf
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of Copts. The delegates made a set of demands centered on equality. These included improved
access to government employment, the closure of courts on the Christian day of rest, the
appointment of an additional Coptic member to the Council of Ministers and to the judicial
supervisory committee, and Christian instruction for Coptic students in state schools, which until
then had only included Islamic instruction. The petition led to a meeting with Lord Cromer in
which he assented to some of these demands, though the gains were rolled back soon after.23
The second event occurred in 1908 when the only Coptic governor general of police
(hikmidar al-bulis), who until then had worked in the mudiriyya (governorate) of Minya, was
demoted to the role of inspector (mufattish) in Cairo where he would “spend the rest of his
service in the ‘storeroom’ [al-makhzin].” Hunin points out this was not the first such incident,
but it had a “negative influence upon the souls of the Copts.” In response, Tadrus Shanudah
published an article in Misr containing a series of letters from Copts residing in different areas of
Egypt in which they described the religious discrimination they had experienced around
employment. Directed to Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi II, the articled repeated the largely unfulfilled
demands made years earlier to Lord Cromer and added a new one: that he open employment in
the state bureaucracy to all Egyptians based on merit, and “without restriction of creed and
religion.”24 Shanudah followed up the article with a formal petition that he and Fanus had
penned.25
The petitions from 1897 and 1908 both produced a vociferous response in the Muslim
nationalist press. In 1897, for example, the periodical al-Ahali accused the Copts in question of
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undermining ancient Coptic–Muslim brotherhood by directing their complaints to the British.26
The petitions were also harshly denounced by certain Copts, revealing new political divisions
among Copts themselves even as the category of the Copt was becoming more unified and
coherent. Writing in the Egyptian Times in 1908, a certain Salim Sidhum Tadrus accused Fanus
of betrayal (al-khiyana), saying that “he became the person who if he passed on the street we
would say this is an agent of the British in Egypt and a tool operated by al-Muqattam [a proBritish daily]. Fear God oh you who strives for falsehood [al-mujtahid fi al-batil].”27 The war of
words in the press, which played a major role in amplifying sectarian tension, continued through
the Egyptian Congress of 1911. This three-year period is still recalled in Egyptian national
memory as an extreme point of fissure to which a united nation should never return.28
Over the course of the crisis, many harsh attacks were delivered by all sides. However,
Hunin cites as particularly “painful [mu’allim] to the souls of the Copts,” what quickly became a
well-known article titled “al-Islam Gharib fi Biladihi” (Islam Is Strange in Its Own Country).
The article was written by the Egyptian-born, Oxford-educated Islamic reformer of Tunisian
origin al-Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish and published in the National Party organ al-Liwa’ (The
Banner).29 Responding to a different article by a Coptic author named Farid Kamil in the Coptic
daily al-Watan (The Nation) likening Islamic history to the “torture of humanity,” al-Jawish
defended the Islamic tradition against the accusation of intolerance and suggested that, through
their recent demands for equality, Copts had attempted to take the reins of power in Egypt. He
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also harshly attacked both Kamil and al-Watan, and implicitly threatened them by suggesting
that Egypt’s “eleven million Muslims will never let this go.”30 Jawish cursed them so severely
that Akhnoukh, in his reply to al-Jawish in al-Watan published several days later, claimed that
“no matter how far we veer from politeness [adab], and no matter how much we search in the
dictionaries of vulgarity and abomination we would not find a drop in the sea of he who came
from the college of ‘Oxford,’ professor in lampoonery and slander [ta‘n], and shaykh in abuse
and cursing.”31 Sectarian discourse had reached unprecedented heights. According to Hunin, alJawish’s article opened “the eyes of the Copts, ‘as a nation [umma] or group [ta’ifa],’ to their
true political position and caus[ed] them to realize that they are treated differently than other
[i.e., Muslim] Egyptians [wataniyyin] in some of the public sectors, requiring them to have a
distinct public opinion that reflects their particular status and works toward their particular
benefit [khayrhum al-khass].”32
As the sectarian crisis deepened, calls for action spread beyond the Coptic lay leadership.
Sometime in 1909, an obscure Coptic youth movement, wishing to push matters ahead,
petitioned the then British consul-general Eldon Gorst to demand access for Copts to Christian
education in state schools and subsidies to support communal projects where Copts saw the state
as falling short (as in education).33 Gorst responded by promising to undertake a fact-finding
mission, though the demands touched on issues of which he had long been aware. As the colonial
state slowly expanded its public education system, which had its roots in Egypt’s nineteenthcentury state reforms, it had to manage the problem of accommodating a religiously diverse
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student body.34 According to Gorst, in 1907 the Egyptian government announced, likely in
response to a prior petition, that it would provide non-Muslim pupils in public schools access to
a teacher from their own religion—whether a local or someone from another area of Egypt—to
provide religious instruction, so long as the pupils numbered at least fifteen. If the non-Muslim
pupils numbered less than fifteen, they would be permitted to leave school prior to the last lesson
of the day devoted to Islamic instruction. Some Copts reportedly complained that due to a
shortage of government teachers, they invariably had to pay for their children’s religious
instruction, whereas Muslim pupils received religious instruction for free. The state responded by
producing more teachers with the ability to provide a Christian education through the Khedival
Training College, a salient example of the Egyptian state’s increasing power to shape religion.35
Yet on 1 January 1909 the Egyptian state shifted control over Egypt’s schools to the
Provincial Councils, a set of partially elected local bodies initially established in 1883 with the
Legislative Council and General Assembly (see Chapter 4). On succeeding Lord Cromer, Gorst
had sought to strengthen these councils to appease Egyptian nationalists who demanded to see
tangible steps toward autonomy as well as the Liberal Party back home. He also sought to
counterbalance the Legislative Council and General Assembly. These institutions, though having
a strictly advisory role and essentially powerless, had become bastions of nationalist agitation. In
1908, for instance, members of the Legislative Council petitioned the British to establish real

34

See Lisa Pollard, “Learning Gendered Modernity: The Home, the Family, and the Schoolroom
in the Construction of Egyptian National Identity (1885–1919), in Beyond the Exotic: Women’s
Histories in Islamic Societies, ed. Amira El Azhary Sonbol (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University
Press, 2005), 249–69.
35
Sir E. Gorst to Sir Edward Grey, “Reports by His Majesty’s Agent and Consul-General on the
Finances, Administration, and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan in 1910,” Cairo, 25 March
1911, 6–7, 36–39.
163

parliamentary rule in Egypt rather than the empty shell they had created and maintained.36 Once
empowered, the Provincial Councils set up a special education tax to fund local schools, which
had been severely neglected by the British. Feeling that their communities were contributing to
local coffers but not reaping rewards, some Coptic community leaders demanded state subsidies
from the tax amounts paid by their communities to set up their own local schools.37 Though this
demand seems to have been brushed aside, the Copts came to realize the importance of Coptic
representation on the Provincial Councils. As a result, in June 1909 the Coptic notable, founder
of the Coptic Museum, and palace-appointed parliamentarian Murqus Sumayka suggested in
parliament the idea of instituting Coptic representation on the Provincial Councils. When this
request was swiftly rejected, the Coptic leadership began to consider the problem of Coptic
representation in all governing institutions.
According to Hunin, it was at this point that “‘representation of minorities [aqalliyyat]’”
in parliamentary bodies first appeared within Copts’ standard list of demands. Before this
innovation could be acted upon, however, on 2 February 1910 the Coptic prime minister Butrus
Ghali, the first Copt to hold so high an office in Egypt, was murdered. The assassin, twentythree-year-old Ibrahim al-Wardani, was a member of the National Party. Though he was a
Muslim and Ghali a Copt in a time of heightened sectarianism, al-Wardani claimed to have taken
Ghali’s life solely due to nationalist considerations. In 1906 Ghali had presided as judge in the
infamous Dinshawai trial in which four Egyptian villagers were sentenced to die by hanging for
alleged involvement in the death of a British soldier. Locally garrisoned British troops had often
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hunted pigeons in the area to the great dismay of locals, who relied on pigeon manure for
fertilizer. On that fateful day, the British soldier had turned up dead, probably due to heat stroke,
after a series of scuffles between villagers and soldiers in which a female villager was shot and
injured. The British sought to use the soldier’s death as a rationale for punishing and disciplining
the nationalists, but the outcome of the case only galvanized Egyptians to the national cause. AlWardani himself was deemed by some a national hero. Given Ghali’s prominent leadership role
within the Coptic community and representation of Copts within the state, many Copts viewed
his death as a major blow. It propelled a heightened sense of anxiety among Copts and the
feeling that their interests were not represented at the state level.38
Making matters worse, on 26 January 1911 a telegram was dispatched to London through
the Reuter’s agency that became public knowledge. It included a summary of Gorst’s promised
fact-finding mission: “Sir Eldon Gorst … found that outside Cairo there were no serious
complaints. Moslems and Copts, he declares, generally live together quietly if they are left along,
and the worst possible service to the Copts would be to treat them as a separate community.”39
With Ghali lost and their appeals to parliament and Gorst deflected, Coptic activists began to
devise new strategies.

The Coptic Congress: Activating the aqalliyya
In February 1911 a group of Coptic landowners (a‘yan) in Assiout, including the head of the
reform committee of Coptic internal affairs Bishri Hanna, Akhnukh Fanus, and others, called for
a General Assembly (later dubbed the Coptic Congress) to be held on 6 March to more formally
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establish a set of demands of the state and to elect a permanent committee to pursue them. In the
lead up to the meeting, Misr published the demands that the assembly intended to make.40 These
were largely equivalent to their precursors, though with a few changes. Most significantly for our
purposes, the Coptic leadership was now demanding “representation of the minority [alaqalliyya] in parliamentary bodies.”41 This was the first time that a non-Muslim group in Egypt
made a political demand based on minority status, and it specifically referred to parliamentary
representation.
The Coptic Congress was held in Assiout between 6 and 8 March and attracted upwards
of one thousand supporters. While the organizers may have been satisfied with this turnout, the
Congress did not enjoy the support of the Coptic Orthodox Church, with political fissures among
Copts persisting.42 Moreover, both the nationalist press and the palace vehemently opposed it.43
The palace had even taken steps to prevent its occurrence or, short of this, to force the organizers
to hold it in Cairo where Copts were fewer in number. But the organizers won out. The Congress
formally lodged five demands: equality of all Egyptians in taking the day off required by their
religion, and, relatedly, excusal of Christian government workers and students from working on
Sunday; dependence on merit in appointing government positions to Egyptians, with no other
factor playing a role, especially religion-based rations; representation of all of the Egyptian
elements (‘anasir) in each of Egypt’s parliamentary bodies that guarantee to all defense of their
rights and preservation of them; all the rights of national education and a portion of tax revenue
to be used for the community’s expenses; and, finally, that government grants aid all
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communities rather than just Muslims. Significantly, in the third demand, the word aqalliyya,
which had appeared in the same demand included in the earlier list published by Misr, had been
replaced with the word ‘anasir (elements), for reasons we will address shortly.44
Nevertheless, the word aqalliyya featured prominently when this demand was discussed
during a session at the Congress. Its meaning was still open and opaque, and the Coptic delegates
sought to shape it in a way that served their own aims at this historical juncture. The discussion
opened with a speech by the nationalist lawyer and later Wafdist politician Murqus Hanna on the
issue of parliamentary representation. Hanna made a nuanced argument rejecting sectarian
categories in favor of what seemed to him the more neutral category aqalliyya. “I detest
[abghad] with all hate and resist with all my power, feelings, and sensibilities out of
consideration for the great nation that no one can deny I love deeply,” he urged, “that method
which is raised sometimes to appoint by law a specific number of Copts [to parliament], because
I detest that the words Copt and Muslim would be mentioned in the law.” Hanna instead
proposed a constitutional system of proportional representation where “each rules himself,”
meaning that aqalliyyas, rather than having a representative appointed for them, would vote for
the representatives they desired—the “most beautiful meaning” of a constitution. He took as his
model the Belgian system, “which all of the experts praise … [and] was adopted in many
countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Spain, parts of the United States, and even France which
just legislated the enactment of something like this law.” Accordingly, Hanna suggested that
each citizen vote as an individual, rather than as a minority or majority, for the delegate he
preferred (women did not gain the franchise until 1956), showing that he thought it possible to
split the undifferentiated citizen from the minority. He also suggested that members of minority
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groups be able to vote separately for a certain number of additional delegates to represent them
as aqalliyyas. The number of delegates for each aqalliyya would depend on its size, financial
importance, social status, and scientific ability. This way, Hanna argued, “the parliament or
senate are constitutional bodies in the true meaning … a real representation of the nation.”45
Hanna’s construction of the aqalliyya, then, was an attempt to ensure that the specific
interests of his community were represented at the level of state but in a way that reinforced
national unity rather than reinscribe sectarian division. Fair representation of all elements of the
nation, he argued, enabled the nation to reach its maximum potential. His proposal was met with
applause and the chant “long live the Constitution!” at the Congress. However, one delegate, the
lawyer Mikha’il Fanus, urged that the speech contained “concepts” (alfadh) that perhaps some
would misunderstand (fahamha al-ba‘d maqluba) and therefore requested that they be removed
before ratification of Hanna’s proposal.46 The meaning of aqalliyya had yet to congeal: it was
still too open to interpretation, too likely to contain unintended significations that could
reverberate in unexpected and hazardous ways. Akhnukh Fanus, whose relation to Mikha’il
Fanus is unclear, agreed. For this reason, the word aqalliyya did not appear in the official
demands of the Congress.
After the conclusion of the Congress, the British consul-general Gorst released the full
report of his fact-finding mission. Leveraging statistical evidence, the report undercut each of the
Copts’ claims of discrimination and demands for equality. What interests us here is the contrast
between Fanus’ notion of aqalliyya and Gorst’s minority. Whereas for Fanus and other Copts the
category aqalliyya, always addressed in the context of parliamentary representation, was a
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politically empowering antisectarian expression of national unity, for Gorst the minority was a
general state of disempowerment necessitating colonial rescue from majority sovereignty. While
Gorst acknowledged slight underrepresentation of Copts in Egypt’s parliamentary bodies, he
claimed that Copts would never be represented in exact proportion to their numbers. The Copts,
he insisted, “must … be a minority on [these bodies] and they should be ready to trust the British
control to see that no substantial injustice is done to them.”47 Evaluating the relationship between
majorities and minorities in general, Gorst concluded that “Majorities can afford to be just, and
minorities cannot expect wholly to escape from the inherent inconvenience of being a minority
and should not be unreasonable.”48
Rather than put out the fire sparked by the Coptic Congress, Gorst’s report fed the
flames. The Coptic press vigorously challenged both his data and the logic of his argumentation.
The Coptic journalist Qiriyaqus Mikha’il, for example, whom the Coptic press had dispatched to
London in 1910 to gain support of the British public for the Copts’ demands, wrote his own
“Collection of Facts and a Résumé of Authoritative Opinions on the Coptic Question.”49 The
text, published in English just prior to the Egyptian Congress, provided a summary of events,
Gorst’s full report, a response to the report, and a list of quotations from the Coptic Congress and
the Egyptian and British press. What is fascinating about it for our purposes is that it was
prefaced, introduced, and opened by three British writers: the Assyriologist and Egyptologist
Archibald Sayce, the Orientalist historian of Egypt and the Coptic Church Alfred J. Butler, and
the amateur historian and enthusiast of the Copts Edith Louisa Butcher (a.k.a. Mrs. Butcher).
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Two of the essays provide a historical account of the Copts in Egypt stretching back to antiquity
to emphasize the Copts’ authenticity as “real Egyptians” based on scientific evidence of racial
lineages. A pair of the essays also refers to Copts as an aggrieved “minority” that possesses
“natural” rights.50 Together, the writings link the notion of a coherent category “Copt” as an
expression of authentic and original Egyptianness to deservedness of rights. Such narratives were
often interpolated within the Coptic press or adapted by Coptic authors, especially those with
strong links to European institutions in Egypt or overseas. Qiriyaqus’ own discussion focuses on
the details of the Coptic grievances rather than the Coptic past, and he uses the word “minority”
only once when quoting verbatim the list of demands put forth by the Coptic Congress.51 But this
European discourse clearly shaped notions of Coptic community and history.
Rather than the ideal notion of Copt as an undifferentiated aqalliyya, it was the Copt as
original, different, and set apart that entered into law after the Congress. In 1913, Gorst’s
replacement as consul-general, Herbert Kitchener, in many ways a throwback to Cromer,
pronounced the Organic Law discussed in the last chapter, which combined the Legislative
Council and General Assembly into a large Legislative Assembly. This assembly, which
included prominent figures such as the future nationalist hero Sa‘d Zaghlul and Murqus
Sumayka, possessed expanded power. However, it also incorporated two features that members
of the Congress had explicitly wished to avoid: the use of quotas identifying Copts as a category
apart and government-appointed rather than elected delegates. The Legislative Assembly
included the Council of Ministers (itself part of the executive branch), sixty-six elected members,

50
51

See, for example, Mrs. Butcher’s account in Ibid., esp. p. 13.
Ibid., 29.
170

as well as seventeen government-appointed members, Copts among them.52 Lord Dufferin’s
conception of the Legislative Council and General Assembly, and Cromer’s implementation of
these chambers, had never involved the managing of religious difference. If anything, they
managed a presumed difference between “Egyptians” and “Turko-Egyptians” in the wake of the
‘Urabi revolt.53 In this sense, the 1913 Organic Law was an important innovation of
governmentality.

The Egyptian Congress: aqalliyya as Cleaver to the Nation
Planned in the run-up to the Coptic Congress, the Egyptian Congress was held between 29 April
and 4 May 1911.54 The Congress was organized by landowners and intellectuals associated
largely with the liberal nationalist Umma Party, which had a more elite constituency compared to
the Watani Party. Presided over by the Egyptian statesman Riyad Pasha, it included significant
Egyptian national figures such as Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid, Ali Sha‘rawi, and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz
Fahmy who advocated the creation of a liberal Egyptian polity independent of Britain. Each day
attracted “members and sympathizers” numbering in the several thousands. The organizers of the
Congress initially titled it the “Muslim Congress,” seeing it as an attempt to defend the interests
of Egypt’s Muslim majority in the face of a perceived assault by a disloyal Coptic minority.
However, prior to the conference they changed the name to the “Egyptian Congress” because,
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even if it involved few if any Christians and Jews, “Muslims constitute the absolute majority in
the country.”55 In addition to the demands of the Coptic Congress, the Egyptian Congress
addressed broad economic and social issues impacting all in Egypt. For our purposes, its
importance lies in the way it establishes both the aqalliyya and the akthariyya as categories of
political subjecthood. The aqalliyya, rather than anonymous and neutral, becomes a cleaver that
bisects the nation.
The Congress opened with a report by its organizing committee, read aloud by its likely
chair, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (with the aid of Ahmad ‘Abd al-Latif and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmy).
This report laid out the objective of the Congress to secure the cohesion of the Egyptian nation,
“the structure of which was almost cracked by the Coptic Congress.” The national body, rather
than in formation, is here presumed to already exist and to be threatened from the inside. Lutfi
al-Sayyid announced that the aim of the Congress was, “to look into the action of the Copts in
order to assess it, to analyze the claims of the Copts, to weigh their demands on the scale of
justice, to distinguish between the beneficial and the damaging, and the possible and the
impossible, and to grant the Copts their due so as to remove any and all reasons for complaint.”
These proceedings, he assured the audience, were completely impartial and free of all political
objectives. Emphasizing again the Congress’ fairness and tolerance, characteristics central to a
unified national community, Lutfi al-Sayid read, “Indeed, Egyptians are first in dealing justly
with Egyptians.”56
In the eyes of the speakers at the Egyptian Congress, tolerance was the mark of
civilization, an ideal to which all in the new Egypt should aspire. Yet tolerance, as Wendy
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Brown has shown, is not only a political discourse that is protean (rather than universal) in
meaning across time and space. It is also exemplary of Foucault’s notion of governmentality in
so far as it organizes "the conduct of conduct” well beyond the formal domain of politics.
“Absent the precise dictates, articulations, and prohibitions associated with the force of law,”
Brown points out, “tolerance nevertheless produces and positions subjects, orchestrates meanings
and practices of identity, marks bodies, and conditions political subjectivities.”57 In Egypt,
tolerance became the idea of civility, the mark of the ideal Egyptian citizen. Like the minority, it
was deposited within national memory to gain salience in the national present, and it was
invested with power to authorize certain religious sensibilities and practices while disabling
others. For the conveners of the Egyptian Congress, the Coptic Congress and its political
demands violated the limits of tolerance. In asserting rights as Copts, this group of Copts was not
behaving in the way a religious minority should.
Revealing its significance to the proceedings, the first matter of substance taken up in the
report was that of “al-Aqalliyya wa-l-Akthariyya” (The Minority and the Majority). The authors
sought to clarify the meaning of these two terms in order to frame their disagreement with the
Copts. In their view, the minority and the majority were wholly political organisms that act in the
public sphere to pursue their interests. As Lutfi al-Sayyid said,

A nation [umma] in its expression as a political organism or system is composed of
political elements. The political doctrine that enlists individuals of greatest number and
influence is the majority [akthariyya] and the other is a minority [aqalliyya]. On this
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basis it is possible to understand the majority and the minority in every nation, and
religion has nothing to do with it.58

In other words, nation-state politics divides into majority and minority elements that exist in
unequal relations of power. Because these elements are inherently public, they can have no
relation to religion, which in secular doctrine should be confined to the private sphere. When that
relation does exist, when religion creeps into the public sphere, serious consequences can follow.
In the words of the organizing committee:

Nothing is more harmful to the country than the consequences of that error which has
implanted itself into the minds of some Egyptians in general, and many Copts in
particular. This gross error is the splitting the Egyptian Nation, as far as it constitutes a
political organism, into two religious elements—a Muslim majority and a Coptic
minority.59

For the committee, the coupling of the political categories “majority” or “minority” with
religion, as many Copts had done, constitutes a dangerous error that can cause fissures in the
nation’s unity and threaten the country’s future. The marriage of politics and religion causes the
type of sectarianism (al-ta‘assub al-dini) that the British had so long sought to sow.
The speakers at the Congress understood the Coptic Congress’ insertion of religion into
politics as exemplary of “medieval fanaticism.” Many speakers drew analogies to the fifteenth-
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and sixteenth-century wars of religion in Europe pitting Protestants against Catholics. These
often-violent sectarian conflicts, they argued, were only resolved through the emergence of
civilization, characterized primarily by the practice of tolerance. The Copts, by organizing
themselves as a political minority, threatened to return Egypt to the past, always in “Europe,”
when religion—unconstrained by state power—was the only available category of identification.
The speech by Egyptian nationalist Ahmad ‘Abd al-Latif, for example, described a
transhistorical competition between national and religious identification in which the ascendance
of the former is characterized by peace and calm and that of the latter by violence and
persecution. It was the Christians, he argues, who first introduced religious division to a Europe
that had been united during the Roman period. Religious division then persisted over many eras
until “the day that people grew tired of war and resolved to put an end to it.” 60 That day arrived
in 1789 with the start of the French Revolution. In the wake of the Revolution, “political parties
arose on the remains of the religious factions which Europe had come to regard with horror.”
‘Abd al-Latif had to wonder whether Copts really sought to “return” to the distant past by
building “religious parties on the remains of political parties.”61
This secularist historical narrative, expressed by many of the speakers at the Congress,
makes two moves that are crucial to understanding the formation of the minority and majority as
categories and changing conceptions of religion in Egypt. First, ‘Abd al-Latif projects the
neologisms aqalliyya and akthariyya back into history, overlaying prior categories of
identification and politics and activating new forms.62 Thus, for ‘Abd al-Latif a Protestant
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“majority” had subjected the Catholic “minority” to torture in Elizabethan England for its beliefs
and practices.63 Similarly, for Shaykh ‘Ali Yusuf a Coptic “minority” had endured persecution
under Roman and Byzantine overlords until the emergence of Islam and the later Arab takeover
of Egypt.64 In this way, aqalliyya and aktharriya come to stand in for prior categories such as
ta’ifa and milla, the systems of political organization in which they held meaning, and the kinds
of subjects they produced. Second, he casts religion in the public sphere as dangerous, atavistic,
violent, and fanatic. Politics can be pursued solely for the good of the nation, not for one’s
private interest.
Yet, even as the organizing committee shunned the notion of religion in the public
sphere, and more particularly the marriage of religion and politics, it advocated an Islamic
identity for the state. In the opening address, Lutfi al-Sayyid, then the leader of the territorial
nationalist Umma party, stated that,

for every nation there is an official religion … and the religion of the nation [umma] is
the religion of its government or the religion of the majority [akthariyya] in it … It is
unthinkable that there be more than one official religion in the nation. The religion of the
Egyptian people is Islam alone because [Islam] is the religion of the government and of
the majority at the same time.65
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Lutfi al-Sayyid and his party have been understood in Egyptian historiography as an elite
vanguard that forged a liberal secular strand of Egyptian nationalism.66 While this
characterization may be correct, less attention has been paid to the ways in which this vanguard
shaped what was meant by religion in an emerging national polity.
The attempt to assert the Islamic character of Egypt at the Congress was a reply to the
Coptic demand to make Sunday an official day of rest. The Congress members’ manner of
refuting this demand shows both the connection between the nascent notion of Egyptian
sovereignty (and, by extension, anticolonial politics) and religion, and the way in which secular
power authorized certain formations of religion while inhibiting others. Many of the speakers
pointed to practical problems associated with acknowledging Sunday as a Christian holiday. For
example, as Lutfi al-Sayyid pointed out, the Copts now want,

two days off per week, Friday for Muslims and Sunday for Christians. But this leaves the
Jews without a day [off] despite the fact that their observance of Shabbat [al-sibt] is
stronger than the Christian’s observance of Sunday. Thus the days [off] are divided
between the religious elements and they are required three days per week!67

For Lutfi al-Sayyid, three days off per week was less inconceivable than it was complicated. But
the matter at hand went beyond practicalities. Lutfi al-Sayyid went on to say that,

the Islamic governments designated Friday the official day off, so having that as a day
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off became a custom for the Islamic governments and one of its ancient traditions that
distinguish it from other governments. It is thus not possible for it to make any day of the
week other than Friday a vacation day if it was possible … For that reason, and because
taking off Friday constitutes part of sovereignty, the government of Lebanon, which is a
Christian government and the majority of its people is Christian, enacted Friday as a
vacation day, preserving the traditions of the Ottoman Empire [al-dawla al-‘uliya] that
has sovereignty over it.68

For Lutfi al-Sayyid, a cultural definition of Islam divested of its sacral quality becomes central to
the construction of Egyptian sovereignty.
The Muslims Congress’ refutation of the Coptic Congress’ demand for Sunday as a staterecognized day off betrays the power that the secular came to have over religion in early
twentieth-century Egypt. Challenging the view that the secular is a successor to a distinct and
stable category of the religious which it contains within the private sphere, Talal Asad has shown
secularism to be a political doctrine initially formed in early modern Europe with power to
construct the religious and the life worlds it contains.69 During the debate over the Coptic
Congress’ demand for state recognition of Sunday as an official day off, for example, Lutfi alSayyid observed, probably accurately, that this demand represented a completely new and
unprecedented phenomenon. The politicization of the Christian Sabbath in turn precipitated new
discursive knowledge about Coptic Christian tradition and practice. Mahmud Bey ‘Abd al-Nasir,
in his speech, argued that while the Christian scriptures do make reference to a day of rest, they
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do not specify the day on which Christians should rest, which calls the validity of the Coptic
demand into question.70 Another speaker, Ibrahim Ghazali, went further. Invoking a Christian
sect that holds there is no Gospel ordaining the observance of Sunday as a Christian day of rest,
he implied that Christian doctrine contradicts itself over whether a Christian day of rest exists at
all.71
In addition to dismantling the association between the Christian Sabbath and Sunday—or
the very notion of the Christian Sabbath itself—the speakers pursued other tacks to bolster their
argument. Even if the Christian day of rest were admitted to fall on Sunday, ‘Abd al-Nasir
argued, he had “consult[ed] a number of the most respected works and ecclesiastic authorities on
this subject” and found that “prohibitions that are attached to Sunday observance apply in
principle only to manual labor, cases of extreme urgency being excepted.”72 Hence, even if the
legitimacy of Sunday as a day of rest was recognized, Christian doctrine actually permits the
work from which Christian government employees wish to be exempted. Ibrahim Ghazali took
this point up in his speech as well. Dismayed by the Coptic Congress’ demand, he asserted that,

the majority of Copts do not hesitate to work every day of the week. They did not even
follow Lent during the conference—banqueting sumptuously on the fat of the land! What
about their ancestors, all of whom worked on Sunday? Were they less intelligent? Or did
they with reason prefer to respect the feelings of their compatriots and the character of
the government?73
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Coptic demands for a day off on Sunday, he suggested, have nothing at all to do with “real”
Christianity. Instead, they are a ploy by the minority Copts to dispossess and disempower the
majority, rendering their loyalty to the nation suspect.
Until now, my discussion has focused on Copts because it was they who made demands
as a minority and upon whom this label was applied. The one other non-Muslim group
mentioned at the Egyptian Congress with some regularity is Jews. For the speakers at the
Egyptian Congress, and for authors in the press who joined the debate, the Jews played the role
of a foil whose inclusion in the national body was uncertain. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid’s dismissal
of the Coptic demand for Sunday as a day off for Coptic government employees, for example,
was based in part on the notion that honoring the demand would logically require recognition of
Saturday as a day off for the Jewish Sabbath, and it was impractical to have three recognized
days off per week. This point was echoed in speeches by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the reformist writer
Salih Hamdi Hammad, and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish, whom we met earlier. For his part, Jawish also
invoked Jews in countering the Coptic Congerss’ demand for the establishment and state support
of Coptic courts equivalent to shari‘a courts. He argued that this demand was impractical not
only because Coptic marriage and divorce were matters for the clergy rather than the courts, but
also because the Copts are divided into sects, each of which could conceivably demand its own
courts. Worse still, there are “other elements among the Egyptians like the Jews for example,”
who are also divided into sects (Rabbinate and Karaite) that may desire their own courts. “Was
this forgotten,” Jawish asked, or were these other Egyptian elements considered as negligible
quantities compared with Copts?”74 Jawish, clever as always in his argumentation, turned the
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Coptic critique of majority Muslims back onto the Copts. In contrast to many speakers at the
Congress who represented Egypt as composed of two elements, Muslim and Copt, here Jawish
considered the Jews to be an “Egyptian element.”
The Syrian-born Muslim reformer Rashid Rida, who reported on the Coptic and Egyptian
Congresses in his journal al-Manar, also used this rhetorical device to echo Muslim critiques of
the Coptic Congress. In an article entitled “The Jews are More Honorable than the Copts,” for
example, Rida opposed the Congress’ demand that the Egyptian government introduce Christian
teaching in public schools by undermining Coptic claims to distinction based on ancient
Egyptian lineage:

The Jews are more honorable than them [the Copts] in terms of descent because they
descend from the prophets of God, glorified be He. And the Copts descend from the
idolater pharaohs [who are] enemies of God, glorified be He. If they [the Copts] do not
have a trait that demands their distinction from other Egyptians then the basis upon which
they built their demand for the teaching of their religion in government schools is
destroyed.75

Having demoted the Copts relative to other groups in Egypt, Rida goes on to say that when it is
impossible to teach all of the religions and doctrines present in Egypt, the government is justified
to offer only the “religion of the ruler, which is the religion of the most numerous group [akthar
sha‘b].”76 For Rida, a “Syrian” and “outsider” who nonetheless saw himself as belonging to a
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newly constituted Egyptian majority, invoking the Jews allows him to face the threat posed by a
perceived disloyal minority challenge to the sovereignty of the majority.

Constituting the Minority
If nothing else, the two Congresses achieved the insertion and normativization of the minority
within the Egyptian lexicon. The swirl of press reports published in their aftermath is filled with
references to the debate over aqalliyyas.77 On the eve of World War I, some Coptic journalists
began to articulate demands on behalf of the Coptic community explicitly in terms of minority
rights (huquq al-aqalliyyat), reflecting a new vocabulary that would become common after the
war.78 However, its meaning and connection to particular groups continued to be slippery and
unclear.
Two events occurred between the Congresses and the establishment of a semiindependent Egyptian nation-state with its own Constitution in 1923 that have particular
relevance to our story. The first event was the 1919 nationalist revolt, which reunified Egyptians
against the British. The second was the emergence of the minority as an international legal
subject by the nascent League of Nations after the war. And yet what differentiated Egypt from
many other new nation-states carved out of the Ottoman Empire and in Eastern Europe was that
it did not come under the League of Nations minority protection regime. Still legally a British
Protectorate at the time of the League of Nation’s establishment, Egypt was beyond the League’s
jurisdiction. Even when the Protectorate ended in February 1922, “the special relations existing
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between Great Britain and Egypt were notified to all the Powers represented on the Council of
the League.”79 Egypt, as far as the British were concerned, was the property of the British
Empire. Yet the legal concept of minority protection, which first appeared in the 1919 Polish
Minority Treaty, still found its way into Egypt. One of Britain’s infamous “reserved points,” or
the areas that Britain would continue to control after it granted Egypt semi-independence, was
the “protection” of “foreign interests” and “minorities.” Minority protection had only been
included in the reserved points because it had been part of Lord Curzon’s original draft of the
1921 “agreement” between Great Britain and Egypt which was based on the Treaty of Sevres.
Although British officials and judicial advisors disagreed over the utility of it in advancing
British interests in Egypt,80 the connection between minority rights and colonial violation of
Egyptian sovereignty was the frame for its “legal life” in Egypt. The adoption of the banner of
minority rights by Protestant missionary groups in the 1930s only strengthened that link.
In March 1922, the Council of Ministers under King Fu’ad appointed a committee of
thirty members to draft a Constitution. These members were partly representative of the complex
make up of Egyptian society, including the three major religious groups—Muslims, Christians,
and Jews. Eighteen of the members were appointed to a subcommittee to discuss the principles to
be included in the Constitution.81 Over the course of their meetings, the question of whether the
Constitution should guarantee the representation of minorities in the new parliament was among
the most divisive. The subcommittee essentially broke into two camps. The first, represented by
the Copt Tawfiq Duss, who had earlier been a participant in the Coptic Congress, was to support
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the inclusion of minority representation. As the 1914 elections to Egypt’s representative bodies
showed, without legally mandated measures of inclusion in national politics, non-Muslim groups
risked being left out of decision-making processes. Moreover, codifying minority rights would
resolve the open-ended question of who was responsible for protecting minorities—the Egyptian
state—rather than leaving it unresolved and inviting continued British interference.82
The second camp, led by the chief legal advisor of the subcommittee ‘Abd al-Hamid
Badawi (whom we met in Chapter 4) and supported by the Wafdists, argued against the
proposition. After the events of 1919, this camp argued, Egyptians would vote on the basis of
merit rather than religion, a position echoing the demand for merit-based employment at the
Coptic Congress. Moreover, constitutionally mandating minority representation would deepen
religious division. This would prevent the gradual unification of the Egyptian nation and benefit
the British, who had tried to divide Egypt by religion in the first place. ‘Abd al-Hamid Badawi
and others asserted that Copts and other religious groups in Egypt were not political minorities,
like some of the minorities in Europe, but rather religious minorities with no role (as a group) in
the political sphere. While Duss enjoyed some support on the committee, particularly among its
Coptic and one Jewish member (Yusuf Qattawi), ‘Abd al-Hamid Badawi’s side proved the
victor. Neither the representation of minorities, nor the very existence of minorities, was
recognized by the Constitution.83 Nevertheless, even as the two sides disagreed over the
representation of minorities, both proceeded on the basis that the Copts, and to some extent other
religious groups, were religious minorities. They differed only over the place of religious
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minorities within the realm of politics. As such, the proceedings of the Constitutional Committee
reveal the completion of a process of linguistic transformation wherein tawai’f, millal, and other
categories became aqalliyyat in relations of power with the majority.

Conclusion
As I have attempted to show, Egypt’s establishment of a semi-independent constitutional order,
rather than the onset of minority politics, was the culmination of a contingent process of defining
the minority that began amid sectarian conflict in the early twentieth century. As scholars have
observed, the 1923 Constitution did not acknowledge minorities, and Egypt remained outside of
the jurisdiction of the League of Nations until 1937, by which time this international governing
institution had already lost its credibility. Nevertheless, as part of the law of states and due to
British claims to be the protector of minorities in Egypt, the category of the minority haunted the
new national order after semi-independence. Part of a new global order of nation-states
established at Versailles, Egyptians were conscripted to a new language structuring political
communities the world over. The question, heavily conditioned by both colonial politics and
missionary activity, was not whether but how that language should be translated and activated.
With minority rights excluded from law, the question of how to define the minority and
to whom the term applied remained open. The word aqalliyya, opaque and unclear, remained
available for subjects to claim and disclaim to achieve their own interests. It struck on a
multitude of registers, allowing for complex categorizations of Egypt’s population along a grid
of loyalty with the aim of producing homogeneity. Some minorities were excluded on the basis
of suspicion, while the belonging of Copts, often considered “original Egyptians” who cannot be
tied to any outside nation, was never in question. However, the price paid by Copts for inclusion
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in the nation was, following a secular logic, the confinement of religious minority identification
to the private sphere. While the persistence of communal structures in Egypt, even if no longer
autonomous from the state, has reinforced communal boundaries and identifications, few
avenues have been made available for collective communal politics. This has left already
politicized religious groups feeling wedged, as one British judicial advisor put it, “between the
devil and the deep sea.”84
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By way of conclusion, I would like to return to Murad Farag, the Jewish intellectual, lawyer, and
reformer whom we met in Chapter 2. I described how Farag, embedded within his tradition,
encountered modern colonial conditions to articulate a notion of the common good that was open
and inclusive but ultimately displaced by the secular notion of public interest. In this section, I
would like to briefly analyze a lengthy essay he wrote in 1908 titled “Harb al-Watan” (The
Nation’s Struggle) that was serialized in the journal al-Jarida (The Newspaper), edited by the
prolific Egyptian liberal thinker Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, amid the sectarian crisis described in the
last chapter. In the essay, Farag offered a vision of society wherein no contradiction exists
between the moral subject/community and the citizen of the nation-state. His vision represents an
ephemeral ripple, a moment of anticipation and aspiration, that I contrast with the secular legal
formations described over the last four chapters.
Adapting new ideas of Egyptian nationhood, Farag’s essay represents a break from his
prior writings on social and political themes that have come down to us, most of which derive
from his community reform journal al-Tahdhib (Edification) published in 1902–3.1 Whereas in
his journal Farag had written as a Jew, in this essay, published one year after the founding of the
Watani Party, Farag foregrounded a new Egyptian national identification. Likewise, whereas alTahdhib had been addressed to Farag’s Karaite Jewish community while obliquely contributing
to a broader, intercommunal project of reform, the 1908 essay addressed the Egyptian nation, the
virtues of which Farag extolled. Confronting the challenges faced by the Egyptian nation, Farag
engaged, in a partial way or directly, with the four concepts under study in this dissertation:
religious freedom, public interest, nationality, and the minority. He did so not to advocate and
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disseminate the binaries of secular ideology, but as part of his long-standing effort to contribute
to the construction of a moral society in modern Egypt.
In this way, Farag’s essay is a sign along the road of the secularization of Egyptian
society. Against the growing sectarianism around him, he called for dissolving perceived
obstacles presented by religion to the unification of the nation, which “knows for itself one
homeland” and whose “Egyptian nationality” (al-jinsiyya al-wataniyya), a phrase that had only
recently entered Egypt’s lexicon, prevails over every other affiliation, national or otherwise.2 As
Farag put it, “In order for the national community [al-jam‘iya al-wataniyya] to be a sound
national community [jama‘iya wataniyya sahiha], it is necessary that in its life it remain distant
from all that damages it from the direction of religion.”3 However, in contrast to secular political
ideology, Farag did not seek to confine religion to the private sphere. Rather, he argued that
unifying the national spirit (nafs) required equity in what he termed “public morality” (al-adab
al-‘amma), maintained through the practice of sincerity (al-ikhlas), or continuously identifying
and untangling “unfavorable mutual feelings.”4 Drawing on his own personal experience to
convey his point, Farag invoked the many occasions when a Muslim would greet him in public
with the common Islamic salutation al-salam ‘alaykum (peace be upon you) only to stop midutterance on realizing that Farag was a Jew and switch to the more neutral though less warm
“good afternoon” (naharak sa‘id).5 Similarly, he described how whereas the Muslim press would
note the passing of a Muslim with the prefix al-marhum (“the late,” denoting mercy and
expressing grief), it would note the passing of a non-Muslim with the less elegant al-mu’sif (the
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regrettable).6 Such distinctions, he asserted, while often premised on doctrine, violated religion
because they caused humiliation and pain (idha’) where religion “preserves its strength in
noninjury [‘adam idha’] to others,” exemplified in his view by the Qur’anic injunction “there is
no compulsion in religion” (la ikrah fi al-din). Citing postrevolution Ottoman society as a
paragon of the practice of sincerity between religious groups, with Muslims agreeing to join nonMuslims in commitment to “public morals” (al-adab al-‘amma), Farag contended that Egypt
ought to develop (tataqaddum) along similar lines. While “nothing is greater than people from
all religions and doctrines coming together in friendship to become Egyptians in the true national
sense of the word,” he remarked, “nothing hurts more than moral injury [al-idha’ al-ma‘nawi].”7
For Farag, the main difference between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt was that the
empire enjoyed constitutional rule that Egypt lacked. A constitution, he argued, would serve
Egypt as “a contract of sound partnership between all of us,” overcoming any “estrangement,
hatred, or inequality” in terms of public morality. With a constitution, Egyptians would “take
responsibility on our shoulders and be forced to truly serve the nation by virtue of serving public
interest [al-maslaha] and preventing it from all [moral] injury.”8 Just as Farag criticized Muslims
for not extending the dictates of public morality to non-Muslims, he criticized Christians and
Jews who rejected a constitution out of fear that Muslims, “greater in number and stronger,”
would use it to degrade their status. This stance, he argued, was to put one’s private interest, the
security of one’s “minority” community, ahead of the public interest. Private and public interest
converged in the prevention of harm: “the nation should not hear with its ears or see with its eyes
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anything harmful from the direction of religion.”9 “My words are not directed to one group
without the other,” Farag concluded, “they are directed to all Egyptians, and I am one of them.”
Although Farag embraces liberal-secular concepts in his essay, his articulation of them is
characterized by confluence between inside and outside, individual and collective, morality and
law, public and private. In other words, Farag articulates key secular concepts as an extension of
his long-standing project of moral reform on the individual, communal, and societal levels. His
program was one of radical openness and inclusion, crossing religious divides. It was also one
that, as a participant in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Arab cultural and social
reform movement called the nahda, he shared with other reformers in Egypt of this period. Farag
could not have known that the very concepts he expounded, as they entered the modern legal
system for which he worked and in which he had tremendous faith, would contribute to the
emergence of new forms of exclusion that would mark him and his community as outsiders, even
traitors, to an increasingly sovereign nation.
This dissertation traced how these concepts were initially translated into Arabic and
Egypt during the colonial period, and their shifting significations through the national-colonial
period. Chapter 2 described how religious freedom, initially articulated through a local ethical
vernacular as defense of one’s religion in a context of perceived missionary attacks, was inserted
into Egypt’s expanding public law in the name of a majority-defined public order, rendering
protection of religion a legal issue punishable by law. Unlike prior laws of blasphemy intended
to maintain, bottom-up, a moral community (not unrelated to Farag’s notion of moral injury),
religious freedom was a technology of public order intended to produce and reproduce, topdown, a governable population through the regulation of religion. In Chapter 3, I described how

9

Ibid., 223.
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a secular notion of public interest, which entered Egypt’s criminal law and was linked to national
security, displaced a prior Islamic notion of the public social good focused on conditions for
sustaining a righteous society modeled on an ideal past. Focused on Egyptian Jewry, I showed
how as the Egyptian nation-state took form, secular public interest proved critical to
transforming Jewishness into a private interest that was inherently suspicious, contributing to the
exclusion of Jews from the nation. Chapter 4 described the emergence of the category of the
Egyptian national as part of colonial governance, how local subjects, Egyptian legislators, and
colonial officials deployed it to suit their interests in a complex historical moment, and Egypt’s
implementation of a nationality regime. I focused on how nationality, with its many constituent
categories, politicized religious communities in unprecedented ways, rendering Muslims a
national majority, Copts a minority, and other Christian and Jewish groups part of racialized
nations whose loyalty was not to be trusted. In Chapter 5, I traced how the category of the
minority emerged in Egypt not with semi-independence in 1922, as has been asserted by other
scholars, but amid an earlier sectarian crisis that itself was an outcome of the politicization of
Coptic communities and their demand for collective rights from the state in a time of emergent
nationalism under colonial rule. While in other ways preserving a communal framework for
society, Egyptian legislators decided to exclude minority rights from the 1923 Egyptian
Constitution due to the association of these rights with the colonial violation of sovereignty. As a
result, newly constructed minorities were left without protection and avenues of collective
political participation.
As a whole, the dissertation has argued that, translated into Arabic and Egypt, these
secular-liberal concepts accumulated new significations over time as locally embedded actors—
whether in the courtroom, in colonial offices, in the halls of parliament, or on the streets—
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claimed them to meet an ever-evolving contingent set of needs and desires. Rather than a
teleological story of the “evolution” of concepts into a generic final form, the dissertation has
highlighted ephemeral possibilities overtaken by larger forces, and critical moments that affected
conceptual pathways. As the concepts under study entered into law in the liberal period in often
surprising ways, part and parcel to the construction of the nation-state, they served as critical
technologies of governmentality in the Egyptian state’s effort to produce a governable population
loyal to the nation and obedient to its laws. Increasingly, the Egyptian state came to define
Egypt’s moral and political vocabularies and imaginaries, creating the conditions of possibility
for the homogenization of Egyptian society in the subsequent decades.
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